SOL M. SIPIN, COMPLAINANT, VS­. GLORIA GIRONELLA, RESPONDENT.

Sipin versus Gironella

The Case

This is an administrative case brought by Sol M. Sipin against Gloria Gironella, an employee in the Criminal Section of the Docket Division of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complainant charges the respondent with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and with unlawful failure to pay a just debt. The case matters because it fixes the reach of the administrative offense of wilful failure to pay just debts under the civil service law: the offense is complete once the debtor admits the existence and justness of the debt and fails to pay it, and the pendency of a civil case or an agreement to pay in installments does not bar administrative liability.

Procedural History

The complainant filed a sworn complaint dated January 27, 1982, directly with the Supreme Court, so this is an original administrative proceeding and not an appeal from any court. The complaint was referred to the Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Lorenzo Relova, who submitted a memorandum finding the respondent's liability sufficiently established and recommending suspension from office for fifteen days without pay. The Supreme Court, through its First Division, adopted the recommendation and rendered this decision. Justice Abad Santos dissented, and Justice Concepcion, Junior, joined him.

Facts

On February 1, 1978, the respondent received from the complainant several pieces of jewelry worth 4,900 pesos. The agreement was that the respondent would sell the jewelry for cash and receive a commission if she succeeded, or return the pieces immediately or upon demand.

When the complainant demanded the proceeds of the sale or the return of the jewelry, the respondent promised to return them as soon as possible. About two months passed, and despite repeated demands, the respondent failed and refused to return the jewelry or pay their value. She kept hiding whenever the complainant visited her at home or in her office.

In her counter-affidavit, the respondent admitted the obligation. She claimed that the persons to whom she sold the jewelry on credit failed to pay her, that she and the complainant had agreed before the court that she would pay in installments, and that she had already paid 1,630 pesos, leaving a balance of 3,270 pesos. She insisted she was not wilfully refusing to pay her just debt.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable for wilful failure to pay a just debt.
• Whether or not her claim that her failure to pay was not deliberate, and the pendency of a civil case and an installment agreement, excuse her from administrative liability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 36, paragraph b, item 22 of Presidential Decree Number 807 provides:

(22) Wilful failure to pay just debts.

This is the statutory ground for disciplinary action invoked against the respondent.

Section 19, paragraph n, Rule XVIII, B, of the Civil Service Rules defines the term just debts:

The term just debts shall apply only to: (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law, or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor.

This definition supplies the second element of the offense, and the respondent's admission brings her squarely within it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the respondent administratively liable. Her admission of the existence and justness of her indebtedness, coupled with her failure to pay, is sufficient to establish liability, and no further investigation is necessary. The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Flores versus Tatad, where it said:

With the respondent's admission of the existence and justness of her indebtedness and her failure to pay the same, disciplinary administrative action is proper.

On the second issue, the Court held that her defenses do not excuse her. Her submission that her failure to pay is not deliberate but due to force of circumstances does not exclude her from the scope of the provisions. Neither does the pendency of a civil case for collection bar the administrative suit, because the thrust of the proceeding is directed at conduct unbecoming of a public official. The Court classified the offense as light, calling for a fine or suspension of one day to thirty days, and found the recommended penalty of fifteen days without pay reasonable and fair. Justice Abad Santos dissented, voting for exoneration on the ground that while the debt is just, the failure to pay it is not wilful, since the respondent was in fact paying in installments under her agreement with the complainant.

Doctrine

Wilful failure to pay just debts is an administrative offense under the civil service law, and it has two elements: a just debt, and a failure to pay it. A debt is just only if it is a claim adjudicated by a court of law, or a claim whose existence and justness are admitted by the debtor. Once the debtor admits the debt and fails to pay, administrative liability attaches. The debtor's plea that the failure was not deliberate but due to force of circumstances does not excuse liability, and neither does the pendency of a civil case for collection, because the administrative proceeding is directed at conduct unbecoming of a public official. The offense is classified as light, punishable by a fine or suspension of one day to thirty days.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent liable and suspended her from office for fifteen days without pay for wilful failure to pay just debts.

Remember This

Memorize this line: admission of the existence and justness of the debt plus failure to pay equals administrative liability, and the pendency of a civil case will not bar the administrative suit. Examiners use this case to test the definition of just debts and the rule that a civil obligation can ripen into an administrative offense.