G.R. No. L-25003. October 23, 1981
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION, AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO DIST…
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case and condemning the
defendants (herein appellants) to pay plaintiff (herein appellee),
the amount of P10,152.42 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the commencement of this action until fully
paid, P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs.
The case commenced when Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the
CFI-Manila against Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when its employees
were prevented from getting their daily supply of newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it
is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of
the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria
Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces,
a first lessee from the aforesaid
company. The premises of the plaintiff is separated
from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. by a concrete and barbed
wire fence with its own entrance and road leading to the national road. This entrance is separate and distinct from
the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.[1]
Plaintiff further alleged
that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for
its printing and publishing business.
The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing plant is taken
from this bodega.
On September
10, 1964, the
employees of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. who are representatives and
members of the defendant union declared a strike against their company.
On October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal
justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its members picketed,
stopped and prohibited plaintiff’s truck from entering the compound to load
newsprint from its bodega. The union
members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees who were in
the truck.
On October 6, 1964,
union members stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel manager,
bodega in-charge and other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in
their bodega.[2]
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to
intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to blockade,
picket or prohibit plaintiff’s truck from getting newsprint in their
bodega. Defendants refused and continued
to refuse to give in to the demands of the plaintiff.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during
the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees from entering
its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus
incurred expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary bodega.
On December 14, 1964,
the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
defendants from:
(a) threatening and
intimidating plaintiff’s executive officers and their representatives, who are
going to its bodega as well as its employees who are getting newsprint from it;
(b) ordering the
defendants and their representatives not to blockade and/or picket the compound
and the gate of the plaintiff;
(c) ordering the
defendants not to stop, prohibit, molest and interfere with the free passage of
the plaintiff in going in and out of
the bodega.
Defendant union moved to
dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. That this case arose out of a labor dispute
involving unfair labor practices and, therefore, the Court of First Instance
where this action was brought has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction since
this case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations;
2. That plaintiff is not the real party in
interest in whose name the present action may be prosecuted in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On the first ground,
defendants argued that the Court of Industrial Relations is vested with the
exclusive power to issue injunctions in labor disputes involving unfair labor
practices and that in the long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to issue an
injunction in any labor dispute particularly when the Court of Industrial
Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over it.
As to the second ground,
defendants argue that the real party in interest in this case is the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. against whom the defendants’ strike and picket
activities were directed and confined, and they point to cases between the real
parties in interest, namely: Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. on one hand and the Permanent Concrete Workers Union on
the other, pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docketed therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge No. 1414-M.C.
Plaintiff Liwayway Publications, Inc. opposed the motion, alleging
that:
1. There
is no employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant;
2. There is no labor dispute between them;
3. Plaintiff’s compound is separate and distinct
from the compound of the company
where the defendants are employed.
Defendants by way of
reply to the abovementioned opposition argued that even if there was no
employer- employee relationship, still the Court of First Instance would have
no jurisdiction to issue an injunction, citing several cases holding that there
could be a labor dispute regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee and that
peaceful picketing is an extension of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution,[3] a fundamental right granted to labor which
cannot be enjoined.
Since plaintiff averred in its complaint that “it is a second sublessee
of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, first lessee from the aforementioned company, defendants
contend that plaintiff has no cause of action against then but against Don
Ramon Roces under the provisions of Article 1654 of
the New Civil Code which obliges the lessor to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract.
On October 22, 1964, the lower court issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction on
the ground that there was no labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant
of which the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance.
On November 16, 1964, the court, on motion of the plaintiff,
declared defendants in default.
Defendants prayed for the lifting of the order of default, which
plaintiff opposed. In the order of
December 16, 1964, the court denied the motion to lift the order of default,
and subsequently defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the court rendered its decision
dated February 16, 1965 which declared permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally the amount of P10,152.42 with interest
thereon at legal rate from the commencement of the action until fully paid,
P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs.
Copy of this decision was received by defendants on July 20, 1965 and
forthwith, defendants filed the notice of appeal on July 26, 1965.
