G. R. No. L-4855. October 11, 1951
JOSE M. NAVA, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN, ETC., RESPONDENT.
PARAS, C.J.:
shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which events
the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
such suspension shall exist. The power to suspend the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it, has been lodged by the Constitution (Article VII, Section 10,
Paragraph 2) in the President.
On January 31, 1905, for the first time in Philippine history, the writ of habeas corpus
was suspended in the provinces of Batangas and Cavite under the
following Executive Order issued by Governor General Luke E. Wright:
“WHEREAS, certain organized bands of ladrones exist
in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas who are levying forced
contributions upon the people, who frequently require them, under
compulsion, to join their bands, and who kill or maim in the most
barbarous manner those who fail to respond to their unlawful demands,
and are therefore terrifying the law-abiding and inoffensive people of
those provinces; and“WHEREAS, these bands have in several
instances attacked police and constabulary detachments, and are in open
insurrection against the constituted authorities, and it is believed
that the said bands have numerous agents and confederates living within
the municipalities of the said provinces; and“WHEREAS,
because of the foregoing conditions there exists a state of insecurity
and terrorism among the people which makes it impossible in the
ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the justices
of the peace and other judicial officers:“In the interest of public safety, it is hereby ordered that the writ of habeas corpus is from this date suspended in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas.”
On October 22, 1950, for the second time in Philippine history, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was decreed by virtue of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by the President:
“WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have
committed overt acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion for the
purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and, in
pursuance thereof, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder
affecting public safety and the security of the state;“WHEREAS,
these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed
raids, sorties and ambushes and the wanton acts of murder, rape,
spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of public and” private
buildings, and attacks against civilian lives and properties, as
reported by the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, have seriously
endangered and still continue to endanger the public safety;“WHEREAS,
these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been
perpetrated by various groups of persons well organized for concerted
action and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and other
automatic weapons, by reason whereof there is actual danger of
rebellion which may extend throughout the country; .“WHEREAS,
100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended and
are presently under detention, and strong and convincing evidence has
been found in their possession to show that they are engaged in
rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts as above set forth;
and“WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and
effective action be taken to insure the peace and security of the
population and to maintain the authority of the government;“NOW,
THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, section 10, Paragraph (2)
of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be
hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection
or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith.”
The writ of habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39
Phil., 778, 788.) It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause
of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to
have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. (Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304, 306.)
The necessity for suspending the writ of habeas corpus in
1905 arose obviously from the fact that it was “impossible in the
ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the justice
of the peace and other judicial officers,” so that undoubtedly it was
never aimed at the indefinite detention of suspects, but at an
investigation (other than judicial) to determine whether there is
evidence sufficient for the filing in court of the necessary
information.
The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210 on
October 22, 1950, was the apprehension and detention of 100 alleged
leading members of lawless elements in whose possession strong and
convincing evidence was allegedly found showing that they are engaged
in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts. The privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus had to be suspended not only
because it was desirable for the prosecuting officials to have
sufficient time to investigate and file the necessary charges in court,
but also because a public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to
the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, shall
suffer the penalties provided in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In other words, the only effect of Proclamation No. 210 is that any
person detained thereunder has no right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice through a writ
of habeas corpus.
The important question is whether or not, after a person covered by the
Proclamation has been formally indicted in court by the” filing against
him of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, arson
and robberies, he may be entitled to bail.
Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, all
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a
capital offense, because it is penalized only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate
and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have
very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the
case of Ex parte Miligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 Law Ed. 297, the Constitution
limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to
remain forever inviolable.
“It is essential to the safety of every government
that, in a. great crisis, like the one we have just passed through,
there should be a power somewhere of suspending the writ of habeas corpus,
In every war, there are’ men of previously good character, wicked
enough to counsel their fellow citizens to resist the measures deemed
necessary by a good government to sustain its just authority and
overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to dangerous
combinations. In the emergency of the times, an immediate public
investigation according to law may not be possible; and yet, the peril
to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at
large. Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the
government, if it should see fit, in the exercise of a proper
discretion, to make arrests, should not be required to produce the
person arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus
is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the
course of common law. If it had intended this result, it was easy by
the use of direct words to have accomplished it. The illustrious men
who framed that instrument were .guarding the foundations of civil
liberty against the abuses of unlimited power; they were full of
wisdom, and the lessons of history informed them that a trial by an
established court, assisted by an impartial jury, was the only sure way
of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong. Knowing this,
they limited the suspension of one great right, and left the rest to
remain forever inviolable.”
The purpose of the Proclamation has already been accomplished in
respect of those who are now facing charges in court, to be dealt with
necessarily in accordance with the Constitution ‘and the law. The
court, in passing upon petitions to bail and granting the same in
proper cases, does not inquire into the cause of their detention which
is plainly under and by virtue of commitments issued by the court upon
the filing of the information for rebellion with multiple murder, arson
and robberies. The court, therefore, cannot be said to be
interfering in an act of the Executive, for it cannot be seriously
contended that, after the filing of the information, the accused
continues to be under detention as a result of an executive commitment
and still covered by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Otherwise, the suspension will operate as a judgment of conviction, in
violation of the constitutional mandate that no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law (Article III,
Section 1, Paragraph 15). “The laws which protect the liberties of the
whole people must not be violated or set aside in order to inflict,
even upon the guilty, unauthorized though merited justice.” Ex parte
Milligan, supra.
The right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,” to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1,
Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove
his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori
imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be
tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence,
absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being
patently untenable. It is not correct to say that, if a person covered
by Proclamation No. 210 is not entitled to be released before he is
indicted in court, there is more reason to hold that he should not be
released after an information is filed against him, because it is then
logical to assume that the Government holds sufficient evidence. If he
cannot secure his release before the filing of an information, it is
because, in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the court cannot look into the legality of his detention under an
executive act, and not because he is assumed to be guilty. And, as
already stated, after the filing of the information, in granting bail
in proper cases, the court does not determine the legality of his prior
detention which has already been superseded by a detention under
judicial process, but merely proceeds with and carries into effect its
jurisdiction over the criminal case and grants a right guaranteed by
the Constitution. Besides, it is significant that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent (Article III,
Section 1, Paragraph 17).
We are not insensitive to the proposition that the very nature of
the crime of rebellion suggests the likehood that a person accused
thereof will jump his bail. The remedy, however, is unfortunately not
in the hands of the court. The lawmakers or the framers of the
Constitution should have made the offense capital or even unbailable.
In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with
rebellion so complexed with other offenses as to make them capital.
Their right to bail is accordingly not absolute and may be denied when
evidence of guilt is strong. The filing of the information implies that
the prosecution holds sufficient evidence for conviction, ‘and it is
fair to suppose that the court will duly exercise its judgment when
called upon to pass on the question of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong. At any rate, on admission to bail, the accused is
delivered to the custody of his sureties as a continuance of the
original detention. (U. S. vs. Addison and Gomez, 27 Phil., 563; U. S. vs. Sunico and Ng Chiong, 40 Phil. 826).
And it should be borne in mind that if the worse comes to the
worst—to the extent that the security of the State is in fact imperiled
and the regular constitutional processes can no longer be observed with
general safety to the people,—the President is authorized by the
Constitution (Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2) to “place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.” Even then, the
primordial objective should be a “regime of justice” as contemplated in
the Preamble of the Constitution. The stubborn fact, however, is that
the mere suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is an admission that the courts can function and are functioning
normally; otherwise, there is no need for the suspension as there will
be no court to grant the writ.
Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
PABLO, M.;
En tiempos normales la Constitucion de Filipinas rige en su
totalidad. Algunos de los derechos individuates, como el derecho del
acusado a la libertad provisional bajo fianza, se hace efectivo por los
juzgados por orden perentoria. Cuando a un acusado se le detiene y no
se resuelve su peticion de libertad bajo fianza, puede acudir a un
tribunal de superior categoria por medio de un recurso de mandamus para
obligarle a actuar en un sentido u otro, que es su deber imperative Un
condenado por un juzgado sin jurisdiction acude en certiorari
a un tribunal superior para pedir la anulacion de la condena. Un
individuo ilegalmente detenido por alguna autoridad u otra persona,
puede acudir a los tribunales por medio de un recurso de habeas corpus
y pedir que se le ponga en libertad. Los mismos abogados en ejercicio
indistintamente utilizan un recurso u otro. Existe confusion en cuanto
a que clase de recurso debe ejercitarse en cada caso. No es extrano. El
reglamento dice que “el mandamiento de Habeas Corpus sc hara
extensivo a todos los casos de confinamiento o detencion ilegales, en
los cuales se prive a una persona de su libertad, o impida a una
persona ejercer sus legitimos derechos en la custodia legal de otra.”
(Art. 1, Regla 102). Revisando los expedientes de este Tribunal, se
vera que en algunos casos se empleo el recurso de habeas corpus para solicitar la libertad provisional de un acusado mediante prestacion de fianza, como en Herras Teehankee contra el Director de Prisiones, Juez Rovira y otros [1] (43 Off. Gaz., 513) ; otros utilizaron los remedios de certiorari y ‘mandamus, como en el asunto de Marcos y Lizardo contra el Juez de Primera Instancia de Ilocos Norte (VII Lawyers’ Journal, 66) ; en Payao contra Juez Lesaca, el recurso de mandamus; en Herras Teehankee contra Rovira y otros [2] (42 Off. Gaz1., 717), los recursos de certiorari y mandamus; y en el asunto de Montalbo contra Juez Santamaria (54 Jur. Fil., 1026), el recurso de mandamus.
