DIONISIO ABENAZA, GAUDENCIO CARDONA, QUINTIN BRIONES, ALFREDO COMPRA AND LUCIO COMPRA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, POMPOSA VDA. DE NATOR AND ALFREDO TALON, RESPO…

Petition for a writ of
certiorari praying that judgment be rendered –

‘”x x x  x x x in favor of the
petitioners and against the respondents by upholding its decision dated March
30, 1962 as against the Resolutions of the Honorable respondent Court a quo dated
January 16 and 26, 1960 and February 25, 1964, and reiterating and ordering
said court a quo to give due course to the plaintiffs (herein private party respondents) appeal from the decision of Civil
Case No. R-3238 docketed as CA-G.R. No. 16861-R for its review and decision of
said appeal.

“Petitioners, likewise, pray for such other remedy or remedies
as may be just, proper and equitable under the premises.”

The
record discloses that on August 6, 1953, petitioners filed in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu an action (Civil Case No. R-3238) against respondents Pomposa Vda. de Nator and Alfredo
Talon to recover various sums of money due them as underpayment, overtime pay
and separation pay for services rendered by them as “hotel boys” of the establishment
known as
“La Suerte Hotel”, owned and operated in Cebu City by said respondents, together with moral damages
and attorney’s fees.  After
due trial the court, on May 20, 1955, rendered, judgment in favor of
petitioners.  Nator
and Talon appealed to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 16861).  While this appeal was pending the Court of
Appeals was informed about the loss by fire of the stenographic notes of the
testimonial evidence.  As a result, on September 24, 1958, the case was
remanded to the court a quo for retrial. 
The latter, however, instead of retrying the case, issued on August 10,
1958 the following order:

“After hearing the arguments of the plaintiffs and it
appearing that the demands of the plaintiffs involve the application of the
Minimum Wage Law; x x x
considering that under the ruling, of the Supreme Court laid down in the case
of PAFLU v. Hon. Tan, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., G.R. No.
9115, any case involving the application of the Minimum Wage Law falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations; and considering by analogy the rule laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of Castro
vs. The Collector of Internal Revenue, et al., Off. Gaz.,
July 15, 1957, to the effect that a case occurring before the effectivity of the act which gives jurisdictions in the new
Court should be decided by the latter under whose
jurisdiction it falls.

“HEREBY RESOLVES;

“To declare itself without jurisdiction to retry this case and
dismisses it without prejudice and without special pronouncement as to
costs.”

Plaintiffs
in the case
(petitioners
herein) assailed the above order in a petition for mandamus and prohibition
filed with Us on September 29, 1958 (G. R. L-14368) to compel the judge of the
court a quo to retry the case, as he had been ordered to do by a higher
court; to restrain him from rendering any decision upon the evidence taken
anew, and instead to transmit such evidence to the Court of Appeals.  The petition, however, was dismissed because We held that appeal in due time from the order of
dismissal was the proper remedy.

Due to the foregoing
circumstances, petitioners herein (plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3238) filed a claim with the Court of Industrial Relations on
December 5, 1958, against Nator and Talon (Case No.
22-V Cebu) also for underpayment of wage
differentials under the Minimum Wage Law, overtime pay, separation pay for
having dismissed without due notice and cause, actual and moral damages and
attorney’s fees.  Nator
and Talon filed separate answers wherein, after specifically denying material
averments of the claim, interposed the following special defenses:  (a) lack of cause of action; (b) prescription
of the several causes of action making up the claim; and bar by prior judgment
based on the order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-3238 and by the
dismissal of the action for mandamus and prohibition (G.R. No. L-14368)
– both mentioned heretofore.  Talon
likewise interposed a counter-claim for P2,500 for
moral damages and attorney’s fees.

After due hearing, the
Court of Industrial Relations rendered judgment in favor of the claimants as
follows:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, the respondents are hereby ordered jointly
and severally to pay petitioners Dionisio Abenaza, Gaudencio Cardona,
Alfredo Compra and Lucio Compra the sums of P1,312.22,
P1,312.22, P1,400.23 and P1,215.16, respectively, plus interest thereon at the
rate of 6% annually from the time of the filing of this case on De­cember 5,
1958 and until the above amounts are fully paid to the satisfaction of said
petitioners.”

Nator and Talon appealed to Us
from the above decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (G. R. L-16671)
raising anew the questions of prescription of the action (claim) and bar by
prior judgment.  In our decision
promulgated on March 30, 1962 We ruled against Nator and Talon on both issues, and, to straighten the
complexities of the already long delayed case, we said the following, inter alia:

“Under the above set of facts, therefore, it is clear that
respondents’ causes of action are legally maintainable.  However, during the pendency
of the case, this Court has made pronouncements which affect the present
controversy.  Thus, in
the case of Naric Workers’ Union v. The CIR and NARIC, G.R. No. L-14999, Dec. 30, 1961, We said:

‘Under the law and jurisprudence the Court of Industrial Relations’
jurisdiction extends only to cases involving (a) labor disputes affecting an
industry which is indispensable to the national interest and so certified by
the President to the Court (Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 875); (b) controversy about the
minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law, Rep. Act No. 602; (c) hours of
employment, under the Eight Hour Labor Practice (Sec. 5/a. Rep. Act No. 875), and such disputes, to fall under the jurisdiction of the CIR, must arise
while the employer-employee relationship between the parties exists or the
employee seeks reinstatement.  When such
relationship is over and the employee does not seek reinstatement all claims
become money claims that fall under the jurisdiction of the regular Courts (Sy Huan v. Judge Bautista, et
al., G.R. No. L-16116, Aug. 29, 1961, and cases cited
therein).’

