REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY, KOSEN PIR…

It is by statute provided that all
persons “claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of
cadastral proceedings” in actual possession of the same at the time of the
survey but unable for some justifiable reason to file their claim in the proper
court during the time limit established by law, “in case such parcels of
land on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about
to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial
proceedings” instituted within the forty-year period next preceding June
20, 1953, the time of the approval of this particular enactment, are granted
“the right within five years” from said date to petition for a
reopening of the judicial proceedings but “only with respect to such of
said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provision­ally or permanently disposed of by the Government, * * *.^[1]

The jurisdiction of respondent Judge Pio
R. Marcos to act in accordance with Republic Act No. 931 in connection with the
petition for a reopening filed by respondent Kosen Piraso, joined by his kinsmen, likewise respondents, all
surnamed Piraso, is assailed in this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding, included in which are the other respondents, Daisy Pacnos and the spouses Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria, petitioners being the Republic of the
Philippines and the Super­intendent of the Philippine Military Academy.

In the language of the petition: 
“This is an original action for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court whereby
herein petitioners seek to annul and set aside: 
(1) The Order, dated July 13, 1967 * * * denying the Motion to Dismiss
dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio
City in behalf of oppositors-govern­ment agencies,
and thus insisting on assuming jurisdiction over the case (without the
requisite publication in the Official Gazette of the petition) and over the
subject-matter (a military reservation); (2) The Decision, dated October 7,
1967 * * * decreeing the registration of a parcel of land with an area of
28,215.58 square meters * * * within the so-called ‘U. S. Fleet Naval
Reservation Center’ in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos;
(3) The Order of August 2, 1968 * * * which in effect denied the Motion to
Annul Decision dated February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and
instead ordered the issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor
of respondent Albino Reyes; * * * and (4) The Order, dated August 24, 1968 * *
* allowing respondents Kosen Piraso,
et. al., to adduce their evidence of alleged ownership * * *, all issued in
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Record No. 211 of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio City, entitled ‘In the Matter of the
Petition for Reopening of Judicial Proceedings, Kosen
Piraso, et al., petitioners)’.”^[2]

It was likewise therein alleged that Civil Reservation Case No. 1
“settled the ownership, private and public, of the Baguio townsite,
terminating with the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City dated November
13, 1922.”^[3]
Prior to said case, however, a military reservation known as the U. S. Fleet
Naval Rehabilitation Center consisting of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio Cadastre with an aggregate area of 29 hectares, more
or less, was set aside pursuant to Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10,
1910, issued by the then President William Howard Taft of the United States, as
attested by Proclamation No. 114 of the then Governor-General W. Cameron
Forbes, and Executive Order No. 5139 of June 19, 1929, issued by the then President
Herbert Hoover, as attested by Proclamation No. 260 of the then
Governor-General Dwight F. Davis.  After
independence, the United States
relinquished to the Republic of the Philippines
all claims to title over the military bases including the afore­said lots,
their relinquishment being formalized by an agree­ment of December 6, 1956.^[4]
Then came this categorical assertion in the petition that the land involved in
this proceeding “is limited to what is admittedly, and by unquestionable
proof, within the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140
and 141, Baguio Cadastre.”^[5]

From a summary of the facts appearing in the Petition, the need
for including the other respondents was made clear.  It was therein set forth that on May 21, 1965
the Pirasos, respondents herein, relying on the
controlling statute set forth at the opening of this opinion, sought the
reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211 of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City; praying for the
issuance in their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132
(Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre) consisting of
290,283 square meters, more or less, situated in Baguio
City.  On September 11, 1965, respondent Daisy Pacnos
filed an opposition.  She sought in a
pleading dated March 14, 1966
to be allowed to introduce evidence to prove her alleged right to registration
of a portion of the land, consisting of an area of 28,215.52 square meters,
subject of the proceedings.  This motion
was granted in an order of the respondent Judge dated May 16, 1966.

On January 26, 1967, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Baguio City, in behalf of all the government agencies-oppositors, filed a motion to dismiss the main petition and
other related petitions, alleging thereto the following grounds:  (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition; (2) that the causes of action alleged in
the petition are barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (3)
that the petition states no cause of action.

