SATURNINO AGUILAR AND MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, APPLICANTS AND APPELLEES, VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

The Public Service Commissioner, on November
29, 1922, granted Tomas Mata a certificate of public convenience
whereby he was authorized to operate one passenger truck between the
City of Manila and the municipality of Salinas, Cavite Province. On or
about January 25, 1924, Tomas Mata sold this truck and his certificate
of public convenience to Saturnino Aguilar subject to the approval of
the Public Service Commission. Upon due application this sale was
approved and the corresponding certificate of public convenience was
issued in favor of Saturnino Aguilar, the second paragraph of which
reads as follows:

“2. ª Que el auto-truck del aqui
cesionario al pasar por los sitios donde hay estaciones del ferrocarril
de la Manila Railroad Company, no hara paradas cerca de dichas
estaciones para recoger pasajeros o carga y permitira que los agentes
de tales estaciones o los inspectores de trafico de dicha compania
puedan hacerle parar para averiguar de una manera adecuada y
conveniente la hora de salida del punto de origen de su viaje, la cual
hora de salida se hara constar en los recibos de pasaje o carga que se
expidan, asi como tambien la hora de llegada al punto terminal del
mismo viaje.”

While Aguilar was the owner of this certificate it was modified in
only one respect and that modification consisted in a change of the
hours of departure from and arrival at Manila and Salinas.

On June 14, 1933, Aguilar sold the above-mentioned transportation
business and his certificate of public convenience to the Manila
Railroad Company. An application for the approval of this sale was
filed on that same day. By an order of the commission dated June 30,
1933, this application was set for hearing on July 13, 1933, and the
applicants were directed to have that order published once, ten days
prior to the date of hearing, either in The Tribune or La Vanguardia.

The Toledo Transportation Company filed an opposition which was
later withdrawn. An attorney appeared for the Pasay Transportation
Company, but after examining the application he did not file an
opposition to the approval of the sale.

Paragraph 4 of this application for approval of the sale reads:

“That the sale and transfer of said business will
not be detrimental to the public interests, in as much as the purchaser
and transferee will continue the operation of same in the same manner
and over the same route as heretofore.”

In the decision of the Public Service Commission, approving the
sale in favor of the Manila Railroad Company, paragraph 2 of Aguilar’s
certificate, copied above, was eliminated.

When the Pasay
Transportation Company noticed that the Manila Railroad Company was not
operating the Aguilar truck in “the same manner” as the former owner
had been operating it and, after an examination of the record in the
office of the commission, it discovered that paragraph 2 of Aguilar’s
certificate had been eliminated, its attorney immediately filed a
motion praying that a new hearing be granted; that the decision of the
commission be reconsidered and amended by including therein the
restriction imposed upon Aguilar by virtue of that paragraph.

This motion alleges in part:

“1. Que la compareciente es una corporacion
debidamente constituida de acuerdo con las leyes de las Islas
Filipinas, y es una operadora regular de servicio de autobuses, entre
otras, entre Cavite y Manila y puntos intermedios y viceversa ; y entre
Cavite e Imus y puntos intermedios y viceversa ;

* * * * * * *

“3. Que dicho certificado de Saturnino Aguilar contenia prohibition
desde y entre Noveleta y Manila y puntos intermedios y viceversa;

* * * * * * *

“7.
Que existiendo como existe actualmente desde mucho antes del traspaso a
la Manila Railroad Company del referido certificado de Saturnino
Aguilar, un servicio local entre Cavite y Manila y puntos intermedios y
viceversa, que es el que se presta por la aqui peticionaria, cuyo
servicio es mas que suficiente para acomodar el trafico, no solamente
no procede autorizar ninguna nueva solicitud a lo largo de la linea de
esta compania sino, que no procede el levantamiento de ninguna
prohibicion de certificados, pues uno y otro caso, afectaran seriamente
los intereses de la compareciente y no tendra otro efecto inmediato que
el de entablar una competencia ruinosa en perjuicio de esta y del
publico;

“8. Que Saturnino Aguilar nunca ha solicitado ni el
levantamiento de su restriccion ni ninguna otra solicitud para que
pudiera tomar y dejar pasajeros en los puntos intermedios,
particularmente en la ruta o parte de la ruta servida por la aqui
compareciente;

“9. Que en la decisidn recaida en el
expediente arriba titulado no aparece inserta la prohibicion que
anteriormente existia, que f ue mas expresamente definida en el
Expediente No. 8039 que arriba copiamos, y la no insertion de dicha
restriccion o prohibicion se habia debido segtin entendemos a un error
involuntario, pero, que la misma (la no insercion de la restriccion o
prohibicion) en la decision de autos, pudiera dar lugar a que la Manila
Railroad Company tomara y dejara pasajeros, como en efecto, de hecho ha
estado y esta actualmente tomando y dejando pasajeros y carga en y
entre Noveleta y Manila y puntos intermedios y viceversa en las horas
prescritas en el certificado a ella traspasado por Saturnino Aguilar.

