G.R. No. L-19750. July 17, 1964
CARIDAD VDA. DE MACASAET, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, LUCIO LANAO, ANGEL JARAPLASAN, PEDRO LLANTO, LORENZO DE LA CUEVA AND SOUTHERN LUZON FARMERS’ FEDERATION (P…
LABRADOR, J.:
of Agrarian Relations, Hon. Jose M. Santos, presiding, in four agrarian
cases, namely: No. 446 (Laguna), entitled Lucio Lanao and Southern
Luzon Farmers Federation (PLUM) vs. Caridad Vda. dc Macasaet,
No. 447 (Laguna), Angel Jaraplasan and Southern Luzon Farmers’
Federation (PLUM) vs. Caridad Vda. de Macasaet, No. 448 (Laguna), Pedro
Llanto and Southern Luzon Farmers’ Federation (PLUM) vs. Caridad Vda.
de Macasaet, and No. 449 (Laguna), Lorenzo de la Cueva and Southern
Luzon Farmers’ Federation (PLUM) vs. Caridad Vda. de
Macasaet, declaring that the tenancy relationship between the
petitioners Lanao, Jaraplasan and de la Cueva changed from share
tenancy to leasehold tenancy from April to November, 1961 and fixing
the number of cavans of palay to be paid by each to respondent, and
dismissing the petition of Llanto without prejudice.
The court below found that the petitioners are the share tenants of
respondent Vda. de Macasaet in separate parcels or riceland in Bay,
Laguna, without the benefit of any written contracts of tenancy; that
the sharing ratio agreed upon and observed between them is 50-50, with
the tenants contributing all the items of production, except the land
and the transplanting expenses which were contributed by the landowner;
that on August 1, 1960 the president of the petitioner union, for and
on behalf of the tenants, sent a letter to the respondent landowner
reiterating the request of the tenants to change the system of tenancy
from the share to the lease system; that at the hearing the parties
stipulated the harvests of the three tenants on the lands cultivated by
them. Respondent landowner attempted to deny that the tenants have
given her the’ corresponding notice, and also attempted to show that de
la Cueva and Jaraplasan are not her tenants but that their father and
mother are the tenants, but the judge did not give credence to these
denials.
In the instant petition for certiorari, counsel for petitioner
Macasaet contends that Sec. 14 of the Share Tenancy Act, which
authorizes the tenant to change the share tenancy to that of leasehold
tenancy, impairs the obligation of contracts, takes away from the
landholder all his rights over the property when the consent of the
landowner is not required to effect the change, and said section is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
And in his Memorandum before Us, he cites various state courts’ decision, among them that of Rumbo vs. Winterrowd (228 S.W. 258-265, Texas), which declares:
“The police power is that authority which resides in
every sovereignty to pass all laws for the internal regulation and
government of the state necessary for the public welfare. *** It has
limitations; it cannot be arbitrarily exercised so as to deprive the
citizen of his liberty and property.’ People of New York vs. Budd, 117 N.Y. 14, 22 N.E. 674, R.L.R.A. 565, 15 Am. St, Rep. 460.
* * * * * * *
“* * * If a particular farm is exceptionally
valuable, highly productive, and by reason of improvements and location
specially desirable and comfortable for a home, the owner and the man
who would rent it can make no contract with reference to all these
things, solely because an arbitrary legislative fiat prohibits it.
* * * * * * *
“*** But while conditions for the same kind exist as
tofarm property, this law says to the owner that he shall not exploit
such advantages, and says to the person whose business judgment
dictates that he could profitably bargain with reference to any such
element of value. The law thus impairs the ownership of farm land, and
amounts to the taking of property without the due course of the law of
the land required by the state Constitution. The law in the same way
takes from the tenant farmer the right to contract freely for the use
of his property and labor, and, while still recognizing him as
responsible, competent, and accountable equally with other normal men,
says to him that he shall not exercise his judgment and discretion upon
a subject of vital interest to him and the other contracting Party but
of no concern whatever to the general public*** It accordingly impairs
a fundamental right of the citizen, the right to freely contract with
reference to a lawful thing of as little public interest as any other
legitimate private undertaking.”
We have already ruled in Ramas vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et
al., G.R. No. L-19555, May 29, 1964 that Sec. 14 of the Share Tenancy
Act, giving the right to the tenant to change his form of tenancy from
share tenancy to lease tenancy, is valid.
“Is Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 legally
justified in impairing the obligation of an existing contract between
the tenant and the landlord? The answer to this is again as follows:
* * * * * * *
“Obligations of contracts must yield to u proper
exercise of the police power when such power is exercised, as in this
care, to preserve the security of the State and the ireuns adopted are
reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not
arbitrary or oppressive. (11 Am. Jar. 1002-1003).”“The right
granted to the tenant to change the contract from share tenancy to that
of leasehold tenancy can not he considered unreasonable or oppressive,
because by the landlord’s giving up of 5% of the harvest (the change
from share to leasehold reduces the landlord’s share from 30% to 25%),
the tenant becomes more responsible, more competent, and financially
prepared to comply with his obligations under the leare, to the
ultimate benefit of the landlord, with the consequent improvement of a
lot of a big segment of the population and thereby riving fnll Meaning
to the social justice directive contained in the Constitution.”
Sec. 14 of the Rice Share Tenancy Law, We have declared, was
inserted in the law to give the tenant an opportunity to improve his
lowly lot, and this privilege was granted in the exercise of the police
power to remedy an acute socio-economic problem existing in the
country, especially in the rice producing provinces of Central Luzon.
The case in Texas cited by counsel for petitioner can have no force in
this jurisdiction because Texas does not have the socio-economic
problem that our Share Tenancy Law seeks to remedy in this country.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari should be, as it hereby is, denied. Without costs. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L, Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.