On July 13, 1967,
the respondent Judge denied the said motion to dismiss.  Then came on October 7, 1967, a decision by re­spondent Judge,
decreeing the registration of a portion of the land (28,215.58 square meters of
Lot 140, Baguio
Cadastre), subject matter of the Pirasos‘ petition in
favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos.  The Solicitor General received his copy of
this decision on December 4, 1967.

There, was a motion for reconsideration filed by the City
Attorney of Baguio of December 9, 1967, denied by respondent Judge on December
15, as “having been filed out of time”.

On January 3, 1968,
the City Fiscal of Baguio City joined by petitioner
Superintendent of the Military Academy
and the Director of Lands jointly filed a notice of appeal.  There was on February 7, 1968, an ex-parte
motion for extension of time to submit a record on appeal.  An opposition thereto was filed by counsel
for respondent Daisy Pacnos.  On February
15, 1968, the Solicitor General filed a motion to annul the
decision dated October 7, 1967,
based on lack of jurisdiction.

On August 2, 1968,
respondent Albino Reyes filed an ex-parte
motion for the issuance of a decree in his favor, having previously manifested
to respondent Judge that respondent Daisy Pacnos had
transferred her right to him.  On the
same day, respondent Judge issued an order considering that the motions for
reconsideration and the motion to annul decision filed by the Solicitor General
and other government lawyers “have been rendered academic and of no moment
on account of the filing of the notice of appeal on January 3, 1968,” but
in his opinion of no avail the time to do so having lapsed.  Moreover, no record on appeal was submitted.  He like­wise directed in said order the
issuance of a decree to respondent “Albino Reyes, married to Isabel Sta.
Maria, Filipino, with residence at Dagupan City.”
Another order specifically to that effect came from respondent Judge on the day
in question.  The last order of
pertinence to this petition ca e from respondent Judge on August 24, 1968, setting for hearing o September 11, 1968 the claim of the
respondents, surnamed Piraso.

Then on October 18,
1968 came this petition for certiorari and prohibition.  The next day, this Court adopted a resolution
requiring respondents to file within ten days from notice an answer, not a
motion to dismiss.  A preliminary
injunction was likewise issued without bond.

Subsequently, on November 8, 1968, the petitioners, through the
Solicitor General, filed a motion for leave to amend the petition, alleging
that the property, “subject matter of the case which re­spondent Daisy Pacnos succeeded in obtaining a favorable judgment of
registration * * * and which respondents Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria subsequently succeeded in securing a decree of
regis­tration” was thereafter transferred on August 16, 1968 to one Arturo
Tongson, who, thereby, would be affected by the
outcome of the  petition.  The proposed amendment, according to this
motion, would consist of his inclusion as one of the respondents.  Accompanying his pleading is the amended
petition for certiorari and prohibition. 
On November 21, 1968, we adopted a resolution in the following tenor:  “The motion of the Solicitor General for
leave to amend petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in L-29675 (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, etc., et al.), is [Granted]; the amended
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction is hereby accepted. 
Respondent Arturo Tong son is required to file, within 10 days from
notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to said amended
petition.”

In the meanwhile, even before the motion for leave to file
amended petition was filed, respondents, the Pirasos,
submitted their answer on November 4,
1968.  To the assertion in
the petition, fundamental in character, that the reopening sought by private
respondents refers to lands “admittedly and by unquestion­able proof,
within the so-called U. S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center, ” the Pirasos answered in this wise:  “The land in question is not a military
reservation under the Republic of the Philippines although it was formerly
reserved and placed under the control of the Navy Department for the use as
Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the American regime
(U. S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139 (Annex ‘B’ of the
petition), and was subsequently released or turned over to the Republic of the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U. S. -Philippine Military
Bases Agreement on Dec. 6, 1956 but the same has not been reserved for military
purposes by the Republic of the Philippines.”^[6]
They would hedge further by the disclaimer of any acceptance on their part that
the land subject of the petition forms part of the naval reservation, with the
further qualification that in any event, even if it be admitted that there is
such a reservation by the government, such lot is subject to private rights.

