THE ESTATE/HEIRS OF DONATO CRUZ, CONSOLACION CRUZ- CONSTANTINO AND LINA CRUZ-MERCADO,[] PETITIONERS VS. HON. WILFREDO T. NIEVES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGION…
GARCIA-FERNANDEZ, M.V., J.:
Celso Barreto and Rosario Barreto-Cruz were husband and wife. Celso died intestate on April 5, 1997 while Rosario also died intestate on March 18, 2005. They had no children but they allegedly left several real and personal properties in possession of Rosario’s nephews and nieces namely, Consolacion Cruz-Constantino, Armando “Ding” Cruz, Rosendo Cruz, Yolanda Cruz and Lina Cruz-Mercado (defendants).[2]
On May 18, 2007, Rosario’s sister Victoria Cruz-Roxas (Victoria), through her attorney-in-fact, Gaspar C. Roxas, filed a complaint[3] for partition, reconveyance, accounting and damages against the defendants in the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan. The complaint was raffled to Branch 84, presided by public respondent Judge Nieves. Victoria claimed that she is one of the heirs of Rosario Cruz-Barreto and entitled to a share in the latter’s estate which was in possession of the children of Donato Cruz; that she demanded partition and accounting of the properties of Rosario, but the children of Donato Cruz did not heed the demand; that she suffered sleepless nights, anxiety, moral shock and besmirched reputation that warrants the award of moral damages.
Meanwhile, the private respondents, heirs of Vicenta A. Baretto-Llamosa, who claimed to be the heirs of Rosario’s husband, Celso Barreto, filed a motion for intervention on August 2, 2007.[4] Defendants opposed the motion asserting that the heirs of Vicenta Barreto-Llamosa are not parties-in-interest; that the movants’ alleged interest is not direct and immediate but only contingent, hence, insufficient to justify the intervention; that the intervention will alter the nature of the action and the issues in that case and will further delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and that their claim may be properly decided in a separate proceedings.[5]
On November 7, 2007, respondent judge issued an order[6] granting the motion for intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention, and further requiring defendants to file an answer-in-intervention within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Private respondents, heirs of Jose Cruz De Jesus[7] and the heir of Gregorio Aurora A. Bandino[8] also filed separate motions for intervention and complaints-in-intervention.[9] On the other hand, the complaint filed by Victoria Cruz-Roxas was also amended to include the intestate estate of the spouses Celso Barreto and Rosario Cruz-Barreto,[10] and the estate of Donato Cruz,[11] as defendants.
Defendants in their answer denied the allegations in the amended complaints of Victroria Cruz-Roxas, and the complaints-in-intervention. They averred that the intestate estate of Celso Barreto had already been settled extrajudicially by Rosario Cruz-Barreto and by Celso’s nephews and nieces, wherein the latter already waived their rights over Celso’s estate in favor of Rosario; that as a result of the extrajudicial settlement, Rosario acquired full ownership of the entire estate; that during the lifetime of Rosario, she donated all her properties to his brother Donato Cruz, hence, Rosario left no properties for settlement; that the ownership of the properties donated to Donato became part of his estate and passed on to defendants as their inheritance; that there is no longer any property to be settled or partitioned, thus, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[12]
After the pre-trial, counsel for the plaintiff Victoria Cruz-Roxas withdrew his appearance due to the plaintiff’s lack of interest to prosecute the case,[13] followed by a motion to withdraw complaint[14] filed by the plaintiff. Intervenors interposed no objection to the withdrawal of the plaintiff’s complaint, but asserted that the withdrawal cannot affect their cause of action against the defendants, but only operates as waiver of rights over the properties by the plaintiffs; and that the complaints-in-intervention will survive despite the withdrawal or dismissal of the main action.[15] Defendants did not also object to the withdrawal of the plaintiff but contended that the withdrawal of the original complaint would result in the dismissal of the complaints-in-intervention.[16]
On June 23, 2009, respondent judge granted the motion to account and deposit rentals and directed the defendants to render an accounting of the income, as well as, the expenses for the maintenance of properties and to deposit the excess amount in court pending resolution of the case.[17]
On October 9, 2009, respondent judge issued the assailed order granting the motion to withdraw the complaint but allowing the complaints-in-intervention to proceed. Respondent judge held that the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action would not affect the intervenors’ complaints that had already been admitted by the court; that the allowance of the intervention would completely settle the claims of the alleged heirs and will preclude a possible multiplicity of suits if the intervenors would be required to pursue their cause in a separate case. Thus:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion at bench, the same is granted and the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. On the other hand, the complaints-in-intervention are allowed to proceed. Let this case proceed with the presentation of intervenors’ evidence on October 6, 2009, as previously scheduled.
