CALTEX    (PHILIPPINES) INC., SHELL CO., OF THE PHIL. LTD., STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO., PETITIONERS, LAMBERTO SANGUILLOSA, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE, VS. LUIS U. GO, ASSIGNEE-APPELLANT.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo as
an insolvency court (Special Proceedings No. 1403) issued on October 6, 1959, the dispositive
portion of which is as follows:

“As it is now, the claim of Lamberto Sanguillosa has already
become final and executory and, consequently, by virtue of the proof claim
presented by Lamberto Sanguillosa, the said claim of P7,274.52,
plus with legal rate of in­terest from June 11, 1957 up to the date of payment,
plus P727.00 as attorney’s fees, is here­by approved and declared as preferred
claim in accordance with the provisions of the insolvency law and Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 of the new Civil Code.”

On June 11, 1957 Lamberto Sanguillosa, hereinafter referred to as
appellee, at the time a resident of Manila, filed a claim under oath with
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor at Manila for payment of
vacation and sick leave, for underpayment of wages and for overtime
compensation against Lopez and Ledesma Transportation Co., Inc., by whom he had
been employed as Line Inspector for a number of years until he resigned on
February 5, 1975.

On June 22 of the same year the Company filed its answer with
denials and affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim for damages.

Upon the issues arising from the above pleadings, the case was
heard.  On February 21, 1958, after appellee had rested his case, the
Company made of record that it was waving its right to present its own evidence
and announced its intention to file an action for prohibition or certiorari
against the Hearing Officer for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of
the Regional Office to try and decide the case.

Thereafter, the Company filed the action for prohibition, with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, against F. A.
Fuentes, administrator of Regional Office No. 3, Jorge Benedicto, the Hearing
Officer and appellee (Civil Case No. 4753 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo) for the purpose of having Reorganization Plan No. 20-A on Labor and
Rules and Regulations No. 1 promulgated by the Labor Standards Commission
declared unconstitutional.   On May 27, 1958, however, said court
dismissed the action.  No appeal from
this dismissal was taken.

After Regional Office No. 3 had received notice of the dismissal mentioned
above, the Hearing Officer thereof rendered his decision on August 5, 1958
ordering the Company to pay appellee the total sum of P7,274.52,
representing his claim for underpayment and overtime, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the claim, plus the amount of P727.00 as
attorney’s fees.  From this decision, the
Company appealed to the Labor Standards Commission (Case No. LSC-R03-185).  On August
9, 1958 – during the pendency of this appeal – the insolvency
proceedings against the Company were commenced in the lower court.  As a result the appeal proceedings were
suspended as of August 30 of the same year until January 24, 1959 when the Insolvency
Court allowed them to be continued.  The court also allowed the assignee of the insolvent
company, by the name of Luis U. Go, to be substituted in its place.

As the appeal of the Company pending before the Labor Standards
Commission was dismissed on March 24, 1959, appellee filed with the insolvency
court on April 13 of the same year his verified claim or proof of debt as
required by the Insolvency Law, and prayed for its allowance based on the final
judgment of August 5, 1958 rendered by Regional Office No. 3, and to have the
same declared as a preferential claim. 
The motion was opposed by the assignee as well as by two creditors,
namely, The Shell Company of the Philippines
and Caltex (Phil.) Inc., but on October
6, 1959, the Insolvency Court
issued the order appealed from.

In the meantime the Company which had been declared insolvent by
the lower court on August 30, 1958 filed an original petition for certiorari
and mandamus with Us against the Labor Standards Commission and herein
appellee, questioning the legality and constitutionality of the action taken by
said Commission dismissing its appeal from the decision of Regional Office No.
3 of the Department of Labor (G.R. No. L-15732), but said petition was
dismissed on August 5, 1959.

The first two assignment of errors submitted in appellant’s brief
assail the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer of Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor to try and decide LSC Case No. 356 upon the ground,
firstly, that the conferment of judicial powers to said body was
unconstitutional and secondly, that the claimant (Sanguillosa) was not a resident
of Manila but of Navas, Aklan Province. 
The third assails the lower court’s ruling to the effect that the
judgment of the abovementioned regional office and the claim of Sanguillosa had
become final and executory, while in the fourth and last it is claimed that
said court likewise erred in approving Sanguillosa’s claim as a preferred
claim.

 As far as the present case
is concerned, appellant must be deemed in estoppel to assail the
constitutionality of the powers granted to Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, upon the ground that, as stated heretofore, he had
properly raised exactly the same issue in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
in Civil Case No. 4753, which said Court dismissed, said dismissal having
become final and executory.

With respect to appellant’s contention that the aforementioned
regional office sitting in Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of
Sanguillosa because the latter was not a resident of Manila, it appears that
the latter’s petition or claim and the evidence show that, at the time of the
filing of the former, Sanguillosa was a resident of Manila.  Moreover, the issue raised in this connection
is purely a matter of venue, and any error committed in connection therewith
raised at this stage of the proceedings would not constitute a reversible
error.

With respect to the third assignment of error, all that We need
to state after what has been said heretofore is that the decision of Regional
Office No. 3 approving Sanguillosa’s claim was appealed by the Company to the
Labor Standards Commission, who dismissed the same in its order of March 24,
1959 and also denied two motions for reconsideration thereafter filed.  There can be no question, therefore, that the
aforesaid decision had become executory.

Lastly, appellant assails the ruling of the lower court declaring
Sanguillosa’s claim as a preferred claim under the provisions of the Insolvency
Law and Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 of the new Civil Code.  His contention is without merit.

The claim in question is for payment of vacation and sick leave,
for underpayment of wages and for overtime compensation.  Being so, it should be considered as a
preferred claim under Section 50(b) of the Insolvency Law or under either
paragraph 2 or paragraph 14(b) of Article 2244 of the new Civil Code.

Appellant argues, however, that Sanguillosa’s claim does not fall
under the provisions of the Insolvency Law just mentioned because his services
were not rendered during the year prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings against the employer.

Section 50(b) of the Insolvency Law gives preference to debts due
for personal services rendered the insolvent by employees etc. immediately
preceding the commencement of proceedings in insolvency.  This is not the same language used in
paragraph 2 of Article 2244 of the new Civil Code in establishing a preference
in favor of credits for services rendered the insolvent by employees etc. for
one year preceding (without the adverb “immediately”) the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency.  The difference, We
believe is obvious.  Had the framers of
the new Civil Code merely intended to reproduce the provisions of the
Insolvency Law, they could have easily said “for one year immediately
preceding the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency”.  The reason for the omission of the adverb
could only be the desire to broaden the meaning of the law by giving preference
to credits for services rendered the insolvent by employees during any year,
provided it was prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.

Appellant’s last contention is that the claim of Sanguillosa can
not fall under paragraph 14 of Article 2244 of the New Civil Code because it
did not arise from a final judgment of a regular court of justice.  This is also without merit, for in Torres vs.
Llamas (70 Phil., p. 59) this Court considered as preferential a claim arising
from a final award made by commissioners of appraisal.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.

Angeles, J., did not take part.