NAMARCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE EMILIANO TABIGNE OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, RES…

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction filed originally with this Court by
petitioner Namarco Employees and Workers Association, hereinafter
referred to as NEWA for short, to restrain respondent Associate Judge,
Hon. Emiliano C. Tabigne, of the Court of Industrial Relations from
enforcing his second and temporary restraining order dated August 3,
1964, issued in its CIR Case No. 149-Inj., at the instance of private
respondent National Marketing Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
NAMARCO. This Court gave due course to the petition and required
respondents to answer; however, it did not issue the preliminary
injunction prayed for.

As disclosed by the record, the facts are:

On July 8, 1964, herein petitioner NEWA declared a strike against
respondent NAMARCO and established picket lines along the premises of
the principal office and business establishment of the latter, located
at Muelle de la Industria, Binondo, Manila. On July 16, 1964, NAMARCO
filed a charge for unfair labor practice against NEWA before the
Industrial Court, alleging illegality of the strike staged by the
latter. This charge was docketed as CIR Case No. 8-ULP (Annex “B”,
respondent NAMARCO’s answer, record, pp. 59-61). On the same date,
NAMARCO also filed, in accordance with Section 9{d) of Republic Act No.
875, a verified urgent ex-parte petition for injunction to
restrain and enjoin NEWA and its union members from committing alleged
acts of coercion and intimidation in connection with the conduct of
said strike. This petition was docketed as CIR Case No. 149-Inj. (Annex
“A”, NEWA’s petition; record, pp. 11-15), for which the corresponding
summons was served on NEWA on July 21, 1964 (Annex “B”, NEWA’s
petition; record, p. 16). On July 24, 1964, NEWA answered said petition
(Annex “D”, NEWA’s petition; record, pp. 27-30).

In the meantime, the Prosecution Division of the Industrial Court
conducted a preliminary investigation of the unfair labor practice
charge, docketed as CIR Case No. 8-ULP; and on July 18, 1964, its
acting Chief Prosecutor presented a complaint for unfair labor practice
against NEWA before the Industrial Court, which was docketed as CIR
Case No. 4257-ULP (Annex “C”, NAMARCO’s answer; record, pp. 62-66).
Summons on this complaint was served on NEWA on August 5, 1964 (Annex
“1”, petitioner NEWA’s memorandum record, p. 83).

After an ex-parte hearing and reception of evidence on the
petition for injunction, docketed as CIR Case No. 149-Inj., respondent
Judge issued, on July 20, 1964, his first restraining order enjoining
NEWA and its union members from committing certain acts specified in
said order to be effective only for five (5) days from notice to NEWA,
and which order was actually received by the latter on July 22, 1964
(Annex “C”, NEWA’s petition; record, pp. 17-26). NEWA did not question
the validity or propriety of the issuance of the foregoing restraining
order.

On July 30, 1964, NAMARCO filed its second verified urgent ex-parte
petition for the issuance of another restraining order, alleging, among
other things, that on the fifth day of effectivity of the first
restraining order and in open defiance and disobedience of the
authority of the Industrial Court, NEWA, its union members and
sympathizers, unlawfully and illegally, prevented the enforcement of
said order thereby rendering it nugatory and ineffective.

Respondent Judge heard this second petition and allowed NAMARCO to present its evidence ex-parte
in support thereof; and on August 3, 1964, he issued the second
restraining order, to be effective only for five (5) days from receipt
by NEWA, notice of which (order) NEWA received on the same day (Annex
“E”, NEWA’s petition; record, pp. 31-39).

The day following, August 4, 1964, NEWA resorted to this Court on a petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the issuance of the second restraining order.

Two reasons constrain us to deny the present petition for certiorari without considering its merits.

First, it is well settled that only an award, order or decision of the CIR en banc, and not that of any of its Judges, is appealable to this Court (Broce vs.
CIR 106 Phil., 388; 56 Off. Gaz. 7445). Petitioner, therefore, should
have resorted first to the Court of Industrial Relations en banc before
coming to this Court. While, under its rules, a motion for
reconsideration to the full court requires a period for the opposing
party’s answer before the motion may be acted upon, there is no law
prohibiting or divesting the CIR en banc from exercising in
the meantime, and upon proper application, the power to stay or suspend
the enforcement of any order, ruling or decision of any of its trial
judges, pending resolution of the motion to reconsider, where such stay
is imperative to prevent reconsideration from becoming nugatory. This
power is implied in the right of the Industrial Court en banc
to affirm, alter, modify or reverse the orders, rulings or decisions of
any of its trial judges (Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended; Connel
Bros. Co. (Phil.) vs. NLU, G. R. No. L-3631, January 30, 1956; Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department Union, 101 Phil., 257). On this score, failure to present a motion to reconsider before the CIR en banc is fatal to the instant petition.

Second, the petition should be denied because the dispute has
already become moot and academic, it appearing that, on September 4,
1964 (after the case was filed here), the parties entered into a
return-to-work agreement (Annex “A”, respondent NAMARCO’s memorandum;
record, pp. 99-100), thereby ending the strike from which these
incidents arose.

Wherefore, the present petition for certiorari should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. With costs against petitioner NEWA.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.