Este Tribunal, desatendiendo tecnicismos, decidio los asuntos en el
fondo; tuvo en cuenta no el tltulo sino la esencia de la solicitud,
Galao y otro contra Juez Diaz y otro[3] (41 Off. Gaz., 873).
Estos recursos de certiorari y mandamus no son mas que remedios derivativos del recurso de habeas corpus; los tres se dirigen a un mismo fin: el obtener la libertad del que esta indebida o ilegalmente detenido.
En Estados Unidos el recurso de habeas corpus se utiliza para la obtencion de Iibertad provisional bajo fianza:
“It is proper to use the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of securing admittance to bail.” Ex parte Perkov, 45 F. Supp. (D.C. Cal. 1942), 864.
“The writ of habeas corpus
may be had for purpose of letting prisoner to bail in civil and
criminal actions as authorized in Constitution.” Ex parte Womack, 71
Pac. 2d (Okl. Cr. App. 1937), 494.“Remedy of person in custody on criminal charge to secure release on bail is by habeas corpus.” Bennett v. State, 118 So. (Fla. 1928), 18.
“Prisoner denied bail or asked excessive bail has absolute right to invoke habeas corpus remedy, and court’s duty to grant writ and to admit to bail is mandatory.” Ex parte Stegman, 163 A. (N. J. Ch. 1933), 422.
“Persons held under indictment for capital offense are entitled as of right to hearing by way of habeas corpus upon issue of bail.” Ex parte Readhimer, 60 S. W. (2d) (Tex Cr. App. 1933), 788.
“The use of the writ of habeas corpus
to speedily determine whether a person charged with an offense is
entitled to bail before trial and conviction is authorized by law, so
as to render effective the rights to bail and to liberty as provided by
the Constitution.” Ex parte McDaniel, 97 So. (Fla. 1923), 317.“The use of the writ of habeas corpus
to speedily determine whether a person charged with an offense is
entitled to bail before trial and conviction is authorized by law.” Ex
parte Hatcher, 98 So. (Fla. 1923), 72.“A writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate and proper remedy in aid of bail.” Mozorosky v. Hurlburt, 198 Pac. (Or. 1921), 556.
“Where
a lieutenant in a military posse, seeking a deserter, was wounded by a
shot in the dark, and fired at the place where he saw the flash, and
killed the shooter, who was found near an illicit still, and, although
the lieutenant was confined thereafter by the federal authorities for
over a year, the state authorities had taken no steps to bring the
charge made against the lieutenant and another member of the posse by
indictment to a hearing conclusion, habeas corpus would issue to release both defendants on bail.” State of Florida v. Tooher, 283 F. (U.S.D.C. Fla. 1922) 845.“A
person charged with being an accessory before the fact to murder by
counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring murder to be committed is
charged with a capital offense under statutes of this state, and when
held in actual custody under a mittimus issued by a committing
magistrate to await the action of the grand jury has a right upon habeas corpus
proceedings before a justice of the Supreme Court to show by all the
evidence proper in the case, including that for the prosecution, that
the proof is not evident and the presumption is not great of the guilt
of the accused of a capital offense, and that consequently the accused
is entitled to bail under the Constitution.” (Syllabus No. 1, Ex parte
Nathan, 50 So., 38.)“On the lower court refusing bail on appeal being taken, habeas corpus proceedings therefor in the Supreme Court is the proper practice.” (Syllabus No. 2, Packenham v. Reed, 79 Pac, 786.)
“Any one who is in custody on a criminal charge for want of bail is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus admission to bail, and the petitioner need only allege that he is confined for want of bail.” (In re Haigler, 137 Pac, 423.)
“Under Const. U. S. art. 1, section 9, and Const. Wash. art. 1, section 13, providing that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it; section 20, providing that all persons
charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for
capital offenses; and section 22, providing that in criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appeal; and Rem. &
Bal. Code, section 1077, providing1 relative to habeas corpus that the writ may be had for the purpose of admitting to bail in civil and criminal actions—habeas corpus
will lie to procure the release on bail of a person held under a body
execution pending an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate
the order for the issuance of such execution, notwithstanding Rem.
& Bal. Code, section 1075, providing relative to habeas corpus
that no court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment
or process whereby the party is in custody or discharge him when the
term of commitment has not expired, when he is held upon any process
issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
{State v. Foster, 146 Pac, 169.)“Application for a writ of habeas corpus
by Kizzie Nathan alleging that she is unlawfully restrained of her
liberty in the actual custody of the sheriff of Leon county on a charge
of accessory before the fact to murder, by being denied the right to
bail; Held: Petitioner was permitted to give bail with sufficient
sureties as required by law.” Ex parte Nathan (Before a Justice of the
Supreme Court of Florida), 50 So., 38.“Appeal from an order in habeas corpus refusing the petitioner admission to bail who is held on a charge of murder in the first degree; Held:
Looking at all of the evidence offered and viewing it in the light of
the presumption of innocence, and remembering that to grant bail is the
ride and the refusal of it is the exception, petitioner is admitted to
bail with sufficient sureties in suck sum as may be reasonable and just
in view of all the circumstances of the case.” In re Haighler (Supreme Court of Arizona), 137 Pac, 423.“Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that an appeal was taken by the relator from an order of the
inferior court denying his motion to vacate an order of arrest. It
appears that one Amy D. Bronson secured a judgment against the relator
for damages for injury to person, and the judgment being unsatisfied,
an execution was issued against his person and was arrested and taken
into custody by the sheriff until the judgment is satisfied. The
petition prays for an order fixing bail pending determination of the
appeal; Held: The writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate and proper remedy in aid of bail. Writ of habeas corpus granted and relator released on bail upon a bond of $3,000.” State vs. Poster (Supreme Court of Washington), 146 Pac, 169.“Petition for writ of habeas corpus
to admit to bail. Petitioner had been committed to the reform school of
the state of Washington until he should attain the age of 13 years, or
until he should otherwise be regularly discharged therefrom. Thereafter
he gave notice of appeal. Bail was denied pending the hearing on
appeal; Held: An infant has a right of appeal when committed
to the reform school, and incidentally a right to be admitted to bail
pending such appeal. Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to bail.” Packenham vs. Reed, 37 Wash., 258, 79 Pac, 786.“The writ of habeas corpus
lies where the imprisonment is illegal and no other remedy is available
to secure a release therefrom. As in the case of other extraordinary
prerogative writs, the writ of habeas corpus will not
ordinarily be granted where there is another adequate remedy, by appeal
or writ of error or otherwise. But, although another remedy exists, it
is not necessarily exclusive so as to oust a court of jurisdiction to
grant relief on habeas corpus, and, in the exercise of its
discretion, the writ may be granted notwithstanding the existence of
another remedy. Generally where another remedy is provided, failure to
take advantage of it until the expiration of the time within which
relief may be had will not authorize relief in habeas corpus,
hut in such cases the writ may issue in the discretion of the court.
Defenses which might have been made in an action cannot be reserved as
grounds of attack in habeas corpus upon the judgment after rendition.” (29 C. J., 17-18.)“The
fact of the existence of another remedy does not necessarily preclude a
resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from illegal
detention. Thus, while there are decisions to the effect that, even
when a judgment is wholly void, a defendant will not, except in rare
and extraordinary cases, be relieved from imprisonment thereunder if
appropriate relief can be granted by writ of error or appeal, it is the
well established general rule that one restrained of his liberty by
virtue of a judgment, order or sentence, void by reason of the court’s
want of jurisdiction to make the same, may be released by a writ of
habeas corpus, whether such release could have been secured by writ of
error or not. The existence of a statutory remedy whereby a person
restrained, of his liberty may be released is usually held to be
cumulative and not exclusive. Thus it has been ruled that the writ of habeas corpus
may be issued to determine the legality of the confinement of a person
in a state insane asylum, without first compelling a resort to a
statutory proceeding1 for that purpose—at least where there is some
doubt as to the effect of the statute. And it has been held that a
parent may have the writ issued for the purpose of securing the release
of his child from a benevolent institution although a remedy is given
the parent by the act under which the child was committed; the remedy
so provided being merely cumulative. The discretion of federal courts
to issue writs of habeas corpus or to require the petitioner
to resort to appeal or writ of error if appropriate relief can be
thereby obtained is treated elsewhere in this article.” (12 R. C. L.,
1186-1187.)
Y el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos en Ex parte Bollman y Ex parte Swartwout, (2 Law. Ed., 554) dijo:
“The appropriate process of bringing up a prisoner,
not committed by the court itself, to be bailed, is by the writ now
applied for. Of consequence, a court possessing the power to bail
prisoners not committed by itself, may award a writ of habeas corpus for the exercise of that power.”