That respondents Pirasos could not very
well explicitly deny the allegation that the lot in question forms part of the
naval reservation is quite apparent from its memorandum submitted in lieu of
oral argument filed on April 7, 1969, wherein in disputing the point raised by
petitioners that the lower court acted without jurisdiction, they stated the
following:  “Contrary to the
allegation of the City Attorney, we humbly state categorically that the land
involved in this case is no longer a reservation in its strict sense.  It ceased to be a Naval Reservation of the United
States of America upon the termination of
its sovereignty over the islands.  It was
formerly reserved and placed under the control of the U. S. Naval Department
for the use of Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the
American Regime (U. S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139 (Annex
‘B’ of the petition), and was subsequently released or turned over to the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the pro­visions of the U. S.
-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on December 6, 1956.  The said parcel of land (Lot
140 of the Baguio City Cadastre) until this time was
not reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the Philippines.”^[7]

The answer of respondents, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santa­maria, to the amended petition filed on November 21, 1968, expressly admits
what petitioners so emphatically insist on that this petition before us
“is limited to what is admittedly, and by unquestionable proof, within the
so-called U. S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre.”^[8]
For the first paragraph of their answer is explicitly worded thus:  “1. 
That they admit the allegations of the Petition with respect to the
Nature of the Case * * * and with respect to the Parties and Jurisdictional
Averments * * *.”^[9]
The above assertion of petitioner was thus given conformity by respondents
Reyes and Santamaria. 
Nonetheless, they would seek to blunt the force of their admission by
alleging:  “That they deny the
allegations in par.  V-A-1 of the
Petition, the truth being that the land in question, particularly the area
decreed in the name of the answering respondents, is not part of a military
reservation.  The proclamation declaring
certain areas to be naval reservations of the Government of the United
States (Annex B of the Petition) expressly
states that such reservations are ‘subject to private rights if any there be.’
Upon the Philippines
becoming independent in 1946 the said areas, by virtue of Executive Agreements,
reverted to disposable lands administered by the Bureau of Lands of the
Republic of the Philippines.”^[10]

There is a similar express admission in the answer filed on
December 13, 1968 by respondent Arturo Tongson, its
wording being almost identical with the answer of Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria: 
“That in so far as they are borne out by and made part of the
records of the case, he admits the allegations of the Petition with respect to
the nature of the case * * * and with respect to the Parties and Jurisdictional
Averments * * *.”^[11]
Again, this particular respondent did attempt to weaken the force of the above
admission by the assertion that the land decreed in favor of respondent Albino
Reyes is not part of the military reservation. 
He would justify this seeming contradiction thus:  “At any rate, when said areas were
turned over to the Philippine Government by virtue of the U. S. Philippine
Military Bases Agreement; the land in question reverted to the disposable lands
administered by the Bureau of Lands of the Republic of the Philippines.”^[12]

In the light of the allegation in the petition and the admissions
made in the answers of respondents, the Pirasos,
Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria as well as Arturo Tongson, even as sought to be qualified, it would seem to
be fairly obvious that the lots in question sought to be reopened in the
proceeding before respondent Judge Marcos form part and parcel of a naval
reservation.  It cannot escape attention
that the above private respondents did try by highly sophistical reasoning,
invoking distinctions far from persuasive, to avoid the legal effect of the
admissions as to the location of the disputed lots within a reservation.  They must have realized that unless
successful in this attempt, doomed by failure from the outset, the facts being
simply against them, the juris­diction of respondent Court can, as petitioners
have done, be successfully impugned. 
That is what petitioners did; they must be sustained.

1. Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from
ambiguous.  It is quite explicit and
categorical.  Only persons “claiming
title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings” are granted the right to petition for a reopening thereof if
the other conditions named therein are successfully met.  It cannot admit of doubt, therefore, that if
the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral proceedings, then this
statute finds no application.  Consider­ing
that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President of the United States,
William H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving for naval purposes the
lots now disputed, they could not have been the object of the cadastral
proceeding involving the Baguio townsite
reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922.^[13]

The Cadastral Act^[14]
was enacted on February 11, 1913,
taking effect on its passage.  As is made
clear in the first section thereof, when public interest requires that titles
to any land be settled and adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive,
the Governor General, he could order the Director of Lands or a private
surveyor named by the landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands,
to make a survey and plan of such lands.^[15]
Clearly, it does not include the survey of lands declared as reservations.

