BENJAMIN DIHIANSAN, LOURDES LARGOZA AND RAMON KING, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSE SERRANO, RESPONDENTS.

The Court dismisses the petition and affirms the questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals which found no reversible error in the
judgment of the trial court.^[1]
Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and the Supreme Court, subject to certain recognized
exceptions which have no application here.^[2]
In reviews on certiorari the
Court addresses only the questions of law, since it is not its function to
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again (which has already been done by
the trial court as the trier of facts and the
appellate court as the reviewer of facts) and its jurisdiction is confined to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under
review.

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are stated
as follows:

“Plaintiff [herein respondent Jose Serrano] is the
registered owner of a parcel of land along Ateneo Avenue, Naga City.  Sometime
in 1966, the Archbishop of Caceres, a corporation sole, signified the intention of
donating to the city of Naga, portions of land which it owned on both
sides of the Ateneo Avenue in order to widen the road.  As
the donation did not materialize, the Archbishop offered to sell the land to
adjoining owners of properties
fronting both sides of Ateneo Avenue.  Among the said adjacent owners
was the plaintiff.  The property abutting
his land was priced at P2,500.

“Upon knowing of
plaintiff’s preferential right to purchase said property, defendant Benjamin Dihiansan, then an employee of the Riconada
Electric Company where plaintiff was the Treasurer, requested the latter to allow him to purchase the
disputed property subject to certain conditions.  Plaintiff agreed.

“On February
3, 1967, defendant Dihiansan executed a
contract in plaintiff’s favor obligating himself to re-sell the disputed property at the same price of P2,500 (Exhibit
‘A’).  In the same contract, defendant Dihiansan bound
himself not to sub-lease the
property to any other person or entity while plaintiff had not yet re-purchased
it.  (Exhibit ‘A-2’)

“On the same date of February 3, 1967, in another document signed in the presence
of the Archbishop of Caceres, defendant further
obligated himself to pay to plaintiff a
monthly ‘honorarium’ of P20.00 starting March 31, 1967 until plaintiff ‘purchased the lot at the Ateneo Avenue.’ (Exhibit ‘B’)

“On May 2, 1970,
after several verbal demands had
failed, plaintiff exacted in writing that Dihiansan re-sell the property to him.  Dihiansan refused.

“On
August 26, 1971, plaintiff took
the matter to court.  It was upon reading the Answer that plaintiff
came to know that Dihiansan had sold the disputed property to Ramon King for P4,500.00. 
Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint, impleading said Ramon King as a party defendant.

“In his Answer,
defendant Dihiansan contended that he had acquired
the litigated property on October 20, 1966, or prior to the execution of
Exhibit ‘A’ without any conditions; that said Exhibit ‘A’ was executed without
the knowledge and consent of his wife, defendant Lourdes Largoza; that Exhibit ‘B’ wherein he obligated himself to
pay a monthly honorarium to plaintiff, is void ab
initio for being devoid of any
consideration; that the land described in Exhibit ‘A’, with an area of 100
square meters, is different from that described in the complaint with an area
of 150 square meters; that he is no longer the owner of the land in dispute,
having sold the same on June 20, 1969 to Ramon King.  In his counterclaim, Dihiansan
averred that he had offered the property for sale to plaintiff but the latter
refused to purchase it for P3,750, which was the price he
(defendant) had paid for it, for which reason, he sold it to Ramon King for
P4,500.00.

“For his part, defendant Ramon King contended that he is the
absolute owner of the disputed land, having purchased it in good faith and for value in 1969, and counterclaimed for
moral, actual, and exemplary damages.

“After plaintiff had rested his case, both defendants waived
the presentation of testimonial evidence. 
Defendant King presented the Absolute Deed of Sale in his favor (Exhibit
‘1’-King), and upon request of his counsel, was given time within which to file
a Motion to Dismiss, but as the same was not forthcoming, the trial court
deemed the case submitted for decision.

“In the dispositive part of its judgment, the Court a quo decreed:

‘WHEREFORE, the preponderance of evidence having been shown to favor the plaintiff, the Court finds and so holds that the defendant
Benjamin Dihiansan has not complied with the
obligation imposed upon him by the contract Exhibit A which is valid and
binding upon him.  He has sold the
property to his co-defendant in bad faith and has thus conferred no title to
the purchaser of the land, his co-defendant Ramon King.  Consequently, the deed of conveyance, Exhibit
1-King, is hereby declared null, void and of no effect.

‘Defendant Benjamin Dihiansan is likewise directed to pay unto
plaintiff P20.00 a month representing defaulted payments from May, 1960 [should be 1969] until the same is fully paid
plus the sum of P1,000.00 in damages as well as attorney’s fees in the sum of
P800.00, and the costs.”^[3]

The foregoing judgment of
the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals which declared that “finding no reversible error in
the judgment appealed from, we hereby affirm the same with costs against
defendants-appellants.” Hence, this petition.

