CARL DACTIL DC. DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. GERMAN L. PENARANDA AND HON. MARIA FLORENCIA B. FORMES-BACULO AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 34, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CALAMBA CITY, RES…
CARANDANG, J.:
Petitioner likewise assails the trial court’s Order[3] dated March 18, 2013 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On March 04, 2012, at around 1:30 in the morning, victim Ray Bernard Reyes Peñaranda (or Ray) was held up along F.O. Santos St., Barangay Batong Malake, Los Baños, Laguna. His Boller type wristwatch was not only taken from him but he was also stabbed by the robbers causing his immediate death.
On April 18, 2012, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against petitioner Carl Dactil de Guzman (or de Guzman) and two other co-accused, Joseph V. Beltran (or Beltran) and Tyronne Kennedy M. Terbio (or Terbio). The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 34, docketed as RTC Crim. Case No. 19120-12-C.
De Guzman was implicated in this case on the basis of the sworn statements given by Myrhen Kaye Jamo (or Myrhen) and Reywilson Vizconde (or Reywilson), the victim’s companions, when the robbery happened and the extra-judicial confession dated March 6, 2012 of co-accused, Joseph Vellila Beltran. Detailing the respective participation of the robbers, Beltran stated that he acted only as look-out while De Guzman was the driver of the motorbike with Terbio as the backrider and the knife-wielder. The three accused were later arrested. Petitioner De Guzman is detained at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Los Baños, Laguna.
Being charged of a non-bailable offense, De Guzman filed on May 3, 2012 a Petition to Post Bail[4] claiming that the evidence of the prosecution is not strong to deny him his constitutional right to bail. He claims that there is no direct and strong evidence pointing to him as one of the perpetrators. The sworn statements executed by Reywilson, who is a minor, should not be admitted because it was done without the assistance of his parent/guardian. Likewise, Reywilson’s identification of him through photograph is questionable, done by a minor who just witnessed a brutal killing. De Guzman denied that he personally knew Beltran.
During the hearing of his petition, the prosecution presented Gemar Coliao [or Gemar] who was allegedly caught in a CCTV camera as the one sitting in front of the eatery located along F.O. Santos St., Barangay Batong Malake, Los Baños, Laguna when the robbery happened.
He testified that while seated in front of the eatery, he noticed a motorbike with two passengers on board pass by the street three times. He recognized the driver of the motorbike and identified him in court as accused de Guzman. He likewise noticed two students running inside the eatery. A moment later, another student arrived and immediately sat down in front of him because of injuries he sustained on his chest. Somebody called a tricycle and brought the injured student to the hospital. Gemar learned from the two students who first went inside the eatery that the injured person was their companion and a victim of a holdup. He admitted that he did not witness the actual holdup.
Giving weight to the 1] sworn statements of Reywilson and Myrhen, 2] extra-judicial confession of co-accused Beltran and 3] the testimony of Gemar, who all positively identified petitioner De Guzman as the driver of the motorbike and one of the perpetrators, and, finding that it is not physically impossible for the petitioner to be at the scene of the crime, the trial court denied his petition for bail. It ruled:
“The Court finds that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong on several points: first, very telling is the positive identification of accused de Guzman by his co-accused Beltran; second, there is positive identification of accused de Guzman by Reywilson and prosecution witness Gemar; and, third, the assertion that accused de Guzman was in Siniloan, Laguna in the evening of March 3, 2012 does not preclude him to be in Los Baños, Laguna in the early dawn of March 4, 2013 and be back in Siniloan in the early morning of the same day.”
His motion for reconsideration was denied. Imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in denying his petition for bail, he filed this petition.
Petitioner avers that the trial court cannot rely on the affidavits of Myrhen, Reywilson and Beltran because these are hearsay evidence as the affiants were not presented in court. Since they did not testify in court, petitioner was not given any opportunity to cross-examine them. Petitioner insists that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong should have been based solely on the testimony given by Gemar without giving weight to the sworn statements of Myrhen, Reywilson and Beltran. As to the testimony of Gemar, it did not establish anything against him because Gemar did not even witness the actual robbery-hold up incident. Gemar did not categorically state and prove that petitioner is involved in the robbery and killing of the victim. He merely stated that De Guzman was the driver of the motorbike he noticed passing by three times.
On the otherhand, Private respondent explains in his Comment[5] that at the hearing held on December 14, 2012 in connection with petitioner’s application for bail, petitioner’s counsel did not object to the Manifestation of the private prosecutor that the documents on file shall be considered in the resolution of the application for bail. Private respondent’s counsel made a lengthy recital of the documents on file including the sworn statements of Myrhen and Reywilson and extra-judicial confession of Beltran. At that point, petitioner through his counsel, did not object to the inclusion of the sworn statements because had he done so, prosecution could have continued with the examination of its other witnesses.
The petition is without merit.
Once an application for bail is filed, the duties of the judge are as follows:
1] In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended);
2] Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless or whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id);
3] Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4] If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id); otherwise, the petition should be denied.[6]
As to the conduct of hearing when admission to bail is a matter of discretion, there is compliance. Petitioner assails how the court appreciated the evidence of the prosecution, arguing that the sworn statements of Myrhen and Reywilson and the extra-judicial confession of Beltran should not have been considered and relied upon by the trial court for being hearsay since the affiants were not presented in court. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion denying his admission to bail on the basis of these hearsay evidence.
WE DISAGREE.
The questioned sworn statements and extra-judicial confession are part of the records of the case and offered as prosecution’s evidence to prove that the guilt of the petitioner is strong for the purposes of petitioner’s non-admission to bail. Petitioner did not object when these documents were offered. In fact, during the hearing conducted by the trial court, there was no objection on the part of accused De Guzman that the petition for bail will be decided on the basis of the documents on record.
Petitioner’s argument that these pieces of evidence are hearsay is misplaced. The 1946 case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe[7] cited by the petitioner is not squarely applicable in the present case. In the Ocampo case, the presentation of evidence of the special prosecutor who merely recited the contents of an affidavit which has no reference to the crime charged and further stated that he had 27 more affidavits was objected to; and, despite such objection, the lower court still denied the application for bail. In the present case, after the presentation of the testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness Gemar, petitioner did not object to the inclusion of the documents on file in the resolution of his petition. Besides, in Ocampo case, the Highest Court did not make a categorical statement that a mere affidavit is not without evidentiary value. What the High Court said is:
“Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases of Baylon vs. Sison[8] and Basco vs. Judge Rapatalo[9] and Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals,[10] having different factual settings, are likewise not applicable in the present case. In the cases of Baylon and Basco, a hearing was not conducted before granting the petition for bail. The issue in Paderanga is whether or not the accused was already in the custody of the law before he filed his motion for admission to bail, an issue totally not related to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of substance and merit.
SO ORDERED.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Gonzales-Sison and Sorongon, JJ., concur.
[1] Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[2] Rollo, pp. 207-217
[3] Rollo, pp. 232-233
[4] Rollo, pp. 120-122
[5] Rollo, pp. 69-71
[6] Atty. Gacal vs. Judge Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 [Formerly A.M. No. IPI No. 03-1831-RTJ], October 05, 2011; Cortez vs. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-138, September 10, 1997; Basco vs. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5. 1997
[7] 77 Phil 55
[8] A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995
[9] A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997
[10] G.R. No. 115497, August 28, 1995