“10. Que la compareciente no habiendo recibido copia de la decision de
la Honorable Comision recaida en este expediente hasta la fecha, y
habiendo tan solo tenido la oportunidad de enterarse de las condiciones
prescritas en dicha decision ultimamente y por haberse enterado de que
dicho operador esta recogiendo pasajeros en los puntos intermedios, no
obstante que dicho operador en su certificado tiene las mismas
restricciones que tenia en el certificado adquirido del vendedor
Saturnino Aguilar, la aqui opositora no pudo presentar la presente
motion de reconsideration a su debido tiempo para la enmienda de la
decision recaida en este expediente.”

The Public Service Commission denied this motion in an order, dated
January 12, 1934, without giving the Pasay Transportation Company an
opportunity to present proofs in support of the above allegations. An
exception was noted and a petition for a review of the above order was
filed in this court on January 30, 1934.

The Manila
Railroad Company appeared and filed a written motion in which it prayed
that the petition for review be dismissed on the sole ground that it
was filed out of time. Section 35 of Act No. 3108, which is cited in
support of this motion, reads:

“Any order made by the Commission may be reviewed
on the application of any person or public utility affected thereby, by
certiorari in appropriate cases, or by petition, to the Supreme Court,
within thirty days from the date upon which such order becomes
effective, as herein provided; * * *”

The attention of this court is directed to the fact that the
questioned decision is dated July 28, 1933, and that the motion of
reconsideration was not filed until December 12, 1933.

This motion was denied by this court in a minute order, dated March
6, 1934. However, the same question is again raised in the brief of the
Manila Railroad Company. This contention is not well founded. Section
28 of Act No. 3108 provides that the commission may at any time order a
rehearing to extend, revoke or modify any order made by it. Section 35,
quoted above, and the decisions of this court, cited in the motion for
dismissal, are not applicable to the facts in this case. That section
and the decisions cited apply to the immediate parties in a case before
the Public Service Commission.

The Pasay Transportation Company was not a party to the case now
under consideration and as soon as it learned that the Public Service
Commission had not only approved the Aguilar-Manila Railroad Company
sale, but that it had also amended, motu proprio, the
certificate of public convenience, one of the objects of that sale, in
a way that it considered prejudicial to its interests, as an operator
over the same line, it rightly appeared and filed a motion for
reconsideration.

Section 29 of the Public Service Commission Act provides that,

“Every order made by the Commission shall be served
upon the person or public service, as herein defined, affected thereby,
within ten days from the time said order is filed, by personal delivery
or by mailing a certified copy thereof to any one of the principal
officers or agents of the public service at his usual place of
business, and, in case such certified copy is sent by registered mail,
the registry mail receipt shall be prima facie evidence of
the receipt of such order by the public service in due course of mail.
All orders of the Commission to continue service or rates in effect at
the time said order is made shall be immediately operative; all other
orders shall become effective upon the date specified therein.” (As
amended by sec. 1, Act No. 3316.)

Parties affected by an order amending a certificate of public
convenience are entitled to notice. Anyone who believes that such an
order affects him has a right to intervene in the case in which that
order is issued, within a reasonable time and without unnecessary
delay, after he receives notice thereof, or, as in this case, after
learning that such an order has been issued by the commission. The
right to be heard and present evidence in support of the allegations,
contained in his motion of intervention, naturally follows, provided
the motion of intervention or reconsideration states facts sufficient
to justify a reconsideration of the questioned order and the granting
of a new hearing. The facts alleged in the motion of the Pasay
Transportation Company are sufficient for that purpose.

In the case of Soriano and Santos vs. Del Rosario and
Rural Transit Co. (55 Phil., 934), a motion to amend a certificate of
public convenience was submitted to one of the associate public service
commissioners, who announced his conclusion with respect thereto.
Instead, however, of entering the corresponding order, said
commissioner, after the lapse of nearly a year, indorsed the matter for
action to another commissioner, who, thereupon, without setting the
cause for hearing, entered an order in which he announced a conclusion
entirely different from that reached by the associate commissioner who
heard the motion. This court said:

“* * * After this stage of the proceedings had been
reached, we are of the opinion that it was improper for Commissioner
Del Rosario to decide the motion differently without at least conceding
to the parties interested an opportunity to be heard. And if there
cannot properly be said to have been an absolute want of jurisdiction
on the part of the respondent commissioner to enter the order which is
the subject of this application, there was at least an irregular
exercise of judicial power by him, in excess of his lawful
jurisdiction, such as supplies a basis for the writ of certiorari.”

In view of all the foregoing this court holds that the Public
Service Commission erred in denying the motion of reconsideration filed
by the Pasay Transportation Company without giving it an opportunity to
present evidence in support of the allegations set forth therein and
that, by reason of its failure to grant the said motion for
reconsideration and new trial, there “was at least an irregular
exercise of judicial power, in excess of its lawful jurisdiction.” The
order denying the motion for reconsideration and new trial is hereby
set aside and the record in this case is remanded to the Public Service
Commission for further proceedings in conformity with this decision,
without costs.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.