THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIANO ESTEBAN Y MOLINA AND LUIS CAMAYA Y ROCHA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Esteban

The Case

This is a review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, convicting Mariano Esteban and Luis Camaya of murder and frustrated murder. The People of the Philippines, through the fiscal's office, charged the two accused in connection with a nighttime shooting that killed Maria Pascua and seriously wounded Antonio Maravilla. The case matters because it illustrates the application of the rules on treachery, dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the victim, and the constitutional requirement that guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt — particularly where one co-accused is acquitted for lack of credible identification while the other is convicted on the strength of res gestae declarations.

Procedural History

The case began when the Pasay City fiscal's office filed two informations with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch. The first charged murder for the killing of Maria Pascua, and the second charged frustrated murder for the assault on Antonio Maravilla. The two cases were tried jointly. In October 1966, the trial court convicted both accused of murder and frustrated murder, sentencing them to death for the murder and to a straight penalty of seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal for the frustrated murder. The accused appealed, and the case came before the Supreme Court for automatic review of the death penalty.

Facts

In 1963, several persons resided near Protacio Street Extension and Gamban Street in Pasay City, including Antonio Maravilla, his common-law wife Loreta Alega, Mariano Esteban, Tomas Ablola, and the spouses Maria Pascua and Apolonio Lozano. Sometime in 1961, the husband of Loreta Alega was killed, and four persons, including Esteban, Ablola, and Camaya, were implicated. The case was compromised, with the four accused agreeing to pay Loreta fifteen hundred pesos as settlement.

On May 1, 1963, at about three in the afternoon, Maravilla and Loreta went to Camaya's house to collect the balance of forty-seven pesos still due on the compromise settlement. An altercation ensued, and Camaya said Esteban would advance the payment. That evening at about six-thirty, Maravilla went to Esteban's house to collect the balance, and Esteban promised to pay twenty pesos the next day. Maravilla reminded Esteban that the criminal case was only provisionally dismissed and that nonpayment might prejudice him. At about eleven o'clock that night, while Maravilla and six companions were singing in the yard of Maria Pascua's house, successive gunshots were fired at the group. Maravilla stood up, looked over the partition, and saw three men about to leave, two of whom were Esteban and Ablola, with Ablola holding an automatic rifle. Maravilla realized he had been wounded in the shoulder and below the nape. Maria Pascua, sleeping inside the house, was mortally wounded in the head. Maravilla was brought to the hospital, where he gave a dying declaration identifying Esteban and Ablola as his assailants. A paraffin test on Esteban's hands proved positive for nitrate specks. More than six months later, Maravilla identified Camaya as one of the companions of Esteban on the night of the shooting.

Issues

• Whether or not the guilt of Luis Camaya was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the guilt of Mariano Esteban was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not Esteban is liable for murder for the killing of Maria Pascua even though he intended to kill Maravilla.
• Whether or not Esteban is entitled to an indeterminate sentence for the frustrated murder of Maravilla.

Applicable Provisions

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

This provision governs the liability of Esteban for the death of Maria Pascua, which occurred while he intended to kill Maravilla.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as it then stood, defined murder and prescribed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction for murder qualified by treachery.

Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the rules for the application of penalties, which the Court applied in determining the penalty for the frustrated murder.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court acquitted Camaya. The only eyewitness to the shooting was Maravilla, and he did not implicate Camaya in his res gestae declarations made immediately after the shooting. It was only more than six months later that Maravilla implicated Camaya. The Court found this belated denunciation lacking in spontaneity and bearing the earmarks of an afterthought or frameup. The Court quoted the principle from Las Siete Partidas: it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.

On the second issue, the Court affirmed Esteban's conviction. Maravilla sufficiently identified Esteban in his res gestae declarations as one of the three assailants. The paraffin test proved that Esteban fired a gun shortly before his arrest. The Court rejected the defense counsel's contentions that Maravilla could not have identified Esteban because of the height of the partition, noting that Maravilla was six feet one inch tall while the partition was only five feet ten inches. The Court also rejected the claim that Maravilla was too intoxicated to recognize his assailants, noting that he retained sufficient consciousness to articulate intelligently what was in his mind.

On the third issue, the Court held that Esteban is liable for murder for the killing of Maria Pascua. The Court applied Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

The Court explained that this rule covers aberratio ictus, or mistake as to the victim. The killing of Maria Pascua was murder qualified by treachery, which absorbs nocturnity, and dwelling was appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Esteban is entitled to an indeterminate sentence for the frustrated murder. The trial court erred in imposing a straight penalty. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from reclusion temporal minimum, and the minimum from the range of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, since no generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present.

Doctrine

A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended, under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This rule covers aberratio ictus, or mistake as to the victim, so that one who intends to kill a particular person but kills another instead is still liable for the resulting death. A res gestae declaration made immediately after a shooting, identifying the assailants, is admissible and credible evidence. A belated identification made more than six months after the incident, lacking spontaneity, may be rejected as an afterthought or frameup. The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and where the evidence is inconclusive, the accused must be acquitted.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of Luis Camaya and acquitted him on the ground of reasonable doubt, affirmed the conviction of Mariano Esteban for murder with the indemnity increased to twelve thousand pesos, commuted the death penalty to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes, and sentenced Esteban to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years of reclusion temporal as maximum for the frustrated murder, with an indemnity of ten thousand pesos to Antonio Maravilla.

Remember This

Memorize the rule that aberratio ictus does not exempt an accused from criminal liability for the unintended victim's death under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between a credible res gestae identification and a belated, non-spontaneous denunciation that fails the test of moral certainty.