ISABELO ASTRAQUILLO AND JUANITA J. ASTRAQUILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. PRIMITIVO JAVIER, AMPARO S. JAVIER, COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NICASIO YATCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT…

Petitioners-spouses Isabelo and Juan Ha Astraquillo prosecuted before this Court the instant
petition to review on certiorari a resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special
Fourth Division), in its CA-G. R. No. 30249-R, which, upon motion for
reconsideration of respondents-spouses Primitivo and
Amparo Javier (defendants-appellees below), reversed its original decision granting
herein petitioners’ petition for certiorari, and upheld a special order of
execution of the decision pending appeal issued by respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch V) in its Civil Case No. Q-2276.

After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch V) had
rendered a decision in its case No. 2276, dated 23 August 1961, the dispositive portion of which read as follows:

“In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in this
case in favor of the defendants Primitivo Javier and
Amparo S. Javier and against the plaintiffs Isabelo Astraquillo and Juanita J.
Astraquillo, as follows:

(a) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;

(b) Declaring the real estate mortgage marked in evidence in this case as
Exhibit K or K-l, inexistent and void;

(c)   Ordering the plaintiffs to vacate the premises in question and
surrender possession thereof to the defendants;

(d)   Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P250.00 in the
form of rentals from April 1956 up to the time the possession of the premises in
question is surrendered to the defendants;

(e)   Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P200.00 a
month from September, 1956 until the possession of the Premises in question is
delivered to the defendants, by way of actual damages;

(f) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P2,240.00 which
the former received from Patrocino Evalle but was not turned over to the latter;

(g) Ordering the plaintiff’s to pay the defendants the sum of P2.789.48 which
the plaintiffs received from the PHHC by way of condonation of delinquency interests and which was not
turned over to the defendants;                                                 
                             

All the foregoing to bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of the filing of the complaint, until fully paid; and

(h) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P5.000.00 as
moral damages;

(i) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants,
the sum of P2,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

(j) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P3.000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and

(k) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

As above stated, the plaintiffs are entitled to be reimbursed in the sum of
P19.587.2G and P12.464.24. It is understood, however, that these amount should
be reimbursed to the plaintiffs after they have surrendered the possession of
the premises in question to the defendants and the same to be deducted from the
respective amounts to be paid by said plaintiffs to the defendants.”

From the unfavorable decision, plaintiffs Astraquillo filed on 27 September 1961 their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and
record on appeal. Upon defendants’ objection to the approval of said record on
the ground that it was incomplete and defective, the plaintiffs were ordered by
the trial court to amend the same to conform to said opposition. Plaintiffs
submitted their amended record on appeal, and set it for approval on 11 October 1961, which was later
reset for 28 October 1961.
In the meantime, defendants Javier filed on 10 October 1961 their motion for execution pending appeal
based on the alleged insolvency of the plaintiffs, which motion was amended on
25 October 1961
substantially alleging the same ground. Plaintiffs opposed said motion.

On 28 October 1961, the
trial court granted defendants’ motion and issued an order which we deem
pertinent o quote hereunder because it discusses the respective contentions of
the parties relative to the disputed issue in the present petition. Said order
reads:

“Before the Court for resolution is an Amended Motion for Execution Fending
Appeal, dated October 25, IDG I, filed by counsel for the defendants. Counsel
for the plaintiffs filed an opposition on October 28, 1961.

“The special reasons set forth in the instant motion is that, plaintiffs in
this case are insolvent. To substantiate their claims, defendants allege that :
(a) as early as March 1955, the PHUC had attempted to eject plaintiffs from the
property in question for nonpayment of the installments due thereon, which
attempt was not carried out only because defendants stepped in and paid the
balance due to said PHHC; (6) plaintiffs Isjbelo Astraquillo himself admitted on the witness stand that he
was in need of funds; that (c) plaintiffs’ gross income for the year 1059
amounted to only P4,400.00 of which sum Pl,500.00 was the total income of
plaintiff Isabelo Astraquillo, while the balance was the salary of plaintiff
Juanita J. Astraquillo from her teaching position.

“The main argument advanced by the plaintiff in support of their opposition
to the issuance of the writ of execution prayed for herein by the defendant is
that, ‘the mere allegation that plaintiffs are insolvent without the
corresponding finding of proof to that effect is not special or good reason that
will justify the issuance of execution pending appeal. Plaintiffs further
contend that the discretion of the trial court in issuing an immediate execution
is to be reckoned from the circumstances obtaining after the decision has been
rendered and not from the circumstances that took place during the period of
trial.

“Needless to state in this connection, that among other things, the
plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants the sum of P250.00 in the form of
rentals from April 1956 up to the time possession of the premises in question is
surrendered to the defendant. Apparently, as to this date, the total of the
accrued rentals amounts to some P16,000.00 more or less. As the years go by
pending appeal of this case, the accrued rentals would gradually increase as a
matter of course, and there are strong indications, as pointed to by the
defendants, that plaintiffs are not in a position to pay the same. Should it be
the case, as there are well founded reasons to believe that it would be, such
circumstances would undoubtedly render the decision nugatory. This to the Court,
is sufficient reason to justify the issuance of the writ of execution prayed
for.

“In fine the primordial reason that impels the Court to grant the motion of
defendants is because, plaintiffs arc insolvent. If they were not in such
situation or if they are now better off than they were during the pendency of this case for trial, said plaintiffs have no
proof on that score.