An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903,^[16]
specifically governs the subject matter of reservations.  As provided therein:  “All lands or buildings, or any interest
therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas
now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be
forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and such
of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to
be public lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions
of said the Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter
stated.” The validity of this statute was sustained as against the
allegation that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910
decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron.^[17]

In a 1918 decision, this Court had occasion to indicate clearly
that the proceeding under this statute, while analogous too, is not covered by
the Cadastral Act.  Thus:  “It will thus be seen that Act No. 627
contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding wherein private owners may be
forced to come in and register their titles, under penalty of forfeiture of all
right in the land included in the reservation in case they fail to act.  The validity of a law of this character can
not be questioned; and this court has uniformly up­held the Act now under
consideration.”^[18]

What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on
the part of the private respondents to seek a reopening under Republic Act No.
931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision.^[19]
We there explicitly held:  “The
defendant’s contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has
jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally established
military reservation cannot be sustained. 
The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that ‘All lands or
buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within
the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be
military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the
Land Registration Act, * * *.’ “

The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, as contended by
petitioners, respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim
of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931.

2. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made
more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to seek
reopening under this statute.  For the
power of the Court to order such reopening is limited “to such of said
parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government K*
*.”^[20]
Included in the petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert
Hoover of June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government
of the United States “that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence
Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore
reserved for naval purposes * * *.” If there were still any lingering
doubt, that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential determination,
then binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty, that the lot
in question should be a naval reservation.

3. The private respondents are thus bereft of any right which they
could assert under Republic Act No. 931. 
Such an enactment is the basis of whatever standing that would justify
their reliance on the specific power granted courts of first instance to reopen
cadas­tral proceedings.  Such
jurisdiction is thus limited and specific. 
Unless a party can make it manifest by express language or a clear
implication from the wording of the statute too strong to be resisted, he may
not set in motion the judicial machinery under such specific grant of
authority.  This, private respondents
have failed to do as the statute in terms that are crystal clear and free from
ambiguity denies them such a right. 
Petitioners have made out their case for certiorari and prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and
setting aside the order of respondent Judge a July 13, 1967, denying the motion
to dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government
agencies; his decision, dated October 7, 1967, decreeing the registration of a
parcel of land with an area of 28,215.58 square meters within Lot 140, Baguio Cadastre, or within the so-called “U. S. Fleet
Naval Reservation Center” in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos;
his order of August 2, 1968 which in effect denied the motion to annul decision
dated February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and instead ordered the
issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor of respondent Albino
Reyes; and his order, dated August 24, 1968 allowing respondents Kosen Piraso, et al., to adduce
their evidence of alleged ownership.  The
writ of prohibition is likewise granted perpetually restraining respondent
Judge from further taking cognizance of and further assuming jurisdiction over
the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1 LRC Rec. No. 211 as sought by the
private respondents.  The preliminary
injunction issued is hereby made permanent. 
With costs against private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Reyes, JBL, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Republic Act No. 931 specifically provides: 
“Section 1.  All persons
claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in
the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels
of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years after the date on
which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial
proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and
fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally
or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent Court of First
Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through
the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find
that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all
taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land
tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it
shall order said Judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken
on such parcels.” Under Republic Act No. 2061, an Act approved on June $0,
1958, the period for the reopening of judicial proceedings under the above
statute was extended to December 31,
1968.

^[2]
Petition, pp. 1-2.

^[3] Ibid,
p. 2.

^[4] Ibid,
Annexes A, B, B-1 & C.

^[5] Ibid,
p. 3.

^[6]
Answer of respondents Pirasos, p. 4,

^[7]
Memorandum for Respondents, p. 5.

^[8]
Petition, p. 3.

^[9]
Answer of respondents Reyes and Santamaria, par. 1.

^[10] Ibid,
par. 3.

^[11]
Answer of respondent Tongson, par. 1.

^[12] Ibid,
par. 3

^[13] G.L.R.R.
Res. No. 211 (1922).

^[14]
Act No. 2259.

^[15]
Section 1, Act No. 2259.

^[16]
Act No. 627.

^[17]
16 Phil. 62.

^[18]
Archbishop of Manila v.
Barrio of Santo Cristo, 39 Phil. 1, 19.

^[19]
49 Phil. 495, 498.

^[20]
Section 1, Republic Act No. 931.