Record shows that defendants have not submitted their compliance with the Order dated June 23, 2009, thus, they (defendants) are given five (5) days from receipt hereof to comply therewith and to explain within the same period their failure to do so when so directed.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the heirs of Donato Cruz, Consolacion Cruz-Constantino, Armando R. Cruz, Heirs of Rosendo R. Cruz, Yolanda R. Cruz and Lina Cruz-Mercado. Noting that only Consolacion Cruz-Constantino and Lina Cruz-Mercado signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, this Court directed the petitioners to submit a special power of attorney in favor of Consolacion and Lina.[18] When petitioners failed to submit the required special power of attorney, this Court dropped Armando R. Cruz, the heirs of Rosendo R. Cruz and Yolanda R. Cruz as co-petitioners in this case.[19]
Petitioners cite their grounds of the petition, to wit:
1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS (sic) DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE COMPLAINTS-IN-INTERVENTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO PROCEED DESPITE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT UPON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW;
2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS (sic) DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDER FOR ACCOUNTING AND DEPOSIT OF RENTALS DESPITE DISMISSAL OF THE MAIN ACTION;
3. THERE IS NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAINT (sic), SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE COURSE OF LAW.[20]
This Court will deal first with the procedural issue. Unmistakably, before a petition for certiorari can prosper, the petitioners must be able to show, among others, that they do not have any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This remedy is referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 as a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order.[21]
In the case of petitioners, the remedy of motion for reconsideration was still available to them when they filed the instant petition for certiorari. Yet, they did not avail this remedy and instead elevated the orders of the RTC to this Court via petition for certiorari. This procedural faux pas warrants the outright dismissal of the petition.
Even if this Court were to decide on the merits, no cogent reason exists to annul and set aside the assailed order of the RTC.
Petitioners assert that the complaint-in-intervention is merely ancilliary to the main action. Citing J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Hon. Torres,[22] Barangay Matictic v. Hon. J.M. Elbinias[23] and Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Hon. Ricafort,[24] they allege that the dismissal of the main action, upon motion of the plaintiff, necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaints-in-intervention.
Indeed, jurisprudence is trite with rulings that an intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an independent action. It is regarded as collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action and not an independent proceeding. It is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on and subsidiary to, the case between the original parties.[25] As such, the final dismissal of the main case necessarily includes dismissal of the intervention.
In this case, however, there is no final dismissal of the case in the RTC. The order on October 5, 2009 which granted the motion to withdraw by the plaintiff certainly did not result in the dismissal of the complaints-in-intervention that had been admitted by the trial court, thus:
[T]he joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the respective claims of the said original parties inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the claim of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original parties.[26]
This Court agrees with the RTC that the withdrawal of the complaint by the plaintiff only affected her claim against the petitioners, but cannot in any way affect private respondents’ intervention. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Presiding Judge of RTC, Manila,[27] is instructive, viz.:
Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may intervene in such action, and when he has become a party thereto it is error for the court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an agreement between the original parties to the action. Any settlement made by the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor is a party to it.
By the very definition of “intervention,” the intervenor is a party to the action as the original parties and to make his right effectual he must necessarily have the same power as the original parties, subject to the authority of the court reasonably to control the proceedings in the case.
Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his interests, an intervenor is entitled to have the issues raised between him and the original parties tried and determined. He had submitted himself and his cause of action to the jurisdiction of the court and was entitled to relief as though he were himself a party in the action.
After the intervenor has appeared in the action, the plaintiff has no absolute right to put the intervenor out of court by the dismissal of the action. The parties to the original suit have no power to waive or otherwise annul the substantial rights of the intervenor. When an intervening petition has been filed, a plaintiff may not dismiss the action in any respect to the prejudice of the intervenor.
It has even been held that the simple fact that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff”s action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be defeated by dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after the filing of the petition and notice thereof to the other parties. A person who has an interest in the subject matter of the action has the right, on his own motion, to intervene and become a party to the suit, and even after the complaint has been dismissed, may proceed to have any actual controversy established by the pleadings determined in such action. The trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor.