Si hemos de atenernos a la definition del habeas corpus y a los precedentes americanos citados, el recurso que tiene un acusado para pedir la libertad bajo fianz’a es el de habeas corpus. Pero no debe confundirse el remedio de habeas corpus con el que originariamente obtuvieron los que luchaban por los derechos individuales contra las demasias del monarca. El habeas corpus
de la legislation vigente es mas amplio en su esfera de accion; no se
dirige solamente contra las detenciones del Ej ecutivo; es un
instrumento procesal contra los juzgados que indebidamente ordenan la
detention de una persona, contra la Comision de Inmigracion que detiene
provisionalmente a los que estan condenados a deportacion, contra el
amo que priva de su libertad al criado, contra la duena de la casa de
hetairas que priva a una pupila de su libertad, contra el
superintendente de un hospital que detiene ilegalmente a un paciente,
contra el Senado de Filipinas y de los Estados Unidos por la detencion
de un condenado por desacato, contra la Camara de Representantes de los
Estados Unidos, contra cualquiera, ya sea un funcionario publico o no,
que en una u otra forma detiene ilegalmente a alguna persona.
En casos de invasion, rebelion o insurreccion, o peligro inminente
de ellas, cuando la seguridad publica Io requiera, el privilegio del
mandamiento de habeas corpus se suspende, o se declara la ley marcial en cualquier parte o en toda la nacion.
En Estados Unidos no se determina quien puede suspenderlo. Su Constitucion dice asi:
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public safety may require it.” (Par. 2, Sec. 9, Art. I,
Constitution of the United States).
En Filipinas la Asamblea Constituyente tuvo a bien confiarlo al
Presidente. El Articulo III, parrafo 14 de la Constitucion dice textual
mente:
“El Presidente sera el generalising de todas las
fuerzas armadas, y, siempre que fuere necesario, podru Hamarlas para
impedir o sofocar toda manifestacion de violencia ilegal, invasion,
insurreccion o rebelion. En caso de invasion, insurreccion o rebelion,
o peligro inminente de ellas, cuando la segnridad publica lo requiera,
podra suspender el privilegio del mandamiento de habeas corpus o declarar la ley marcial en todo el pais o en cualquier parte de el.”
En 22 de octubre de 1950, el Presidente suspendio el privilegio del habeas corpus para aquellos detenidos por rebelion o insurreccion. La razon por que se toma esta medida descansa en la seguridad publica.
No es un secreto para nadie las frecuentes matanzas a sangre fria de
ninos, viejos y mujeres, las emboscadas de pasajeros inocentes, de la
viuda del Presidente Quezon y comitiva, el robo a sangre y fuego, el
secuestro de particulares y de funcionarios publicos; el de
inspectores de eleccion esta a la orden del dia; son victimas del
secuestro personas pertenecientes a diferentes partidos. No solamente
existe el deseo de derrocar al gobierno establecido sino tambien el de
sembrar el terror y la anarquia en todas partes para Jirustrar la
expresion libre del sufragio, que es el alma de la democracia. Para
impedir la ola destructora de rebelion o insurrection, el Poder
Ejecutivo, como medida de propia preservacion, detiene a todos cuantos
tienen interveneion en ella. Si se suelta a los detenidos, pueden
volver a las andadas, pueden reunirse con sus companeros y reduplicar
su obra de destruccion; de ahi la necesidad de suspender el recurso de habeas corpus. El gobierno, escudado por la suspension del habeas corpus,
podria con facilidad suprimir la rebelion e insurreccion deteniendo
indefinidamente a todos los sospechosos; pero eso daria lugar a muchas
injusticias, la detencion de inocentes. Consciente de su obligacion de
velar por los derechos individuales, no se vale de este privilegio:
detuvo pero entrego los detenidos a los tribunales de justicia para que
fuesen juzgados. Eso es motivo de satisfaccion. No quiere obrar solo;
no quiere ser despota; solicita la colaboracion de los tribunales.
Desea que los juzgados— y no el—decidan quienes son los culpables y
quienes son los injustamente acusados. Pero debe entenderse que
mientras no esten absueltos, no deben ser puestos en libertad bajo
fianza; su Hbertad pone en peligro la seguridad del Estado. En muchos
respectos la Hbertad de los acusados pone en peligro la seguridad
nacional, ya facilitando ayuda economica o provisiones de boca,
proporcionando medicinas o trasmitiendo informes a los que estan en
espera del tnomento oportuno para dar el golpe de gracia y, lo que es
peor aun, empleando el “sabotage.”
Si su detencion por el Poder Ejecutivo esta justificada por la
seguridad publica ¿por que no esta justificada tambien su detencion
cuando esta se ordena por los tribunales de justicia? Es tan peligroso
el detenido por rebelion e insurreccion puesto en libertad por el Poder
Ejecutivo como el acusado de )os mismos delitos puesto en libertad por
el Poder Judicial. Si el objeto de la suspension del recurso de habeas corpus
es suprimir la rebelion e insurreccion, ¿no es un contrasentido
conceder libertad a los que estan acusados de rebelion o insurreccion?
Soltarlos es ayudarles: es poner en peligro la salud del pueblo.
Mientras rige la suspension del recurso de habeas corpus,
por tanto, los acusados de rebelion o insurreccion no tienen derecho a
la libertad provisional bajo fianza. Razon fundamental: para ponerles a
buen recaudo.
Se arguye que la suspension del privilegio de habeas corpus se aplica solamente a las detenciones realizadas por el Poder Ejecutivo y no a los acusados ante los tribunales de justicia.
La proclama no distingue para que clase de detencion esta suspendido
el recurso: es aplicable, por tanto, no solamente a los detenidos por
el Poder Ejecutivo sino tambien a los detenidos por orden judicial.
Seria el mayor de los absurdos privar de este privilegio a los
detenidos por el Poder Ejecutivo y no a los detenidos por los
tribunales. No parece sino que los tribunales tienen que regirse por la
parte de la constitucion suspendida. Si es constitucional privar del
recurso de habeas corpus a los detenidos por el Poder
Ejecutivo, con mayor razon se debe privar de ello a los acusados ante
los tribunales porque el ministerio fiscal posee pruebas que demuestran
su culpabilidad.
Se arguye que el Poder Ejecutivo puede detener por todo el tiempo
que quiera sin necesidad de dar cuenta de la detencion, pero en cuanto
los detenidos se han colocado bajo la jurisdiccion de los tribunales,
ya tienen derecho a la libertad bajo fianza. Esta teorla fomenta el
establecimiento de un gobierno dictatorial y autocratico y no quisiera
que en Filipinas se estableciese un gobierno de tal naturaleza.
Si los tribunales ponen en Hbertad, bajo fianza, a los que atentan
contra la seguridad del Estado, a pesar de la suspension del habects
corpus, entonces, para afrontar la situacion, el Poder Ejecutivo no
acusaria a los detenidos ante los tribunales: los detendria
indefinidamente por su propia cuenta. Aun mas, detendria a cualquier
ciudadano; entonces hasta los inocentes estarian en peligro. Los
tribunales no tendrian oportunidad de absolver a los inocentes. Esto
seria el reinado de la fuerza y no de la ley. Y eao es precisamente lo
que quiere evitar el Poder Ejecutivo al poner a disposicion de los
tribunales a los detenidos por rebelion. Los que pretenden velar por
los derechos individuales, alucinados por el oropel de la decantada
libertad, son los que, tal vez sin quererlo, estan fomentando el
establecimiento de un regimen al estilo Nazi, la ereccion del Poder
Ejecutivo en un despota.
Tal como se desarrollan los acontecimientos, el Poder Ejecutivo
entrega los detenidos a los tribunales de justicia para que puedan ser
juzgados cuanto antes; si son culpables que se les condene, pero si son
inocentes, que les absuelva. No es esto un ordenado proceso legal y
constitucional? Por que obligar de una rnanera indirecta al Poder
Ejecutivo a detener indefinidamente a los acusados de rebelion sin
colocarlos bajo la jurisdiccion de los tribunales? Es mejor que
continue acusandolos ante los tribunales para que puedan ser juzgados
prontamente. Es indispensable que los dos poderes, Ejecutivo y
Judicial, actuen al unisono cuando la seguridad publica lo requiere.
Si la suspension del privilegio de habeas corpus es
infundada y arbitraria, que lo declare asi este Tribunal; que declare
nula la suspension. Pero si los acontecimientog aconsejan la medida
por necesaria e indispensable, que los detenidos permanezcan detenidos
hasta que hayan sido absueltos en sentencia judicial.
Voto por la denegacion de las solicitudes en las causas Nos. L-4855
y L-4964 y por que se declare nula y de ningun valor la orden del Hon.
Juez Abaya del 12 de
septiembre de 1951, concediendo libertad bajo fianza a 3os acusados.
[1] 76 Phil., 630 and 756.
[2]
75 Phil., 634.
[3]
75 Phil., 109.
BENGZON, J. (in L-4964)
I fully agree to the views of the Chief Justice.
This case (like the other cases of Jose M. Nava et al., vs. Hon. Magno Gatmaitan, G. R. No. L-4-855 and Eugenio Angeles vs.
Hon. Gavino S. Abaya, G. R. No. L-5102) involves the question whether
the presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
for persons detained for rebellion or insurrection has equally
suspended their right to bail after the information has been filed
against them.