On October 12, 1965, Liwayway Publications, Inc. filed with the Supreme Court a
petition praying that a writ of attachment be issued on any sum of money which
is owing from the company to the union and to other defendants to be used to
satisfy the judgment in its favor should the same be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Defendants filed an opposition to the petition for attachment alleging
that even assuming that there is an amount owing to the union from the company, such would be in the concept of uncollected wages due the
strikers and, therefore, cannot be subject of attachment as provided by Art.
1708 of the New Civil Code that the laborers’ wages shall not be subject to
execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing
and for medical attendance.
The Supreme Court denied
the above petition for attachment but without prejudice to the movant seeking remedy in the Court of First Instance.
The sole issue raised in the instant
appeal is whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction considering
that there was a labor dispute between Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and
appellants for alleged unfair labor practices committed by the former.
The first question that strikes Us to be
of determinative significance is whether or not this case involves or has
arisen out of a labor dispute. If it
does, then with certainty, section 9 of Republic Act 875, the “Industrial
Peace Act”, would apply. If it does
not, then the Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction because it will not partake the
nature of a labor injunction which the lower court has no jurisdiction to
issue.
The record before Us reveals that
appellant union and its members picketed the gate leading to appellee’s bodega.
This gate is about 200 meters from the gate leading to the premises of
the employer of the appellants. Appellee is not in any way related to the striking union except for the fact
that it is the sublessee of a bodega in the company’s
compound. The picketers belonging to the
appellant union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the appellee
from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega, the union
members intimidating and threatening with bodily harm the employees of the appellee who were in the truck. The union members also stopped and prohibited
the general manager, personnel manager including
the man in-charge of the bodega and other employees of the Liwayway
Publications, Inc. from getting newsprint in said bodega. The business of the appellee
is exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag,
Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation
or connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against
their company, much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the
strikers. In such a factual situation,
the query to be resolved is whether the appellee is a
third party or an “innocent by-stander” whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the regular
courts.
At this juncture, it is
well to cite and stress the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the right to
picket. Thus, in the case of Phil.
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, et al.,
L-25878, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 465, 472,
the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, said:
“The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of
a labor dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
constitution. If peacefully carried out,
it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not
without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the
demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related
interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial
connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the
dispute. Thus, the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or ‘innocent bystanders’ if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression
that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists
between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we upheld
a trial court’s injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to
a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union
had a dispute. Although sustained on a
different ground, no connection was found other than their being situated in
the same premises. It is to be noted
that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but
merely regulated. And in one American
case, a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which
the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in
front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other
stores operated by third persons were located.”
The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for
the court’s regulation of the right to picket in the following wise and manner:
“Wellington and Galang are mere ‘innocent bystanders’. They are entitled to seek protection of their
rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the
same. Moreover, PAFLU’s right to peacefully picket METBANK is not
curtailed by the injunctions issued by respondent judge. The picket is merely regulated to protect the
rights of third parties. And the reason
for this is not farfetched. If the law
fails to afford said protection, men will endeavor to safeguard their rights
by their own might, take the law in their own hands, and commit acts which
lead to breaches of the law. This should
not be allowed to happen.”
It may be conceded that
the appellant Union has a labor dispute with the Permanent Concrete Products
company and that the dispute is pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations docketed therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge
No. 1414- M.C. Nonetheless, the rule laid down in the case of National Garment and Textile
Workers’ Union. (PAFLU)
vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag,
et al., G.R. No. L-9104, September 10, 1956, cited by the appellants as authority
holding that “where the Court of Industrial Relations has already acquired
jurisdiction over two unfair labor practices cases and much later on as a
consequence thereof, the Court of First Instance cannot legally issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against the picketers.
Besides, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is
exclusive. (Sec. 5-a, Republic Act
875)” is not controlling, much less applicable to the instant case where
the facts are essentially and materially different.
Neither is the case of SMB Box Factory Workers’ Union vs. Hon. Gustavo Victoriano,
et al., G.R.