‘x x x.  In the recent case of National Labor Union v.
Insular Yebana Tobacco Corporation, L-15363, July 31, 1961, it was ruled that in
the absence of unfair labor practice, the CIR has no power to grant remedy
under its general powers of mediation and conciliation, such as reinstatement
or back wages.  x x x (G. R. No. L-16031, C.
Cagalawan v. Customs Canteen, et al., Oct. 31, 1961).’

“Respondents in this case never asked for reinstatement, nor
was there any allegation of unfair labor practice committed by the
petitioners.  Their case, therefore, is
properly cognizable by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
which Court has already rendered judgment in their favor but for circumstances
heretofore mentioned, it had declared itself without jurisdiction.  To affirm the judgment of the CIR would in
effect be legalizing an act which, under existing jurisprudence, said court has no right to
exercise.

“Because of the conclusions reached, We
deem it unnecessary to discuss the question of whether the appeal taken is
premature.

“We hereby return the case to, and direct, the CFI of Cebu, to conduct a hearing as ordered by the Court of
Appeals in the Resolution dated February 24, 1958, in case CA-G.R. No. 16861-R
for the purpose of retaking the portions of the testimonies in the case which
were lost, after which to forward the same to the Court of Appeals for
decision.  Without
specific pronouncement as to costs.”

In
connection with C.A.-G.R. No. 16861-R (appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. 3238
mentioned heretofore), it appears that, resolving a motion filed by the
therein plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners herein),
the Court of Appeals issued on February 24, 1964 a resolution of the following
tenor –

“No. 20 CA-G.R. No. 16861-R, Dionisio Abenaza et al., vs. Pomposa vda. de Nator, et al.,

“The plaintiffs-appellees thru
counsel filed a motion praying, on the grounds therein alleged, ‘that this
Court resume consideration of the defendants-appellants appeal as
above-docketed, with all the records now reconstituted; or clarify the present
status of the above-entitled case, whether it has considered the above-entitled
case before this Honorable Court totally and finally dismissed or the due
course which had been given to the defendants-appellants appeal shall be
resumed.’

“This was considered. 
The Court RESOLVED to deny the said motion, this case having been
dismissed by this Court in its resolution of Jan. 26, 1960 and the same was
remanded on Jan. 20, 1964.  The case
CA-G.R. No. 17289-R, was dismissed by this Court in its resolution of May 7, 1957 And remanded on Aug. 12, 1957.”

From
the above resolution it appears that CA-G.R. L-16861 had been dismissed by the
Court of Appeals since January 26, 1960, the reasons therefore not appearing of
record.

Going
back now to the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
dismissing the case remanded to it for retrial, it appears that on July 25, 1959, herein petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against said court
assailing the validity of said order. 
However, by resolution of August 3 of the same year the Court of Appeals
dismissed said action upon the ground that the main case CA-G.R. No. 16861-R
was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

According
to the foregoing the real issue before Us now is whether or not the Court of
First Instance of Cebu erred in dismissing Civil Case
R-3238 of its docket (Appealed to the Court of Appeals as G.R. 16861) remanded
to it by the Court of Appeals for retrial in accordance with its
resolution of February 24, 1958 in CA-G.R. 16861; and whether or not the Court
of Appeals likewise erred in dismissing the aforesaid case CA-G.R. 16861 as per
its resolution of January 26, 1960.

 After a careful review of the record and the
complicated circumstances involved, we have arrived at the conclusion that both
courts erred.

The
Court of First Instance of Cebu erred because under
the resolution of the Court of Appeals of February 24, 1958 and our decision in
G.R. No. L-16671 of March 30, 1962, it had absolutely no authority and no
discretion to dismiss the case remanded to it expressly for the purpose of
conducting the “hearing as ordered by the Court of Appeals in the
resolution dated February 24, 1958, in case CA-G.R. No. 16861-R for the purpose
of retaking the portions of the testimonies in the case which were lost, after
which to forward the same to the Court of Appeals for decision”.  Its only duty, therefore, was to retake the
testimony of the witnesses the stenographic notes of whose testimonies had been
lost by fire.  Instead of doing this, it
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Similarly,
the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case G.R. 16861 when it should
have ordered the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
proceed to retry the case under the conditions heretofore mentioned.  Both courts, in this manner, rendered nugatory and virtually set aside our
decision in G. R. L-16671.

We, therefore, hold that both orders of dismissal are void end of
no legal effect whatsoever.

The petition under consideration alleges – and this has not been
denied by respondents – that subsequent and pursuant to our decision in G. R.
No. L-16671, the Court of First Instance of Cebu took
the testimonies and other evidence presented by the opposing parties and
thereafter elevated the record to the Court of Appeals to enable the latter to
decide CA-G.R. No. 16861-R, but that the Clerk of said Court returned the
record to the court of origin on the ground that said appealed case had already
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals in its resolutions of January 16 and 26,
1960.  Having arrived at the conclusion
that the aforesaid resolutions are void and of no legal effect whatsoever, it
is clear that it is now the duty of the Court of appeals to act accordingly in
the premises.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:  (a) setting aside and declaring void the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals complained of in the petition under
consideration; (b) ordering said court to reinstate the case known as CA-G.R.
No. 16861, and thereafter, after proper proceedings, to render judgment
therein.

With
costs against the private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.