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QUITERIO HERMO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROSALIO G. DELA ROSA, JUDGE, RTC-BRANCH 28, MANILA, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-897. November 24, 1998 November 24, 1998

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Hermo versus Dela Rosa

The Case

This is an administrative case filed by Quiterio Hermo, a resident of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, against Judge Rosalio G. dela Rosa, then presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Hermo charged the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and malfeasance in the performance of his official duties, arising from the judge's handling of the petition for naturalization of Juan G. Frivaldo, then governor of Sorsogon. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's own reckoning, in a disciplinary proceeding, of the consequences of a judge's disregard of the jurisdictional publication and waiting periods of the naturalization law, and it fixes the boundary between the clerk of court's duty to publish and the judge's personal duty to obey the law he is bound to know.

Procedural History

Hermo complained by letter dated March 16, 1992 to Justice Ernani Cruz Paño, then Court Administrator, attaching a complaint-affidavit outlining the alleged irregularities in the proceedings before the respondent judge. On June 15, 1993, the Supreme Court resolved to hold action on the complaint in abeyance pending the determination of the main case, which was the consolidated challenge to Frivaldo's reacquisition of citizenship and his qualification for the 1992 elections, decided by the Supreme Court on June 6, 1994. On July 26, 1994, Hermo filed an urgent motion to resolve his complaint in view of that decision. On February 18, 1997, the Court referred the administrative case to the Office of the Court Administrator, already under Justice Alfredo Benipayo, for evaluation, report, and recommendation, and the Office submitted its report on April 16, 1997. The administrative case was thus an original administrative matter before the Supreme Court, resolved on the basis of the complaint, the report of the Office of the Court Administrator, and the Court's own prior findings in the naturalization case.

Facts

On September 20, 1991, Juan G. Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization, docketed as Special Proceeding Number 91-58645, heard before the sala of the respondent judge. By order dated October 7, 1991, the respondent judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed publication of the order and the petition in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least six months before the date of hearing. He likewise required posting in a public and conspicuous place in the office of the Clerk of Court. Frivaldo caused publication of the order in the Philippine Star, with the last publication on November 21, 1991.

On January 20, 1992, Frivaldo moved to set the hearing ahead of schedule, because he planned to run in the elections of May 11, 1992 and had to file his certificate of candidacy before March 15, 1992, a day before the scheduled hearing. The respondent judge granted the motion and reset the hearing to February 21, 1992. It does not appear that the order granting the motion was published or posted. On February 27, 1992, the respondent judge rendered his decision granting the petition, and on the same day Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance.

Quiterio Hermo learned of these proceedings when his secretary, Alma Catu, inquired at the office of the branch clerk on March 9, 1992 and was told the hearing had been reset and the case was awaiting resolution. She later discovered that the petition had already been decided in Frivaldo's favor on February 27, 1992, eleven days earlier. Hermo then wrote the Court Administrator, questioning the non-publication of the order in the Official Gazette, the resetting of the hearing to a date within six months from the last publication, the allowance of the petition and of the oath of allegiance on the very day the petition was heard, the oath taken before two years had elapsed from the decision, the absence of the affidavit of two disinterested persons, the grant of the petition despite a libel conviction, and what appeared to be an attempt to cover up the proceedings.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for serious procedural lapses in the naturalization proceedings, specifically for hearing the petition before six months had elapsed from the last publication.
  • Whether or not the respondent judge is liable for allowing the applicant to take his oath of allegiance on the same day the decision was rendered, before the decision had become final and before the two-year waiting period had elapsed.
  • Whether or not the respondent judge may be excused from liability for the failure to publish and post the petition and the order, that duty belonging to the clerk of court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, as quoted in the decision, provides:

No petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation.

This provision fixes the six-month waiting period before hearing and the two-year period before the decision may be executed, both of which the respondent judge disregarded.

Section 2 of the same law, as quoted in the decision, provides:

The applicant may only take his oath of allegiance after the Solicitor General finds that within the period of two years from the date the decision granting citizenship is promulgated, the applicant has not left the Philippines, has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

This provision governs the taking of the oath, which the respondent judge allowed on the very day of the decision, long before the two-year period could run.

Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as described in the report of the Office of the Court Administrator, requires:

A petition for naturalization and the order setting the same for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.

Compliance with this requirement is jurisdictional, so that without it the court acquires no jurisdiction over the petition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the failure to observe the procedure required by law as regards the date of hearing and the granting of the petition is clearly attributable to the respondent judge. It noted that he heard Frivaldo's petition before the lapse of six months from the date the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation, contrary to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530. The Court quoted the provision anew:

No petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge allowed Frivaldo to take his oath of allegiance on the same day the petition was granted, disregarding the requisite two-year waiting period under Section 2 of the same law. It stressed that even discounting the provision of Republic Act No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.

On the third issue, the Court drew a distinction. The duty to publish the petition and to post the same, as well as the general notice of hearing, belongs to the clerk of court, and the failure of the clerk of court to fulfill this duty might not necessarily be imputable to the respondent judge. But the failure to observe the procedure required by law as regards the date of hearing the petition and granting the same is clearly attributable to him. The Court held that observance of the law he is bound to know is required of a judge, and that the procedure he followed is clearly erroneous, precluding any inference that it was due only to some mistake or mere inadvertence.

Doctrine

A judge is bound to know and to observe the law. Errors in the application of clear statutory procedure, so patent that they cannot be attributed to mistake or mere inadvertence, constitute serious procedural lapses for which the judge is administratively liable.

The six-month waiting period under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, counted from the publication of the application, is mandatory; a petition heard before its lapse is heard without jurisdiction. The two-year period before a decision granting citizenship becomes executory, and the requirement under Section 2 that the oath be taken only after the Solicitor General's finding within that period, are equally mandatory; a court cannot implement a naturalization decision before its finality.

The duty to publish the petition and the order and to post the general notice of hearing belongs to the clerk of court, and the clerk's failure may not be imputed to the judge. But the judge personally answers for setting the hearing ahead of the statutory period and for granting the petition and allowing the oath in disregard of the waiting periods.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge liable for serious procedural lapses in the naturalization proceedings and ordered him to pay a fine of 5,000 pesos, to be deducted from benefits previously withheld from him pending the determination of the administrative case.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the duty to publish belongs to the clerk of court, but the duty to observe the six-month and two-year periods belongs to the judge, who is bound to know the law. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional nature of publication under the naturalization law and the administrative liability of a judge for patent procedural lapses.