For purposes of discussion of this central issue I will assume that
the information against Hernandez describes the crime of rebellion
only, unattended by other crimes that make the offense a capital one.
At the end of this opinion I shall explain my vote as to the
disposition of petitioner’s cause, the charge against him being
rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.
Now inasmuch as the information does not describe a capital offense,
(rebellion is punished with prision mayor) the prisoner is entitled, as
a matter of right, to bail. This privilege is vouchsafed to him by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
But it is alleged that the Executive proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
had the effect of suspending the right to bail of all persons charged
before the courts with crime of rebellion. I do not think so. What the
proclamation suspended was the privilege of the writ—not the right to
bail.
The writ of habeas corpus is of immemorial antiquity. Originally there were several forms of the writ: (1) habeas corpus
ad respondendum (2) ad satisfaciendum (3) ad prosequendum,
testificandum, deliberandum (4) ad faciendum et recipiendum and (5) the
great writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. (Blackstone’s Commentaries (Jones) p. 1676). The writ mentioned in the U. S.
Constitution is the writ ad subjiciendum. The American colonists
brought it with them. (Ex parte Yerger 8. Wall [75 U. S.] 85 at p. 95.)
And undoubtedly that is the same writ contemplated in our fundamental
laws, the Philippine Bill, the Jones Law and the Philippine Consti
tution. It is an order issued by the court directed to the person
detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, * * * to
do, submit, to and ., I receive whatsoever the judge or court shall
consider in that behalf. (Blackstone [Jones] p. 1676).
Marshall (in Ex parte Watkins 3 Pet. 193) explained the character of
the writ as “a highly prerogative writ ; known to the common law, the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error, to
examine the legality of the Commitment.”
Habeas Corpus. Este auto es una orden de producir, es decir, de presentar el cuerpo del detenido (habeas corpus,
have the body) ante el Tribunal, para que este determine sobre la
validez del arresto. Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola Tomo XVII, p. 406.
From the above descriptions and many others of the general nature of
the writ, I deduce that when by Executive proclamation the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, the Judiciary is
thereby prevented from interfering with the Executive doings by
inquiring into the legality of the detention of prisoners held by the
Executive Department for rebellion or insurrection.
Here Hernandez does not ask for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into
the legality of his detention. No need for such inquiry because he is
now detained by a judicial warrant of arrest. The Court knows the
reason for the detention. Hernandez assumes for the moment the legality
of the restraint; but he files a motion, in the case initiated against him (Criminal Case No. 15841) that he be allowed to go on bail. He did not petition for habeas corpus.
In this Court he is not asking for habeas corpus, he pleads for mandamus and/or certiorari. The cases decided by this Court show that his request should be granted.
Mandamus: Sy Guan vs. Amparo,[1] 45 Off. Gaz., 2447. Certiorari: Ocampo vs. Bernabe,[2] 43 Off. Gaz., 1632. Certiorari and Mandamus: Teehankee vs. Rovira,[3] 42 Off. Gaz., 717.
For one thing the Constitution does not provide that all accused
persons shall be bailable except in capital offenses when the evidence
of guilt is strong or when the President has suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
The proclamation of the Chief Executive did not have the effect of
depriving the Courts of their normal powers or jurisdiction. It merely
curtailed their privilege to issue the writ of habeas corpus
at the request or on behalf of prisoners held for rebellion or
insurrection. The proclamation did not suspend all the constitutional
rights of such prisoners. Only the right to habeas corpus. Needless to say, martial rule has’ not been established, luckily for all.
The English themselves, from whom Americans inherited the practice
of the suspension, believe that the so-called “suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act” “is not in reality more than suspension of one particular remedy for the protection of personal freedom.” (Ennyc Britanica, Habeas corpus)
Other remedies remain intact. The petition to go on bail is one of
them. Pertinent excerpts from American decisions confirm this trend of
thought.
- “The illustrious men who framed that instrument
(Constitution) limited the suspension to one great right, and left the
rest to remain forever inviolable.” Ex parte Miligan, 18 U. S. (Law Ed.) 281, 297. - “This clause (suspension of the writ) refers only to the writ of habeas corpus
ad subjiciendum when a person stands committed or detained as a
prisoner for a crime, and does not include the other writ?’. This
involved a construction of a similar clause in the constitution of the
Confederate states. “On so grave a subject every word used must be
supposed to have some import; and every word used in this clause does
import that the power of suspension has reference only to the writ
applicable in the case of persons imprisoned for crime. “The
privilege.” When one is committed to wait his trial for a crime, it is
a privilege to be allowed a writ whereby the legality of his arrest may
be inquired of, and he may be discharged or admitted to bail. But when
one who has not committed and is not supposed to have committed a
criminal offense is wrongfully restrained of his liberty, that he should be allowed to institute a civil suit to
be relieved from the confinement is a right which every state is bound
to secure at all times to its citizens; and these words must import
that the power of suspension refers only to the former class of cases, otherwise
no meaning can be attached to them.” Matter of Cain, 1864, 2 Winst. L,
N.C., 145. (Note, United States Code Annotated, Constitution Vol. I p.
747.) - “The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
does not legalize a wrongful arrest and imprisonment; it only deprives
the party thus arrested of the means of procuring his liberty, but does
not exempt the” person making the illegal arrest from liability to
damages, in a civil prosecution.” Griffin vs. Wilcox, 1863,21 Ind. 732, (Note, United States Code Annotated, Constitution Vol. I p. 748.) - “The suspension merely disturbed ‘one of the safeguards of civil liberty.'” (Sinclair vs. Hiatt 86 Fed. Supp. 828)
It is contended that because habeas corpus is one of the remedies[1]
to obtain personal freedom thru bail after the information has been
presented, the suspension of the writ, suspended the right to bail. The
answer is that the proclamation suspended only that particular remedy (habeas corpus)
to obtain personal freedom. Not the other remedies to secure bail. It
is pretended that the suspension of the writ also suspended the right
of the prisoners to defend themselves, to present witnesses, to face the accusers etc. because these rights would be ways to obtain their freedom?
An illustration will serve to emphasize the point. Hernandez like
all accused persons, is entitled to speedy trial. If the prosecution or
the court should unreasonably delay his trial, he may resort either to
mandamus, or habeas corpus (Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil., 650; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil., 215). Now, simply because the writ of habeas corpus
(one of his remedies) has been suspended, would it be reasonable to
hold that Hernandez has also lost the right to speedy trial, and that
he may not enforce such right by mandamus? Quod erat demostrandum. Suspension of one of two remedies does not suspend the other.
Another example: Suppose after trial, Hernandez is sentenced to life
imprisonment, although the Penal Code punishes rebellion with prision mayor (I assume he is charged with rebellion only). Obviously that would be plain error, which Hernandez may rectify either by habeas corpus (Cruz vs.
Director of Prisons, 17 Phil., 269) or by an ordinary appeal to this
Court. Will anybody contend that simply because the writ has been
suspended, Hernandez may not apply to this court for correction of the
decision, thru an ordinary appeal?
It is urged that bail should not be allowed those charged with
rebellion, because the moment they are released they will rejoin the
dissidents and resume their destructive activities against the
established government organizations. But as long as the Legislature
has not deemed it proper to make rebellion a capital offense, we do not
see how courts may refuse bail consistently with the constitutional
precept that “All persons shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, “except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong.”
And in my opinion, one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a
sincere demonstration of this Government’s adherence to the principles
of the Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to
all citizens, whether dissidents or not. Let the rebels have no reason
to apprehend that their comrades now under custody are being railroaded
into Muntinlupa[2], without
benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the
ages has deemed essential for the protection of all persons accused of
crime before the tribunals of justice. Give them the assurance that the
judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission will not, thru faulty
cogitation or misplaced devotion, uphold any doubtful claims of
Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but will always
cling to the principle uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall that
when in doubt as to the construction of the Constitution, “the Courts
will favor personal liberty” (Ex parte Burford 3 Cranch [7 U. S.] Law.
Ed. Book 2 at p. 495).
Under normal conditions—when no suspension has been decreed—a person under detention may ask for a writ of habeas corpus
to inquire into the legality of the restraint. If the court finds that
he is illegally detained, it will order his release. If the court finds
that he is legally held for a crime which is bailable, the court may
permit him to go on bail.
When normalcy is disturbed and the Executive decrees a suspension of
.the writ he thereby erects, so to speak, a fence around those detained
for rebellion or insurrection, a fence which the judiciary may not
penetrate by the writ of habeas corpus. The Executive thereby
practically tells the judiciary: “Please do not meddle with these
prisoners. I am holding them for investigation or for purposes of
quelling the rebellion.” So long as the proclamation subsists, just so
long will the Courts keep away in obedience to Constitutional
inhibition. But when the Executive, thru the fiscals, files an
information and requests the Courts to punish a particular rebel, the
reason for non-interference ceases, because he thereby takes the
prisoner out of the fenced premises and brings him into the Temple of
Justice for trial and punishment. Thereby he sets in motion a train of
consequences resulting from the rituals of the Temple: the principles
regulating criminal procedure, e.g., proceedings to obtain bail or to
enforce other rights of the prisoner at the bar. Indeed it would be
preposterous and paradoxical for the Executive in so presenting the
detainee expressly to stipulate, “Here is the prisoner, judge him; but
you may not release him from confinement.”
