IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FRANCISCO LIM ALIAS ELIS LIM, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APP…

Petitioner, who was born in Bacuit (now El Nido), Palawan,
on October 10, 1939, applied for naturalization. The judgment below
denied his petition. Hence this appeal.

1. The main point of inquiry is: Are petitioners two character witnesses credible within the meaning of the Naturalization Law?

We part with the statement that petitioner lived in
Bacuit (now El Nido), Palawan, with his parents until 1954, when he
transferred to Manila. He took up high school at the Mapua Institute of
Technology and graduated therefrom in 1958. In 1961, he found
employment with the Manila Advertising Company and Acme Mill Supply.

Witness Vicente M. Rodriguez, a supervising nurse in the
Muntinglupa Prisons Hospital, declared that he knew petitioner since
birth; that he was a resident of El Nido from 1924 to 1946, when he
transferred to Muntinglupa, Rizal, where he resides. Witness Bernardo
Dangan’s testimony is that he was a resident of El Nido; but that from
1950 to 1961, he resided in Muntinglupa, Rizal, where he worked first
as bookkeeper then as accountant at the Bureau of Prisons until 1961,
when he retired and returned to El Nido.

Evident is the fact
that, for a long period of time – since 1946 in the case of Rodriguez,
and since 1950 in the case of Dangan – these witnesses were living at a
place (Muntinglupa) far from petitioner’s residence which was El Nido,
and later, Manila. Dangan, it is true, returned to El Nido in 1962; but
by that time petitioner was already in Manila. When, for a long period
of time, witnesses are residents of one place and petitioner of
another, the former unquestionably have no “sufficient background and
basis to vouch for petitioner’s character or to qualify as ‘insurers’
of his good conduct”.^[1] This is specially true here, because Manila or Palawan is far from Muntinglupa.

Petitioner’s witnesses, however, sought to fill the void caused by
separate residences. Rodriguez declared that from 1953 petitioner used
to visit him in Muntinglupa “sometimes once a month, or twice a month”;
that he goes to petitioner’s house “Sometimes once a week, or twice a
month, like that, or once a month”, and stays, “Sometimes a few
minutes, sometimes an hour, like that, or half an hour”; that they also
meet at parties – twice in his house and “about three or four times” in
petitioner’s house; that they meet sometimes at the Luneta. Witness
Dangan’s version, upon the other hand, is that in Manila, he used to
visit petitioner “once a week, sometimes, two times a month”; that
petitioner used to visit him in Muntinglupa; that from 1961 he came to
Manila 4 times a year, one month each time, to buy things for his sari-sari store.

The
versions just recited – assuming them to be true – would not help
petitioner any. At best, they reveal but occasional meetings which
afforded petitioner’s witnesses no ample opportunity to observe
petitioner’s conduct. And yet, witnesses must have personal knowledge
of petitioner’s conduct “during the entire period of.his residence in
the Philippines”.^[2] This is a fact for which an applicant’s witnesses must vouch.^[3]

But
the narrative of witnesses Rodriguez and Dangan in reference to the
so-called “visits” between them and petitioner, strains credulity.
These alleged visits would appear to be out of the ordinary. At the
time of the hearing, petitioner was but 24 years of age, Rodriguez 62,
and Dangan 48. The wide gap in ages suggests that there is not much in
common upon which social contacts between petitioner and his witnesses
could rest. Appropriately, the trial court remarked:

“***
Moreover, it is very doubtful if these-witnesses had really visited the
petitioner as often as they did, considering the disparity in their
ages. There was no common interest between them which would warrant the
alleged frequent visits of the petitioner to his character witnesses
and vice-versa.”

But if the foregoing were not yet
sufficient, let us take a look at the evidence given by witness Dangan
on other matters. He declared that petitioner’s father is Lim Kim. This is not correct – the true name of petitioner’s father is Lim Te. Culled from another portion of the transcript is the following, also of vdtness Dangan:

“Q
– How do you know that the petitioner has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen?
A – He is more than 21 years of age.

Q – I am asking you how do you know that the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino
citizen. Did you read the revised Naturalization Law?
A – No, sir.” y^[4]

This
admission is quite revealing. Dangan certainly does not rise to the
level of a credible witness. For, when one has no knowledge of the
qualifications and disqualifications to become a citizen of this
Republic, as witness Dangan has displayed, he can hardly be qualified
to testify on the subject with respect to the petitioner.^[5]

At all events, the evidence heretofore recited epitomizes the fact that
very little do petitioner’s witnesses know about his (petitioner’s)
character, behavior and moral fitness, and his other qualifications to
become a citizen. At best, their knowledge of petitioner is but
superficial, not intimate.^[6]

On this score alone, petitioner’s application for naturalization was correctly denied.

2. Naturalization proceedings involve public interest. In consequence, the entire record is open to scrutiny.^[7] We thus approach the case from another angle. And we reach the same result.

At the time of petitioner’s application for naturalization, hia income – the first
he ever reported – was a monthly salary of P240.00, with commissions of
P3,755.01 per annum. Commissions do not figure in reckoning income
because they are contingent, speculative.^[8]
For purposes of naturalization, his income is but P240.00 a month. By
judicial standard, this income is below the level of the lucrative
within the meaning of Section 2, Fourth, of the Naturalization Law,
having in mind the high cost of living and the low purchasing power of
the peso.^[9]

Upon the record as we read it, the appealed judgment should be, as it is, hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C. J., Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

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^[1]
Sy Pifiero vs. Republic, 1-17399, October 30, 1962. See also: Sheng vs.
Republic, L-13496, April 27, 1960; Serwani vs. Republic, L-18219,
December 27, 1963; Manuel de Lara vs. Republic, L-18203, May 29, 1964; Pio de Lar vs. Republic, L-18204, May 29, 1964.

^[2] Uy Tian vs. Republic, L-1991S, July 30, 1965.

^[3] Manuel de Lara vs. Republic, supra.

^[4] Tr., November 15, 1963, p. 21.

^[5] Cf. Ong Ling Chuan vs. Republic, L-18550, February 28, 1964.

^[6] Cuaki Tan Si vs. Republic, L-18006, October 31, 1962; Ngo vs. Republic, 1-18319, Kay 31, 1963; Tse vs. Republic, L-19642, November 9, 1964; Uy vs. Republic, L-19578, October 27, 1964; Saw Cen vs. Republic, L-20310, April 30, 1965; Tan Sang vs. Republic, L-19914, June 23, 1965; Yu Tiu vs. Republic, L-19844, June 30, 1965.

^[7] Kwan Kwock How vs. Republic, L-18521, January 30, 1964; Tio Tek Chai vs. Republic, L-19112, October 30, 1964; Cheng vs. Republic, L-2OO13, March 30, 1965; Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, L-20151, March 31, 1965; Lee vs. Republic, L-20148, April 30, 1965.

^[8] Ong Tai vs. Republic, L-19418, December 23, 1964; Tochip vs. Republic, L-19637, February 26, 1965; Ong So vs. Republic, L-20145, June 30, 1965.

^[9]
In the following cases, income of an applicant for naturalization who
is single – as is the petitioner – was held insufficient: F3,600.00 a
year, Uy vs. Republic, L-20208, June 30, 1965; P3.000.00 a year, aside from bonuses and allowances, Tan vs. Republic, L-19694, March 30, 1965.