G.R. No. L-14495. September 29, 1962
VICENTE UY CHAO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DE LA RAMA STEAMSHIP CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
of First Instance of Manila of July 22, 1958, dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 35269, and the order of August 4, 1958, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal.
The action, commenced on February 11, 1958, is for collection of a sum of
money for certain purchases made by appellee from appellant during the period
between October 1 and December 1, 1941, plus interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, attorney’s fees and costs. Appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that
the cause of action had prescribed. Appellant opposed the motion, pleading that
the running of the ten-year prescriptive period had been interrupted by the debt
moratorium statutes (Executive Orders No. 25 and 32 and Republic Act No. 342).
In the written arguments submitted by the parties in connection with the motion
the issue was raised as to whether the interruption was only up to July 26,
1948, the date of enactment of Republic Act No. 342, which lifted the moratorium
granted by the previous statutes except with respect to pre-war debtors who had
filed war damage claims, as to whom the moratoruim was extended for eight years
after such claims were settled, or the interruption was up to May 18, 1953, when
this Court, in the case of Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil., 68; 49 Off. Gaz. 1807,
declared the further operation of the said act unreasonable and oppressive and
hence unconstitutional and void. The issue is one of law, but carried with it
the factual question of whether or not appellee was a war suffer and had filed a
war damage claim with the United States-Philippine War Damage Commission.
On March 25, 1958 the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground, among others, that the issue was evidentiary in nature and that “it
cannot be determined with certainty from the allegations of the complaint
whether or not the action has already prescribed.” On April 7, 1958 appellee
filed a motion to reconsider the order of denial, to which motion a written
opposition was presented by appellant. On June 13, 1918, ruling that it was
incumbent upon appellant, as plaintiff, to prove that his debtor was a war
sufferer who had filed a war damage claim, the court set the motion for
reconsideration for hearing on July 19.
On July 10, 1958 appellant served upon appellee a written request for
admission, under Rule 23, that it was a war sufferer and had filed such war
damage claim. On July 14 appellee moved to strike the request for admission on
the ground that it was improper at that stage of the case, as no answer to the
complaint had yet been submitted. The motion to strike was accompanied by a
request that it be heard on July 19, 1958, the same date set for the hearing of
appellee’s motion for reconsideration.
On July 22, 1958 the court issued the following order, which is now the
subject of review:
“When this case was called for hearing for the reception of evidence of
plaintiff that defendant is a war sufferer and had presented a claim with the
United States-Philippine War Damage Commission, plaintiff presented as his only
evidence a request for admission dated July 10, 1958 and confessed that it has
no other evidence to support the fact in issue. It is even contended that the
burden of proving such fact lies on the defendant’s prescription according to
plaintiff being a matter of defense. Plaintiff, however, loses sight of the fact
that it is he who claims that, and would benefit if, the period of prescription
does not run between 1948 when Republic Act 342 became effective and the
promulgation of the Rutter case in 1953. Having claimed the exemption, and being
to his advantage, the burden of proof lies on plaintiff to establish the fact in
issue (David vs. Barreto, G. R. No. L-10882, prom. May 21, 1957). However, it
cannot be proven by the failure of defendant to answer the request for admission
under Rule 23, which is applicable only after the pleadings are closed; and in
the present case, defendant has not presented any pleading, but merely a second
motion to dismiss.“Wherefore, in accordance with the David case and plaintiff not having shown
that defendant falls within the purview of Republic Act 342, the complaint is
dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
The issue now before us concerns the correctness of the dismissal of the
complaint, considering, on one hand, its failure to allege that
defendant-appellee was a war sufferer and, on the other hand, the pendency, at
the time motion to dismiss was heard and resolved, of a request for admission by
appellee precisely of that fact not alleged in the complaint.
Rule 23, Section 1, provides:
“SECTION 1. Request for admission.—At any time after the pleadings
are closed, a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described
in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of
fact set forth therein. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the
request unless copies have already been furnished.”
Appellee’s position, sustained by the court below, is that the complaint must
be tested on the strength of its allegations alone when the motion to dismiss
was presented; that since it appears therein that the cause of action arose in
1941 it had already prescribed when the complaint was filed in 1958; that the
debt moratorium which interrupted the period of prescription was that provided
for in Executive Order No. 32, which was lifted by Republic Act No. 342 on July
26, 1948; and that the exception in said act with respect to pre-war debtors who
were war sufferers and had filed war damage claims, as to whom the moratorium
remained in force, cannot be availed of by appellant against the plea of
prescription because it was neither alleged nor proved that appellee was a war
sufferer.
As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion to
dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of facts alleged herein.
The allegations, however, although showing that the cause of action accrued in
1941, seventeen years before the complaint was filed, do not indubitably
establish the validity of the plea of prescription, for they do not necessarily
rule out the possibility that appellee was a war sufferer and had filed a war
damage claim. This possibility was recognized by the trial court when it
declared that the issue required presentation of evidence and consequently set
the same for hearing on July 19,1958. If appellee had complied with appellant’s
request for admission the issue of fact would have been resolved, one way or the
other; but appellee ignored it and filed a motion to strike instead, and the
court ruled in effect that appellee’s stand was correct on the ground that the
request for admission was premature, the pleadings not having yet been closed as
provided in section 1 of Rule 23.
The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and
genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the
costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, U.S.C.A. Title 28, Section 723c, p. 624. The reason for the
requirement that such request must be made after the pleading are closed is that
the questions of fact involved in a case are required into only when it reaches
the stage of proof. But where this stage, as to any particular relevant fact, is
accelerated by a motion to dismiss which cannot be fairly resolved without
evidence thereon being received, the purpose of the rule comes into play. In so
far as that fact is concerned the issue is already joined and the pleadings may
be deemed to be closed within the meaning of Rule 23. To hold otherwise would be
to substitute technicality for substance and hamper an expeditious inquiry into
the facts, contrary to the principle of liberal construction of the rules “in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding” (Section 2,
Rule 1).
Furthermore, the fact that in dismissing the complaint the court below did
not make a definite finding as to whether or not appellee was a war sufferer and
had filed a war damage claim, leaving the question still dangling and
unresolved, shows that the ground of the motion to dismiss does not appear to be
indubitable, for which reason the court would have been justified in allowing an
amendment of the complaint so as to include therein the necessary allegation on
that question of fact, or deferring the determination of the motion until the
trial, as prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 8.
The orders appealed from are set aside and the court a quo is
directed to give due course to appellant’s request for admission by requiring
appellee to comply, within a period to be fixed by said court but not less than
10 days from notice, with the procedure laid down in Section 2 of Rule 23.
Costs against appellee.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.