I admit that by virtue of the Presidential proclamation, persons
detained for rebellion against whom no information has been filed may
not ask for bail. The admission must be made because, under the rules,
they may obtain bail only by inquiring into the cause of detention
i.e., by the writ of habeas corpus, which is in abeyance. Sublata causa
tollitur effectus.
But once the information is formulated, the circumstances change. The accused may ask bail by mere motion in the case—not necessarily by habeas corpus proceedings. The suspension order does not preclude that motion—it only bars the remedy of habeas corpus.
The suspension paralyzed one of the means to obtain freedom it could
not extinguish the ultimate objective. And if his motion is denied
where he is charged merely with rebellion—he will be entitled to
mandamus to compel the judge to grant bail.[3]
If he is booked for a capital offense and the court, refusing to
exercise its discretion to determine whether the evidence is strong or
not, flatly denies bail invoking the suspension, mandamus will lie to
compel the judge to exercise his discretion to determine whether or not
the evidence is strong and act accordingly.[4]
However if such court, exercises its discretion, but without any proof
denies bail declaring that the evidence is strong or makes no finding
on that point certiorari will surely ba available to redress judicial
abuse of discretion.[5]
The storm center of these litigations has been represented as a
clash between individual liberty and governmental security. A third
aspect should not be overlooked: Curtailment of the power of
adjudication.
Fundamentally the three great branches of
the Government are independent, and none may encroach upon territory of
the other except in those few instances specially allowed by the
Constitutional structure. It should follow as a matter of judicial
dialectics that when the line of separation projects into the other’s
domain, and alternative choices are equally available, the part of
wisdom is to follow the course that, deflecting the angle of deviation,
reduces the encroachment to a minimum consistent with the intention of
the framers of the Constitution. Now, the suspension of the writ
undeniably effects a temporary invasion of normal judicial territory;
yet it is authorized by the Constitution for reasons of paramount
necessity. The methaphorical “fence” previously mentioned is
constructed on judicial realm. Therefore the Courts, in loyalty to the
original apportionment, and the basic theories of republican
institutions, should not enlarge its area by approving the extension
ably but erroneously sponsored by the prosecution. Logical should be
the view that when the Executive submitted the information, he invited
the Court to look into the case
of the accused here, and thereby waived the suspension of the writ,
opening the fictional fence, in so far as this particular detainee is
concerned. Unless it could be pretended[6] that after this detainee is acquitted by
the Court of the charges of rebellion, the Executive may still legally
detain him, keep him within the enclosure, on the pretext that the
remedy of habeas corpus is not available to secure his release from custody.
I have heretofore mentioned two alternatives equally
available. In thus describing the situation I have favored the opposing
school of thought. For in truth the competing theories are not of equal
validity. The one maintains that the right to bail has been impliedly suspended with the suspension of the writ; whereas the other asserts that the right to bail is expressly
guaranteed by the Constitution, not only as individual privilege but
also as judicial prerogative. Express guarantee versus implied
derogation. Considering that repeals by implication are never favored,
the choice offers no doubt: the desired advantage to the prosecution
should not outbalance the right of the prisoner nor the powers of the
Court.
Nevertheless the conflicting propositions may be, and are,
coordinated and reconciled in the manner herein advocated: bail before the information is filed has been suspended; after the information is filed, the right to bail emerges in full force and effect.
Before concluding I wish to touch upon the argument that although
the only exception expressly mentioned to the right to bail is “when
the offense is capital and the evidence of guilt is strong” another
implied exception should be “when the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended.” By its effect section 1(14) of Article III (about
suspension) appears to be an exception to section 1(16) (right to bail)
of same Article III. But a little reflection will show that the
paragraph about suspension is complete in itself, containing
the general rule and the exception: the general rule being “no
suspension of the writ” and the exception, “cases of invasion” etc.
Consequently it may not be deemed as an exception to another paragraph, specially because it relates to procedure whereas the paragraph about bail is a substantive
right. And this paragraph about bail is complete in itself, with the
general rule and one exception. By the way, “an express exception excludes others.” In re Estate of Enriquez 29 Phil., 167. (See also Chartered Bank vs. Imperial 48 Phil, 931.)
My vote in this case:
Amado V. Hernandez is actually charged with rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies. That is a capital offense. But he is
entitled to bail just the same unless the evidence of his guilt is
strong. The lower court received no evidence, in the belief that the
proclamation suspended bail. The error is plain and the right of
petitioner to bail should be upheld. The respondent judge should
therefore” be directed to receive evidence for the People and then,
determining whether it is strong or not, should deny or grant bail
accordingly. Needless to say, the burden of proof lies on the
prosecution. (Moran Comments 3d. Vol. II, p. 676)
Bengzon, J. (in L-4855) :
In view of my opinion in Amado V. Hernandez vs.
Hon. Agustin P. Montesa G. R. No. L^964 I vote that the respondent
judge be required to hear the evidence for the prosecution and act
accordingly. What I said about Hernandez right to bail applies equally
to the rights of herein petitioners.
[1] 79 Phil., 670.
[2] 77 Phil., 55.
[3] 75 Phil., 634.
[1] It is not the only remedy—Mandamus or Certiorari may be used.
[2] Unjustly denying them bail might have that effect.
[3] Sy Guan vs. Amparo, 45 Off. Gaz., 2447.
[4] Ocampo vs. Bernabe, supra.
[5] Tee Han vs. Kovira, supra.
[6] Mistakenly of course
PADILLA, J.:
I am of the opinion that paragraph 14, section 1, Article III, of
the Constitution, which prohibits the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and paragraph 16 of the same
section and article, which grants to all persons before conviction the
right to be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except to those
charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong, and
enjoins that excessive bail be not required, may be invoked and applied
in normal times or during periods of normalcy in the life of the
nation, for such is the import of paragraph 14 if the exception is to
be taken into account. The exception has reference to the suspension of
the privilege during such period as the necessity for it shall exist,
which may be decreed by the President in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it (Article VII, section 10, paragraph 2, of the
Constitution). It envisages and is intended to confront an abnormal
situation pregnant with perils and dangers to the existence of the
State. The exception in paragraph 16, unlike the one in paragraph 14,
refers to the denial of bail during a period of normalcy.
Unless martial law has been declared and proclaimed by the President,
any citizen or inhabitant of the Republic may apply to the courts for a
writ of habeas corpus.
However, if upon the face of the petition it appears that the person in
whose behalf the writ is applied for is held, detained, or deprived of
his liberty by virtue of the proclamation suspending the privilege of
the writ, or if in the return to the writ by the agent of the law
holding or detaining a citizen or inhabitant or depriving him of his
liberty, he states that such citizen or inhabitant is being held,
detained, or deprived of his liberty because he is suspected of having
something to do with invasion, insurrection or rebellion and such
allegation is found true, the court to which the writ is returned need
not go further than to dismiss or deny the petition because of the
suspension by the President of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
If that is what the Court could do in the case of a detained suspect,
there would be no cogent reason for the Court to act otherwise in the
case of a detained person already indicted or charged with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, because then the detention of such person
would be more justified.
When the President decrees the suspension of the privilege of the
writ, he does it under and pursuant to a constitutional authority
(Article VII, section 10, paragraph 2, of the Constitution). He must
have reasons for the exercise of the power and authority with which he
is clothed by the Constitution. The coordinate Judicial Department
cannot inquire into the constitutionality and sufficiency of such
reasons which led him to exercise the power. The possibility of abuse
of the power does not argue against its existence, does not destroy or
remove it and does not vest in the coordinate Judicial Department the
power or authority to inquire into the constitutionality, propriety and
sufficiency of the causes which prompted the President to exercise the
power conferred upon him by the Constitution. He, too, more than
anybody else, will be judged by posterity. And any citizen chosen by
the people to hold such an exalted position is amenable also to the
hearkenings of his conscience and fearful of an adverse verdict of
history. And he knows too well that he cannot hold the office for more
than eight years.
Those who contend that when the Executive Department turns over a
detained person suspected of subversive activities to the Judicial
Department, the control of such person by the Executive ceases and the
jurisdiction of the competent court attaches and begins and the legal
process must be followed, such as the granting of bail before
conviction, except to those charged with capital offenses when evidence
of guilt is strong, and those who claim that if the competent court may
acquit such person of the charge of rebellion or insurrection, it also
must be . deemed to possess the authority to grant bail which is less
than the power to acquit, lose sight of the fact that the decree
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
authorized by the Constitution in times of abnormality and the right to
be released on bail may be secured and is granted only in times of
normalcy. The prosecution of a person detained under the terms of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ or the turning over
of such person to the competent court does not mean that such court may
ignore, disregard or brush aside the terms of the proclamation or
decree, because the latter has the effect of a law promulgated under
and pursuant to a constitutional authority. The competent court must
take into consideration and apply the terms of the proclamation to such
detained person against whom an information has been filed. The
eventuality of an acquittal does not withdraw such person from the
effects, force and vigor of the proclamation or decree. The acquittal
of such person upon the merits of the case means that he is innocent of
the charge and hence entitled to his immediate release. His acquittal
on grounds other than upon the merits of the case entitles him to an im
mediate discharge by the trial court, but he may again be apprehended
and detained under and pursuant to the terms of the proclamation. The
filing of an information .for rebellion or insurrection against such
person is an act of good faith on the part of the agents of the
Executive Department which this Court should encourage and not stifle,
so that his guilt or innocence may be determined judicially. If this
Court were to construe that, after the filing of the informations
against such person, the proclamation or decree suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ceases to have force
and effect as to him, such a construction would have the effect of
goading the agents Of the Executive Department not to file an
information and to detain him indefinitely or as long as they believe
his detention is necessary. The filing of an information only means
that the competent court should proceed to try the person charged with
rebellion, or insurrection and, if found guilty, to impose upon him the
penalty provided by law or, if found innocent, to direct his immediate
discharge. It cannot and does not mean that the competent court may
order his release on bail by sufficient sureties, because that would be
a violation of the proclamation or decree which has the effect of law.