The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be heard like any other party. A claim in intervention that seeks affirmative relief prevents a plaintiff from taking a voluntary dismissal of the main action. Where a complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiff’s action had been expressly dismissed, the intervenor’s complaint was not subject to dismissal on the ground that no action was pending, since dismissal of plaintiffs action did not affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the dismissal of intervenor’s complaint. An intervenor’s petition showing it to be entitled to affirmative relief will be preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of the principal action.
In Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines,[28] the Supreme Court sustained the allowance of an intervention despite the dismissal of the main action for lack of personality of the plaintiff, holding thus:
[I]t should be noted that the private respondents also filed a Complaint-in-Intervention which was granted by the RTC. The complaint in intervention reiterated the material allegations in the complaint and prayed for the same reliefs, plus damages. Hence, even if the main action is dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had no personality to file the action, the complaint in intervention will remain. Dismissal of the plaintiff’s action would not necessarily result in the dismissal of the intervenor’s complaint in intervention. An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his interest, an intervenor is entitled to have the issues raised between him and the original parties tried and determined.
With this as jurisprudential yardstick, this Court sustains the RTC for allowing the intervention to proceed. Furthermore, considerations of equity weigh heavily in favor of private respondents. To require them to refile another case for the settlement of their claims will necessarily result in greater prejudice and delay, aside from the inevitable consequence that it will entail multiplicity of suits.[29] Respondent judge, therefore, acted well within his discretion in allowing the intervention to proceed.
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioners should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so because “grave abuse of discretion” is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose.[30] In this case, the order of respondent judge can hardly be characterized as grave abuse of discretion amounting to jurisdictional error that would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari.
Anent the order granting the motion for accounting and deposit, this Court notes that the assailed order was issued on June 23, 2009 and was certainly received by petitioners more than sixty (60) days from the filing of this petition. Section 4, Rule 65 provides that the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the judgment. Therefore, it is too late in the day for petitioners to assail the order on June 23, 2009 in this petition for certiorari.
Certainly, the order granting the motion to account and deposit was not rendered moot by the withdrawal of the complaint by Victoria Cruz-Roxas. A perusal of the complaints-in-intervention shows that the intervenors also prayed for accounting and deposit of rentals, hence, respondent judge cannot be considered whimsical for resolving the plea for accounting and deposit prayed for in the complaints-in-intervention.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Lampas peralta, F., (Chairperson) and Acosta, F. P., JJ., concur.
[*] Armando “Ding” R. Cruz, Heirs of Rosendo R. Cruz and Yolanda R. Cruz were dropped as petitioners per Resolution promulgated on June 29, 2019, rollo, pp. 302-303.
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[2] See Complaint for (sic) Intervention, id. at 74-81.
[3] Id. at 42-47.
[4] Id. at 74-81.
[5] Id. at 82-89.
[6] Id. at 90-91.
[7] Motion for Intervention, id. at 146-148
[8] Id. at 146 -148.
[9] See Complaint for (sic) Intervention, id. at 177-184.
[10] Id. at 103-107. See also Amended Complaint, id. at 108-113.
[11] See Urgent Motion to Amend Complaint with Leave of Court, id. at 198-203; see also Fourth Amended Complaint, id. at 204-217.
[12] See Amended Answer, id. at 235-247; see also Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaims (to the complaint-in-intervention of Heirs of Jose Cruz De Jesus) and Consolidated Answer, id. at 248-256 and 257-265, respectively.
[13] Id. at 276-277.
[14] Id. at 278-279.
[15] Id. at 280-282.
[16] Id. at 286-287.
[17] Id. at 37-39.
[18] Id. at 290-291
[19] Resolution promulgated on June 29, 2010, id. at 302-303.
[20] Id. at 16.
[21] See Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. no. 194104, March 13, 2013.
[22] G.R. No. L-24559, July 22, 1981.
[23] G.R. No. L-48769, February 22, 1987.
[24] G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006.
[25] Asian Terminal, Inc. v. Hon. Ricafort, supra. note 24; International Pipes v. Italit Costruction & Development Co., G.R. No. 127543, August 16, 2001; Saw v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.90580, April 8, 1991. Barangay Matictic v. Hon. Elbinias, supra note 23, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Hon. Torres, supra note 22,
[26] Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, G.R. No. 899090, September 21, 1990.
[27] Id.
[28] G.R. No. 151424, July 4, 2008.
[29] See Camacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79564, November 24, 1989.
[30] See Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155306. August 28, 2013.