We affirm on the strength of controlling and established jurisprudence “that this Court decides
appeals which only involve
questions of law and that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court.”^[4]

Petitioners’ allegation
that Exhibit “A” is null and void for lack of cause or consideration
is untenable.  The consideration as found
by the lower court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals is private respondent’s preferential right to buy the
property in question from the owner.  The
contract Exhibit “A” clearly stipulates that petitioner Dihiansan shall re-sell the disputed property to private
respondent.  The contract is the law
between the parties.  When the words of a
contract are plain and readily understandable, there is no room for construction. 
As the parties’ agreement are reduced in writing (Exhibit
“A”), the rule applies that their agreement is to be “considered
as containing all such terms and there can be between the parties and their
successors-in-interest no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing.”^[5]

Petitioners’ contention
that the amended complaint below contains no allegation of fraud or bad faith
whatsoever relative to the sale of the disputed property and that there is no
testimony on record that the sale was effected in bad faith is likewise untenable.  Fraud
has been established.  As the
trial court stated:  “The defendant
King did not choose to offer
evidence.  He merely affirmed the
plaintiff’s contention that his
co-defendant Benjamin Dihiansan sold to him in bad
faith the land in question (Exhibit 1-King) for P4,500.00.  The sale is yet incomplete and full title did
not, as yet, pass to him.  It does not
appear that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1-King) is registered.  It is very elementary in land registration
and in dealing with registered lands that the final culminating act to complete
the alienation or sale is the registration of the document of sale.  Exhibit 1 does not show such fact.  At most, it merely shows that Benjamin Dihiansan received from his co-defendant Ramon King the sum
of P4,500.00.  It did not bind the
land.”^[6]
The finding of fraud in this case was a finding of fact and there are no
factors which can justify a reversal thereof. 
We apply the
“fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the
trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed
unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case.”^[7]
None of the recognized exceptions to the rule has been shown to apply in this
case.

The identity of the
disputed property has been clearly established by both parties’ pleadings in
the lower court.  We take particular
attention in petitioner Dihiansan’s admission in his
answer to the allegation in paragraph 6 of private respondent’s complaint which
shows that petitioner Dihiansan admits the identity
of the disputed land.  The mistake
in designating the lot in the document “does not vitiate the consent of
the parties, or affect the
validity and binding effect of the contract. 
The reason is that when one
sells or buys real property — a piece of land, for example — one sells or
buys the property as he sees it, in its actual setting and by its physical
metes and bounds, and not by the mere lot number assigned to it in the
certificate of title.”^[8] The Court of Appeals thus correctly held
regarding this assigned error:

“The second assigned error must also fail.  It is apparent from Dihiansan’s
answer that he has assumed inconsistent positions.  While in paragraph 3 thereof he expressly
alleges that the land described in the contract, Exhibit ‘A’, and that in the
complaint are different, in paragraph 1 thereof he asserts that the land
described in the complaint was purchased by them without any conditions
attached to its acquisition; and in paragraph 4, that the land had already been
sold to defendant King.  In his counterclaim,
Dihiansan also avers that the ‘lot mentioned in
paragraph 6 of plaintiff’s complaint’ was first offered for sale to plaintiff
but was finally sold to defendant King
upon failure of plaintiff to purchase the same. 
In other words, Dihiansan unwittingly admits
the identity of the disputed property despite his protestation to the
contrary.  Besides, instead of proving
that they had purchased a parcel of land different from that described in the
complaint, or that appearing in Exhibit ‘A’, Dihiansan
chose to remain silent and allowed plaintiff to present his evidence without controverting the same by adequate and satisfactory
proof.”^[9]

As to the allegation of
petitioners that the land subject of Exhibit “A” does not fall under the purview of Article 1622 of the Civil Code (on the right of preemption or
redemption by adjoining owner(s) of small urban land which cannot be used for
any practical purpose), we hold that this is a question of fact which should have been raised in the
lower court.  Petitioners waived their
right to present testimonial evidence in the lower court.  They chose to remain silent.  Consequently, they are now barred from
raising said issue for the first time in this Court.  “It us a well-settled rule that, except
questions on jurisdiction no question will be entertained on appeal unless it
has been raised in the court below and it
is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings.”^[10]

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. 
With costs against petitioners.

Narvasa, Cruz, Paras,
and Gancayco,
JJ., concur.

* Eighth Division then composed of
Melencio-Herrera, ponente, Relova and
Gopengco, JJ.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 7174 of the CFI of Camarines Sur at Naga City, then presided
by Judge Rafael de la Cruz.

^[2]
See Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514, 518.

^[3]
Pp 22-24, rollo.

^[4]
Conde vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 144 at page 149, citing Baniqued vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 596,
601.

^[5]
Siasat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 139
SCRA 238 at page 246.

^[6]
Record on Appeal, p. 44.

^[7]
Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 365 at page 381.

^[8]
Atilano vs. Atilano,
28 SCRA 231, pp. 234-235.

^[9]
Page 26, rollo.

^[10]
Cordero vs. Cabral, 123 SCRA 532, at page 543.