For these reasons, I believe that after the filing of an information
for rebellion or insurrection, the defendant charged with that crime is
not entitled to be released on bail during the effectivity of the
proclamation or decree suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
TUASON, J.:
Under constitutional guaranty bail is a matter of right which no
court or judge could properly refuse in all cases beyond the exceptions
specified in the Constitution. The meaning of this fundamental
provision is that a party accused of any and every bailable offense
shall have the inestimable privilege of giving security for his
attendance at court and shall not be imprisoned. (6 C. J. 893.)
The Constitution will “be searched in vain for any provision that
abridges this right. Any argument in support of the contention that the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus carries with it the
suspension of the right to bail is, and has to be, based on
interference. I do not believe that the curtailment of the right to
bail is a normal, legal, or logical outcome of the suspension of the
writ. The error, I am inclined to believe, arises from a confusion of
terms and misapprehension of the principles underlying the suspension
of the writ.
The purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the
executive, as a precautionary measure, to detain without interference
persons suspected of harboring designs harmful to public safety. (Ex
Parte Simmerman, 132 F. 2nd, 442, 446) The Constitution goes no
further. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, 18 Law. Ed. 281, 297.) If
this is the purpose, the suspension can contemplate only cases which,
without the suspension, are open to interference; such cases are
arrests and detentions by the executive department. Since the
suspension of the writ is designed to prevent the issuance of this
extraordinary remedy, and since the writ issues from the courts but
never to the courts, it necessarily follows that arrests and detentions
by order of the courts are outside the purview of the constitutional
scheme.
As stated, the theory of the prosecution stems from a misconception
of the ends pursued by the suspension of the writ. If it is to have any
color of validity, this theory must assume that the Constitution
directs positive action to be taken, orders arrests and detentions to
be made. Unfortunately or fortunately, the Constitution does not do so.
The intent of the Constitution in authorizing the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is no other than to give the
authorities a free hand in dealing with persons bent on overthrowing
the Government. The effects of the suspension are negative, not
positive; permissive, not mandatory nor even directory. By the
suspension, arrests and detentions beyond the period allowed under
normal circumstances are tolerated or legalized. The Constitution is
not in the least concerned with the disposition of persons accused of
rebellion or insurrection, whether or how long .they should be kept in
confinement, or whether they should be set at large. In the nature of
the governmental set-up under the Constitution, their immediate fate is
left to the discretion, within reasonable and legal limits, of the
proper department.
With these distinctions in mind, the query is, on what department of
Government is entrusted the prerogative of deciding what is to be done
with the prisoners charged with or suspected of rebellion or
insurrection? The answer, as I shall endeavor presently to explain, is
either the executive or the Court, depending on who has jurisdiction
over them.
All persons detained for investigation by the executive department
are under executive control. It is here where the Constitution tells
the courts to keep their hands off— unless the cause of the detention
be for an offense other than rebellion or insurrection, which is
another matter.
By the same token, if and when formal complaint is presented, .the
court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be
an executive and becomes a judicial concern. Thereupon the
corresponding court assumes its role and the judicial process takes its
course to the exclusion of the executive or the legislative
departments. Henceforward, the accused is entitled to demand all the
constitutional safeguards and privileges essential to due process. “The
Constitution does not say that he shall be tried otherwise than by the
course of common law.” (Ex parte Milligan, ante, 297.) The
Bill of rights, including the right to bail and the right to a fair
trial, are unaffected by the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution “suspended one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.” (Ex parte Milligan, ante, 297.)
Section 1, paragraphs 14 and 16, Title III, and section 10,
paragraph 2, Article VII, of the Constitution are clear and specific
requiring no construction. The two provisions pertain to different
spheres of action devolving on different branches of the Government. To
repeat, arrests and detentions for investigation by the executive are
executive affairs beyond the reach of the courts. Arrests and
detentions after the presentment of proper indictment, are arrests
effected by court warrant and are part of the judicial process with
which the other branches can not meddle. There are no discordant
provisions to reconcile, no conflict to adjust, no obscurity to clarify.
But if we are to resort to construction, the provision which secures
the right to bail ought to prevail. This inestimable right, sanctified
by tradition and ratified by express mandate of the Constitution, can
not be abrogated by implications, much less forced implications drawn
from faulty premises. If there be inconsistency between the clauses of
the Constitution hereinbefore mentioned, which is not true, that which
would impair the right to bail should give way. The rule, applicable to
the interpretation of constitutions as well as statutes, leans heavily
on the side of a narrow construction of an exception to the operation
of the laws. (56 Am. Jur. Section 431.) And so is a rule of strict
construction generally applied to the interpretation of statutes in
derogation of rights, either of the public or of individuals, or in
derogation of their natural rights, or rights which had been enjoyed
from time immemorial. This rule has been applied to rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The scope of each statutes in
derogation of rights, either of the public or of individuals, or in
derogation of their, natural rights, or rights which had been enjoyed
from time immemorial. This rule has been applied to rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The scope of each statutes is
not to be extended beyond the usual meaning of their terms. No act
should be construed as infringing an ordinary right except by
unmistakably clear, unambiguous, and peremptory language bearing other
construction. (Idem 397.)
The precept that the express mention or enumeration of conditions
excludes, by force of logic, conditions not mentioned or enumerated,
should not be lost sight of. And it should not be forgotten, as
indicated in Ex Parte Miligan, that if the purpose of the Constitution
was to suspend the right to bail of persons accused of rebellion or
insurrection, it was easy to have accomplished it by the use of direct
words. Note also that Article VII, section 10, paragraph 2, of the
Constitution says the President may, not shall, suspend the privileges
of the writ. In fact Article III, Section 14, is couched in negative
terms. (The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may
be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist.), which plainly conveys the idea that the
Constitution is for respecting individual liberty except in case of
necessity.
To the plea that the security of the State would be jeopardized by
the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence
of danger is never a justification for courts to tamper with the
fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These rights
are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure of convenience,
expediency, or the so-called “judicial statesmanship.” The legislature
itself can not infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Eights are
incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the
Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while
the Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of
civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual
rights.
At this juncture a case not dissimilar to the
cases under consideration in their animating principle came’ up before
a United States (Second) Circuit Court. It was an application for bail
Of ten communists who had been convicted by a lower court of advocacy
of violent over throw of the United States Government. Among other
grounds of opposition to the application, the Government stressed the
peril of granting the applicants bail, judged by their past acts. Mr.
Justice Robert H. Jackson, of the United States Supreme Court, acting
as Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, overruled the objections in
an eloquent decision from which I quote the following pas sages:
“The Government’s alternative contention is that
defendants, by misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim
to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be
expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every
opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it is still
difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of
persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted
crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but uncommitted
offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger
of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a
discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such
offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted,
* * * * * * *
“But the right of every American to equal treatment
before the law is wrapped up in the same constitutional bundle with
those of these communists. If in anger or disgust with these defendants
we throw out the bundle, we also cast aside protection, for .the.
liberties of more worthy critics who may be in. opposition to. the.
government of some future day.
* * * * * * *
“If, however, I were to be wrong on all of those
abstract or theoretical matters of principle, there is a very practical
aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or
underestimated—that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of
American justice if I should now send these men to jail and the full
Court later decide that their conviction is invalid. All experience
with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial Question about
a conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed
this experience lies back of our rule permitting and practice of
allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the hazard of
unjustifiable imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our
system of justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary
case, how much more important to avoid every chance of handing to the
Communist world such an ideological weapon as it would have if this
country should imprison this handful of Communist leaders on a
conviction that our highest Court would confess to be illegal. Risks,
of course, are involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am not
naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities of the
defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the dangers,
the worst they can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the
litigation is preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment
from a celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist
leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization of
an evil force in the world to be hallowed and glorified by any
semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail these
men until it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.”
Let us bear in mind that in the case just cited, the prisoners had
already been found guilty and sentenced, and their right to bail lay
within the court’s discretion. In the cases at bar the accused have not
yet been tried and so, unless we accept the theses that the right to
bail has been suspended, bail is obligatory.
There is no denying that risk is present in every case of granting
liberty on bail. The wise men who framed the Constitution did not
overlook the possibility of escape; it was and is a matter of common
knowledge and occurrence. But the possible escape of accused was
considered a lesser evil than the imprisonment of persons who may be
innocent, and are presumed innocent by law.
