EMPRESS TELEVISION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. CONCEPCION B. BUENCAMINO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH LII AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari filed pursuant to the provisions of R.
A. No. 5440, We are asked to set aside the order of the respondent judge
which dismissed the petitioner’s complaint with prejudice.

The antecedent facts are:

Empress Television, Inc., the petitioner herein, filed on March 13,
1979, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for
restitution and damages against the Manila Banking Corporation, the
private respondent herein. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-27172. In the course of the trial, the following events occurred:

On January 15, 1980, Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte, counsel for the plaintiff, filed a Motion for Postponement worded as follows:

“THE UNDERSIGNED counsel for the plaintiff respectfully states that:

1. The undersigned counsel’s mother who had been confined for quite a time at the Chinese General Hospital has just died.

2. As a consequence, shock and anxiety engulfed him and it will take time that he be relieved therefrom.

3. The above notwithstanding, it will take time for the
undersigned to make necessary adjustments, the making of preparations
entailing his mother’s death at the time thereof and even thereafter.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the hearing
scheduled for January 21, 1980 be cancelled and the same be transferred
to some other dates preferably on any day in March, 1980.”

Reacting to the motion, the respondent judge issued an Order on January 16, 1980, as follows:

“The Motion for Postponement is hereby set for hearing on January
21, 1980 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning as the defendant did not conform
to the said motion.”

On January 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued another order as follows:

“In the absence of the movants, and the counsel for the defendant
is not also present, the Court grants the petition of plaintiff for the
postponement of this case, and this case is reset again for pre-trial on
March 13, 1980, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.”

It should be mentioned that contrary to the statement in the
above-quoted order, the case was no longer in the pre-trial stage for in
fact on September 26, 1979, plaintiff petitioner had terminated the
direct examination of its first witness, as shown in the minutes of the
hearing on that day. (Expediente, p. 27.)

The minutes for March 13, 1980 (Expediente, p. 36) show that the
respondent judge issued an order which was formalized in writing on
March 18, 1980, as follows:

“On January 15, 1980 there was filed with this Court a motion for
postponement from the plaintiff praying that the scheduled hearing for
January 21, 1980 be cancelled and the same be transferred to another
date preferably on any day in March, 1980, Because the motion did not
bear the conformity of the defendant the Court issued an order on
January 16, 1980 to the effect that the motion be heard on the very date
the case was set for trial. On January 21, 1980 the movant was not
present but as a matter of liberality the Court granted the movant’s
petition for postponement and reset the trial of the case to this date
March 13, 1980 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon and from the records of
the case it appears that the copy of the order sent by registered mail
to counsel for the plaintiff was returned unclaimed. Counsel for the
defendant is now asking for the striking out of the testimony of
Esperanza T. Vivas and for the dismissal of the case grounded on the
fact that since counsel for the plaintiff did not even come to court to
find out what happened to his motion dated January 15, 1980 said
plaintiff should not be allowed another postponement today for lack of
interest of said party and this case be dismissed.

“The Court noted that the motion for postponement dated January
15, 1980 was not set for hearing which under the provision of Rule 15
Section 4 should have been set for hearing because it does not contain
the conformity of counsel for the other party. It is likewise true that
said movant should not have taken the liberality of the Court for
granted by not coming at all to Court to find out what happened to his
motion, and finally, since he asked that this case be set for hearing
preferably on any date in March, 1980 with the incoming of the month of
March he should have come to Court to find out what was the date set by
the Court for the next hearing of this case. This counsel for the
plaintiff never did so. For this negligence or lack of interest of the
plaintiff this case is hereby ordered dismissed without findings as to
costs. Defendant also manifested that he has not reserved his right to
present evidence on his counterclaim and will not pursue the same and
therefore the Court will consider it dismissed without prejudice.”

It is to be noted that the order which is poorly composed does not
categorically dismiss the plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. However, on
a motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff, the respondent
judge issued another order, also badly composed, dated May 27, 1980, as
follows:

“The order of the Court of March 18, 1980, dismissing this case
with prejudice, but what was dismissed without prejudice was the
counterclaim as the said order reveals. However, the plaintiff alleges
that the order of March 18, 1980 was received on April 1, 1980, and the
motion for reconsideration was filed on April 17, 1980, then the Court
has the obligation to pass upon the motion for reconsideration even
though the movants did not appear in Court today.

“For lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is ordered denied.”

With the above as factual background, the issue is whether or not the
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when she
dismissed the petitioner’s complaint with prejudice upon its failure to
appear for trial on March 13, 1980, as stipulated in the order of
January 21, 1980.

The petition is impressed with merit; the respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion when she dismissed the petitioner’s complaint
with prejudice.

Petitioner’s counsel was not aware of the order dated January 21, 1980,
which re-set the case for trial on March 13, 1980. He could not have
been aware of the order precisely because he was not present on January
21, 1980, having asked for postponement of the hearing on that day in
view of the recent death of his mother. And then again, although a copy
of the order dated January 21, 1980, was sent to him by registered
mail, the same was returned unclaimed. The record is bereft of any
indication that petitioner’s counsel was at fault in this respect.

The respondent judge asserts that petitioner’s counsel took the court
for granted; that he should at least had gone to court “to find out what
happened to his motion.” Suffice it to state a lawyer has a right to be
notified of a court order unless it is issued in open court in his
presence. In the case at bar there was lack of notice.

While We commend the spirit of the respondent judge to get the case
moving speedily, the speed must be deliberate, not hasty. The following
quotations from Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City,
Branch I, et al., G.R. No. L-41530, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 590,
595-597, are worth bearing in mind:

“The reconsideration of the dismissal order becomes more proper
when it is considered that trial courts have, after all, the duty to
dispose of controversies after trial on the merits whenever possible.
It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, ‘to
enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the
case.’ While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is
addressed to their discretion, such discretion must be exercised soundly
with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case. If
facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the
same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside, especially
where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not
culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant.”

xxx xxx xxx

“The policy of the courts to expedite disposal of cases and
prevent clogging of dockets is well-nigh desirable. Nonetheless,
inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute
‘a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets; while they
lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges,
they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final
disposition of the cases before the court.’ The desire to reduce docket
congestion should not be allowed to justify the sacrifice of the
substantial rights of the litigants. Speed in judicial administration
should not be promoted at the expense of justice, which is indispensable
to any court system worthy of its name. Any attempt to cut down on
court congestion by dismissal of meritorious lawsuits ‘is doomed to fail
even in its misguided purpose of promoting speed in judicial
administration,’ because litigants with meritorious lawsuits are not
likely to accept such rulings without exhausting all available appellate
remedies. As a result, any reduction of trial court dockets
accomplished by such dismissals will be more than offset by the
increased burden on appellate remedies. As a result, any reduction of
trial court dockets accomplished by such dismissals will be more than
offset by the increased burden on appellate courts.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the orders of the
court a quo, dated March 18 and May 27, 1980, are hereby set aside and
the petitioner’s complaint is reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., no part.