No. L-12820, Dec. 29, 1957, where We held that “the Court of First
Instance cannot take cognizance of an action for injunction where the issue
involved is interwoven with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court of
Industrial Relations,” nor the rule laid down in Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger
Employees Association-NATU, G.R. No. L-11907, June 24, 1958, 104 Phil. 17, holding that “even if no
unfair labor practice suit has been filed at all by any of the parties in the
Court of Industrial Relations at the time the present petition for injunction
was filed in the court below, still the latter court would have no jurisdiction
to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for if it is shown to its
satisfaction that the labor dispute arose out of unfair labor practices
committed by any of the parties. The
parties would still have to institute the proper action in the Court of
Industrial Relations, and there ask for a temporary restraining order under sec. 9(d) of the Industrial Peace
Act.”
We cannot agree that the
above rules cited by the appellants are controlling in the instant case for as
We said in Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU),
et al. vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, that “with regard to activities that may
be enjoined, in order to ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue the
injunction, it is necessary to determine the nature of the controversy,”
(underscoring supplied) We find and hold
that there is no connection between the appellee
Liwayway Publications, Inc. and the striking Union,
nor with the company against whom the strikers staged the strike, and neither
are the acts of the driver of the appellee, its
general manager, personnel manager, the man in-charge of the bodega and other
employees of the appellee in reaching the bodega to
obtain newsprint therefrom to feed and supply its
publishing business interwoven with the labor dispute between the striking
Union and the Permanent Concrete Products company. If there is a connection between appellee publishing company and the Permanent Concrete
Products company, it is that both are situated in the
same premises, which can hardly be considered as interwoven with the labor
dispute pending in the Court of Industrial Relations between the strikers and
their employer.
The
contention of appellants that the court erred in denying their motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action, is likewise without
merit.
Article 1654 of the New
Civil Code cited by the appellants in support of their motion to dismiss, which
obliges the lessor, among others, to maintain the
lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract, and therefore, the appellee
publishing company should have brought its complaint against the first sublessee, Don Ramon Roces, and
not against the appellant Union, is not in point. The acts complained of against the
striking union members are properly called mere acts of trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that following the doctrine laid down in Goldstein
vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562, the lessor
shall not be obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of the estate
leased but the lessee shall have a direct action against the trespasser.
The instant case falls
squarely under the provisions of Article 1664 of the New Civil Code which
provides as follows:
“Art. 1664. The lessor is not
obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on
the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against
the intruder.
There is a mere act of trespass when the third person claims no
right whatever.”
The Goldstein
doctrine had been reiterated in Reyes vs. Caltex
(Phil.) Inc., 84 Phil. 654; Lo Ching, et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 81 Phil. 601; Afesa
vs. Ayala y Cia, 89 Phil. 292; Vda. de Villaruel, et
al. vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., et al., 104 Phil. 926; Heirs of B.A. Crumb,
et al. vs. Rodriguez, 105 Phil. 391.
The
obligation of the lessor under Art. 1654, New Civil Code, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract arises only when
acts, termed as legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho), disturb, dispute, object to, or place
difficulties in the way of the lessee’s peaceful enjoyment of the premises that
in some manner or other cast doubt upon the right of the lessor
by virtue of which the lessor himself executed the
lease, in which case the lessor is obliged to answer
for said act of trespass.
The difference between
simple trespass (perturbacion de mero
hecho) and legal trespass (perturbacion
de derecho) is simply but clearly stated in Goldstein
vs. Roces case, supra, thus:
“Briefly, if the act of trespass is not accompanied or preceded by anything which reveals a
really juridic intention on the part of the
trespasser, in such wise that the lessee can only distinguish the material
fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons, we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero
hecho).” (pp. 566-567)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex A, Exhibit H-4.
[2]
Annex C, D, E, F, G and H.
[3]
Art. 3, Sec. 1, Paragraph 8 of the 1935
Constitution provides: “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of
the people to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.”