As a measure of expediency, denial of bail in the instant cases
would not do away with the feared danger that the defendants might
resume their nefarious activities. Temporary liberty on bail is not as
perilous to public peace and order as complete freedom. The defendant’s
acquittal, which is by no means a remote probability, would leave the
door wide open to the dreaded consequences. The point is, if the
Government could afford the risk involved in acquittal, it could the
risk that goes with conditional liberty during the short period that it
takes to dispose of these cases.
The remark by the Judge Advocate General that by reason of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
the Army could lawfully re-arrest and re-jail the defendants if they
were absolved, happily is not the law. We are not to suppose that the
courts are being made to work in vain, that their decisions could be
ignored if they do not meet with the approval of one of the parties.
Rebellion is punishable by prision mayor and persons
accused of this crime are of right entitled to bail. The inclusion ¦ of
murders, arsons, and kidnappings in the information must be regarded as
aggravating circumstances, as in treason, and would not authorize the
imposition of a penalty higher than the maximum provided for rebellion.
Separate charges for murder, arson, and kidnapping ought to be
instituted if the defendants are to be punished for these offenses.
Murder, arson, or kidnapping is not an essential element of the
definition of rebellion. There is no such creature known to law as the
complex crime of rebellion or insurrection with murder, etc. For this
reason I am of the opinion that Judge Abaya did not err in disregarding
the offer—granting there was such an offer—of the City Fiscal to show
that the evidence against the accused is strong.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
The cases before us involve a fundamental issue which vitally
concerns the security of the State and the welfare of our people. They
involve a conflict between the State and the individual. When the right
of the individual conflicts with the security of the State, the latter
should be held paramount. This is the self evident political
shibboleth. The State is the political body that stands for society and
for the people to secure which individual rights must give way and
yield. For as Justice Holmes well said, “when it conies to a decision
by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary
rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of
the moment” (Moyer vs. Peabody, 55 Law. Ed. 410). Only having
in mind this fundamental point of view can we determine in its true
light the important case before us which has no precedent in the annals
of our jurisprudence.
The President has issued the Proclamation under consideration with
one primordial purpose: to promote, protect, and maintain the security
of the nation. To his attention was brought definite evidence showing
that groups or bands of people have taken up arms against the
Government, or have engaged in subversive activities in several
provinces, causing disturbances and hampering the peace and tranquility
and the normal pursuits of the people. Already many had been wounded
and killed, and many more are falling in the bloody trail. And the
victims are civilians and military men alike. Stern measures had to be
adopted to stave off a greater peril. The President saw no other course
of action. A picture of the situation is well reflected in several
passages of the Proclamation.
In the light of the precepts of our Constitution, the issuance of
the Proclamation has no other legal consequence than the limitation of
the right of the individual to his liberty. This is the immediate
effect of the suspension of the .privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
No other right or privilege vouchsafed to him by the Constitution has
thereby been affected or impaired which he is free to invoke in line
with the processes prescribed by our statutes. For, paraphrasing
Justice Davis, “The illustrious men who framed that instrument (whose
provisions are similar to ours on this point) limited the suspension to
one great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable” (Ex
parte Milligan, 18 U; S. [Law. Ed.] 281, 297). And in our opinion this
limitation or restraint must continue so long as the Proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ remains pending if it is to
achieve its wholesome purpose, or so long as the detainee is not
pronounced innocent by our courts of justice. If the person indicted is
pronounced innocent, the Government has no cause to hold him in
confinement. His case does not come within the purview of the
Proclamation.
Three fundamental reasons may be advanced in support of the view we
have expressed in the preceding paragraph. These reasons are: (1) the
express terms of the Proclamation; (2) the purpose of the Proclamation;
and (3) the nature of the writ of habeas corpus. Tested under
the force and strength of these reasons, the only logical conclusion
that can be drawn in keeping with sound rules of statutory construction
is that the herein petitioner should be denied the right to bail.
- The concluding paragraph of the Proclamation recites that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be suspended “for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained
for the crimes of sedition, insurrection, or rebellion, and all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith”. Note the
word “detained” employed in the Proclamation. It is employed without
any qualification or distinction. To detain is “to hold or keep as in
custody” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2nd ed.). A person
detained for purposes of investigation is no different from one
detained after his arrest resulting from his indictment. One is held in
custody or deprived of his liberty if he is detained before or after he
is actually indicted. The scope of the Proclamation covers both. It is
elementary in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, we ought not to distinguish. This is too obvious to
require elaboration. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that in the
light of the very terms of the Proclamation the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus applies alike to all
persons detained for the offenses enumerated therein whether formal
charges had been filed against them or not.
“The meaning of this provision in the constitution
of the United States would seem to be that, when the public safety is
endangered by rebellion, or invasion, the privilege of this writ
(habeas corpus) may be suspended as to persons suspected of or charged
with aiding, sustaining or promoting such rebellion or invasion, and
thereby endangering the public safety.” (39 CJS 754-755; People vs. Gaul, 44 Barb. 98, N. Y., underscoring and word in parenthesis supplied.)
- As we have already adverted to, the paramount
purpose behind the issuance of the Proclamation is to protect and
safeguard public safety or national security or “to insure the peace
and security of the population and to maintain the authority of the
Government”. This is the compelling objective of the Proclamation. The
reasons and motives that have compelled the President to issue it are
well narrated therein all pointing in bold relief to the necessity of
placing the persons affected under restraint to prevent them from
strengthening the forces of rebellion and increasing the danger to
national security. If there is justification for their confinement
while they are under investigation for the purpose of determining their
participation or complicity in the acts for which they are held under
suspicion, there is indeed more cogent and plausible reason, if not
more, to keep them behind bars after they are indicted and turned over
to the courts for the corresponding prosecution. Before they are
indicted and formally charged, the right to hold them is merely
predicated on suspicion or at best on circumstantial evidence of
doubtful probative value. But after formal charges are filed against
them, the suspicion becomes strengthened and the evidence reinforced
and secure. The military authorities could hold them in confinement
indefinitely if they so prefer, but they chose to turn them over to the
courts not merely to give them an opportunity to prove their
innocence but as a proof of their abiding faith in the processes of
democracy. To release them on bail after their indictment would be to
defeat the very purpose of the Proclamation because its logical result
would be to give freedom to those who, if before were mere suspects,
now are a real menace because the evidence against them is stronger and
more compelling. We are not prepared to adopt an interpretation that
would give such absurd and inconsistent result. - Considering the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus
in the light of law and precedents, the same conclusion can be reached.
The law and precedents on the matter reveal to us that that writ is
the only remedy open to a person held in confinement regardless of its
nature. Section 1 of Rule 102, speaking of the scope of that writ,
provides that it “shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty”. It refers to
all cases of confinement, whether before indictment or thereafter. It
does not make any distinction. Precedents available here and elsewhere
point to the same conclusion. They are all ‘agreed that if a person is
deprived of his liberty, his only remedy is to invoke that writ whether
in the form of mandamus or certiorari. So we said m a case recently
decided in this jurisdiction (People vs. Alano, No. L-1801,
May 14, 1946; 45 Off. Gaz., No. 11, pp. 4935-4936). It has also been
held that this privilege is not only the right to be discharged from
imprisonment, but also the right to give bail if the offense is
bailable, and if not bailable, the right to a speedy trial and without
arbitrary delay. (In re Dugan, 1865-6 D. C 131, 139, see also in re
Fagan, B. C. Mass. 1863, 2 Sprague, 91, 8 Fed. Cases No. 4604). It is,
therefore, an all embracing remedy the purpose of which is to test the
legality of restraint irrespective of its nature. If this is the only
remedy available to one deprived of his liberty it logically follows
that the Proclamation denies him the right to bail.
The power of the President to hold in custody indefinitely a
person suspected of any of the acts covered by the Proclamation is not
disputed. In fact opposing counsel are ‘agreed that the President may
so hold him so long as he believes it imperative to safeguard public
safety. What they contend is that while that is an untrammelled
prerogative of the Chief Executive granted to him by the Constitution,
his function ends the moment he submits the case to the courts of
justice. From that moment, they contend the executive function ends and
the judicial function begins. Since then the accused is placed under
the absolute power and authority of the courts to be dealt with in
accordance with law and the constitution.
We have no quarrel with this pretense if carried to its logical
conclusion. We concede that once the case is brought to court the
indictee is placed under the full command of the court who can exercise
over him his plenary jurisdiction. We also concede that the detainee,
once indicted, can invoke in his favor all the rights guaranteed to him
by law and the Constitution if he deems it necessary to protect his
interest. And in this sense, he can invoke his right to a speedy trial,
to be defended by counsel, to be confronted by and cross-examine
witnesses, to have compulsory process in his favor, to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to such other rights granted
to the accused in ordinary cases. He may even ask for time to prepare
for trial. This right is not denied to him for the simple reason of his
confinement for he can always confer with his counsel or witnesses if
he so desires, and the jail authorities, to be sure, will not dare deny
him this privilege. In other words, he is not denied due process of law
simply because of his confinement. The only limitation on his rights
refers to his freedom which, as already stated, has been withheld from
him by the Proclamation. The contention that to deny the accused the
right to bail once the court has acquired jurisdiction over him would
be a relinquishment of a judicial prerogative cannot stand in the light
of what we have heretofore stated because that power has been
obliterated as a necessary consequence of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What is not possessed
cannot be relinquished. Under the same token the denial of bail is not
a denial of a right because the same has been withheld by the
Proclamation. And good reasons may be invoked in support of this
limitation of right.