Wherefore, for the special reasons set forth above, the Court orders the
issuance of a writ of execution in this case pending appeal, unless the
plaintiffs file a supersedeas bond in the sum of
P20,000.00 within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order.. It is
understood that if after the period of ten (10) days as aforestated, plaintiffs have not filed the supersedeas bond, the Clerk of Court is directed to issue
the writ of execution in this case pending appeal. Counsel for both parties
notified hereof in open court.”

Plaintiffs filed on 28 November 1961 a motion to reconsider the above-quoted
order which the trial court denied on 2 December 1961, and for failure to post
the supersedeas bond required in the same order trial
court also directed, on 28 November 1961, respondent Sheriff to enforce the
corresponding writ of execution.

Plaintiffs went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari to annul
and set aside said writ of execution pending appeal, which, as intimated at the
beginning of this opinion, was ultimately denied by said appellate court.
However, before petitioners herein could seek a reconsideration of said
resolution, and before the same could become final and executory, respondents Javier secured on 14 July 1962 an
alias writ of execution in the trial court, and, pursuant thereto, respondent
Sheriff levied on the personal properties of the petitioners herein and set the
sale thereof for 25 July 1962. Respondent Sheriff also threatened to eject
petitioners herein from the property in question. Petitioners herein therefore
presented on 23 July 1962
the instant petition to review on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction before this Court. We gave due course to the petition,
and issued the corresponding writ upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P10,000.00f which the petitioners posted in due time.

The sole issue for determination in, the present petition is whether
respondent Court of Appeals correctly upheld the order of the trial court in
executing its decision pending appeal. In other words, the only issue is whether
respondent trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the special order of execution in
question.

Petitioners herein question the propriety of the conduct of the Court of
Appeals in completely reversing its original decision granting their petition
for certiorari and setting aside and annulling the order of execution of the
decision of the trial court pending appeal. They contend that respondents
Javier, in their motion to reconsider, raised substantially the very same issues
and grounds alleged in their answer to the petition; hence, there was no
justification for respondent appellate court to change its original
decision.

Petitioners herein also contend that respondents Javier as the prevailing
parties and movants for executing the decision pending
appeal in the trial court, had the burden to prove the former’s alleged insolvency, and since no evidence was
submitted to substantiate such claim of insolvency, the issuance of said special
order was not warranted under the circumstances.

On the other hand, respondents Javier maintain that respondent Court of
Appeals correctly upheld the disputed special order of the trial court, the same
being conformable to the law and jurisprudence on the matter.

It is already well-settled that under Section 2, Rule 30, of the Rules of
Court,

“The power to grant or deny a motion for execution is discretionary with the
court (Federal Films vs. Quimpo, 78 Phil. 479).
Accordingly, the appellate court will not interfere to modify, control, or
inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless it be shown that there has
been an abuse thereof (Calvo vs. Gutierrez, 4 Phil.
203; Case vs. Metropole Hotel, 5 Phil. 49; Gamay vs. Gutierrez David, 48 Phil 768; Buenaventura vs.
Pena, 78 Phil. 795; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Naredo vs.
Yatco, 80 Phil. 220).” (Federation of United Namarco Distributors vs. National Marketing Corp., et al.,
& National Marketing Corp. vs. Tan, et al., G. It. Nos. Lr-17819 &
16678, March 31,
1962)

It is not disputed that respondents Javier filed their Motion for execution
pending appeal in the trial court before petitioners Astraquillos perfected their appeal, and averred the
insolvency of the latter as the special and good reason for such execution
specifying and citing the facts appearing in the records of the case upon which
such claim is based. Respondent trial judge, in granting the motion, seemed to
have been satisfied that the evidence already submitted did warrant such
execution pending appeal. This finding was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in
its disputed resolution.

Under the circumstances prevailing in the case at bar, we are constrained not
to disturb the disputed ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Coming to the first contention of the petitioners herein, suffice it to state
that it is one of the inherent powers of the court “to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice” (Sec. 5,
Rule 135, Revised Rules of Court). This power includes the right to reverse
itself, specially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or
mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to
a party-litigant. This appears to have been what happened in the case at bar;
hence respondent Court of Appeals perfectly acted within its prerogatives in
reversing itself.

With respect to the second contention of the petitioners herein, the records
of this case belie their claim. In its resolution, the Court of Appeals
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to confirm the order of the trial
court executing its decision pending appeal. Thus, it ruled that the insolvency
of the petitioners herein has been clearly shown, which is a good and special
reason for the immediate execution of the decision, to wit:

“1. The petitioners owe in back rentals alone to the respondents, as per
decision of respondent Judge the sum of P250.00 monthly from April, 1956 to the
present or roughly P18,000.00;

“2. Petitioners Isabelo Astraquillo admitted during the trial of the civil case, his
need of funds several times;

“3. As per notice of the Sheriff’s sale, dated December 4, 1961, respondent Sheriff could levy only on
household effects of the petitioners, mostly furniture items, to satisfy the
judgment;

“4. Petitioners could have stayed the writ of execution by filing the
P20,000.00 supersedeas bond required by respondent
judge, which they did not do;”

Considering that we are bound by the above-quoted factual findings, since in
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 (formerly Rule 46 of the old Rules )of the
Revised Rules of Court “the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to
facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court” [11 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court (1963 ed.), 413], we see no way to hold that the Court of Appeals
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ultimately affirming the special
order of execution issued by the trial-court. Anyway, insolvency of a party (in
the sense of inability to show apparent assets adequate to meet its obligations)
need not be proved directly, but may be inferred, as the appellate Court did,
from a number of circumstances appearing of record.

Wherefore, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, and
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued ordered dissolved. With
costs against the petitioners.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo,
Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.
and Zaldivar JJ., concur