It should be noted that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the right of an accused person to bail are both embodied in the
Bill of Eights of our Constitution. Section 1(14) of article III,
refers to the first, and Section 1 (16) of the same Article refers to
the second. It should also be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has reference only to
cases of invasion, insurrection, and rebellion, whereas the right of an
accused person to bail refers to all offenses with the exception only
of those involving capital punishment when evidence of guilt is strong.
Paragraph 14 is, therefore, a provision which is special or specific in
nature, whereas paragraph 16 is a general one. And it is a well known
rule of statutory construction that “when general and special
provisions of a constitution are in conflict, the special provisions
should be given effect to the extent of their scope, leaving the
general provisions to control in cases where the special provisions do
not apply” (16 C.J.S. p. 65) ; or “where there is a conflicting
specific and general provision, or a particular intent which is
incompatible with a general intent, the specific provision or
particular intent will be treated as an exception, and should receive a
strict, but reasonable, construction. The courts will neither curtail a
general rule nor add to an exception by implication” (16 C.J.S. p. Q6).
And, under this rule, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
the habeas corpus should be treated as an exception to the
general clause providing for bail to all persons charged with offenses
not involving a capital punishment. Another rule is that, “in case of a
conflict in the provisions of a constitution, if one or the other must
yield, the one which, under the law, is the lesser right will yield”
(16 C.J.S. p. 65). And speaking of the two conflicting provisions,
there is no doubt that the suspension of the privilege is a greater
right because it involves the security of the State. The right to bail
must, therefore, yield because it merely involves the right of an
individual.
There are other rules that may be invoked in support of our theory.
Thus, it was held that “in ascertaining both the intent and general
purpose, as well as the meaning, of a constitution or a part thereof,
it should be construed as a whole. As far as possible, each provision should be construed so as to harmonize with all the others, (yet)
with a view to giving effect to each and every provision in so far as
it shall be consistent with the construction of the instrument as a
whole” (16 C.J.S. p. 62). And “The presumption ‘and legal intendment is
that each and every clause in a written constitution has been inserted
for some useful purpose, and courts should avoid a construction which
would render any portion of the constitution meaningless” (16 C.J.S.,
p. 64).
In the light of the foregoing rules no other conclusion can be
reached, for to hold that because of the incidence of the filing of a
formal charge the court can grant an indictee his liberty under bail as
counsel now contend would be to render ineffective and nugatory the
suspension of the privilege exercised by virtue of a mandate of the
same constitution. That is an unreasonable interpretation. It is our
duty to reconcile and harmonize them so that both provisions can be
given effect and validity. We should give them a fair, consistent and
harmonious interpretation.
“It would be an absurdity to say that the action of
the executive, under such circumstance, may be negatived and set at
naught by the judiciary, or that the action of the executive may be
interfered with or impugned by the judiciary. If the courts are to be
made a sanctuary, a city of refuge * * * they will soon cease to be
that palladium of the rights of the citizen * * *.”“It is not the province of the courts to hinder, delay, or place obstructions in the path of duty prescribed by law for the executive, but rather to render to him all the aid and assistance in
their power in his efforts to bring about the consummation most
devoutly prayed for by every good and law-abiding citizen in the
state.” (In re Boyle, 45 L.R.A. 832, 836-837; underscoring supplied.)
Our country is in distress. Our individual and collective security
in great peril. Our Chief Executive has taken stock of the gravity of
the situation and to avert the spread of the subversive movement, has
issued the Proclamation under consideration. It is our duty to find a
way within the tenets of the law to the end that this great and
compelling objective may be brought to a happy and successful fruition.
For all the foregoing reasons, I vote for denial of the right to bail.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring in the result (in L-5102):
In G. R. No. L-5102 entitled Eugenio Angeles, the City Fiscal of Manila vs.
Hon. Gavino S. Abaya, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, I vote for the granting of the petition that the respondent
Judge be ordered to hear the evidence of the prosecution to enable it
to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt of the defendants as
authorized by section 1(16), Article III of our Constitution.
I predicate my vote merely on a matter of procedure which the
respondent Judge has disregarded notwithstanding the express request
made to that etfect by the prosecution. The reasons advanced for
denying such request are in my opinion untenable because the order of
September 12, 1951, granting bail was not yet final when the request to
present evidence was made and because estoppel does not operate against
law and the Constitution. When, therefore, the respondent Judge denied
the request of the prosecution to be given that opportunity considering
the circumstances that had concurred in the incident regarding bail, he
committed an abuse of discretion.
The prosecution is entitled to be given an opportunity to present
evidence as to the guilt of the defendants because the information
charges a capital offense. There was, therefore, room for the
respondent Judge to act on the petition to grant bail to defendants
without passing on the controversial question touching on the effect of
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the right to bail.
On this question, I have already expressed my view in a separate
decision. The vote of the Court on this issue is divided and so far no
decision has been reached. My vote in this case is merely limited to a
matter of procedure which in my opinion should be decided in favor of
the prosecution.
FERIA, J., dissenting (in L-4855 and L-4964) :
I dissent from the minute resolution which dismisses the petitions
in these cases under section 2 of Rule 56, on the ground that after the
rehearing thereof the necessary majority of six votes can not be had
for the pronouncement of a judgment or decision.
In view of the result of the last deliberation and voting in these
cases, five (5) Justices to four (4), and the fact that there is one
vacancy now in the Supreme Court and Justice Montemayor, one of the
Justices, is absent on vacation abroad, I submitted to the Supreme
Court in bane the proposition, which was not accepted, that a
recommendation be made by the Honorable Chief Justice of this Court to
the President of the Philippines for the designation of two Justices of
the Court of Appeals or district judges to sit temporarily as Justices
of the Supreme Court until a judgment in this case is reached by the
concurrence of six Justices, under section 9 of Judiciary Act of 1948,
Republic Act No. 296. Said section 9 provides that “if on account of
illness, absence, incapacity upon any of the grounds mentioned in
section 1, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court of any of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, or whenever, by reason of temporary disability of
any Justice thereof or vacancies occurring therein, the requisite
number of six Justices necessary to render or in a judgment in any
given case can not be had, the President of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Chief Justice, may designate such number of
Justices of the Court of Appeals or district judges as may be necessary
to sit temporarily as Justices of the Supreme Court, until a judgment
in said case is reached.” Had the Chief Justice of this Court made that
recommendation and the President designated two .Justices of the Court
of Appeals or District judges to sit temporarily as Justices of the
Supreme Court, a judgment in the present case must have necessarily
been reached.
Section 2 of Rule 56, in connection with section 1 of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, provides that “When the Supreme Court in bane is
equally divided in opinion or the necessary majority can not be had,
the case shall be reheard and if on rehearing no decision is reached,
the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in
appealed cases the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed
in civil cases?” and in criminal cases “the judgment of conviction of
the lower court shall be reversed, and the defendant acquitted
according to section 12 of Rule 120. Said provisions of the Rules, of
Court were relatively of more frequent application to cases to be
decided by the Supreme Court at the time and after said Rules were
promulgated in 1940, because the number of Justices of the Supreme
Court was reduced to seven by the Commonwealth Act No. 3 approved on
December 31, 1935, which created the Court of Appeals although the
second paragraph of section 2 of said Commonwealth Act. No. 3 contained
substantially the same provisions as those of the second paragraph
above-quoted of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. In People vs.
Galang, No. 46787 decided on September 12, 1941, (73 Phil. 184, 201),
Justices Paras and Hontiveros of the Court of Appeals were designated
by the President to act as Justices of the Supreme Court in ]ieu of
Justices Santos and Ozaeta under said section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
3, and there were also several such designations after the occupation
in cases decided by this Court.
But after the new Judiciary Act of 1948 was approved increasing the
number of Justices from seven to eleven, the above quoted provisions of
section 2 of Rule 56 and section 12 of Rule 120 became almost obsolete,
because there will always be eleven (11) Justices of the Supreme Court
present and qualified to act, by the designation of sufficient number
of Justices of the Court of Appeals or District Judges by the President
of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court if necessary in any given case until a judgment is
reached according to section 9 of the above quoted of the Judiciary Act
of 1948. With eleven qualified Justices of the Supreme Court present,
the concurrence of six Justices necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment may always be had, except in very exceptional cases in which,
notwithstanding such designation of temporary Justices of the
President, the concurrence of six Justices can not be had, and said
provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied.
I am of the opinion that the provisions of section 2, Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court can not be applied to the present case, which is a very
important one and requires a decision on the merits by the majority of
this Court, because no recommendation has been made by the Chief
Justice to the President of the Philippines to designate two Justices
of the Court of Appeals or district judges to sit temporarily as
Justices of the Supreme Court, for as above stated there is one vacancy
in this Court and Justice Montemayor is absent on vacation abroad.
As there is no decision in the present case it is not necessary for the
members of this Court to write their individual opinion or concur in
the opinion of others, and for that reason I am not writing down my
opinion on the merits.