PHILIPPINE RUBBER PROJECT CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION, MINDANAO FEDERATION OF LABOR AND PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR…

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction, petitioner seeks the
nullification of the Order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
April 16, 1969, upholding its jurisdiction, and of its Resolution en banc
dated July 1, 1969 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, both issued in Case
No. 1814-MC, entitled “In the Matter of Certification Election in
Philippine Rubber Project Co., Inc., Kabasalan, Zamboanga City, Philippines Association of Free Labor Union
(PAFLU), Petitioner,”

Petitioner Philippine Rubber Project Co., Inc. is a duly
organized corporation with principal offices at Kabasalan,
Zamboanga del Sur.  It owns a
rubber plantation consisting of 1019 has., more or
less, and is engaged in the planting and growing of rubber trees from which
rubber latex is tapped.  It also has a
processing plant in its plantation where latex is processed into rubber in its
crude form.  It is engaged in the
processing not only of its own latex product but also of others like the Zamboanga Rubber Company and the Mindanao Rubber Company
and small rubber planters.  Its workers
are interchangeably employed in the sense that during certain periods, known as
the withering season, employees in the processing plant also work in the
plantation to avoid being laid off because of absence of work in the processing
plant.

Respondents Associated Labor Union (ALU), Mindanao Federation Labor (MFL), and Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) are labor organizations duly
registered with the Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor.

On October 17, 1966,
respondent PAFLU instituted before respondent Court of Industrial Relations the
aforementioned Petition for the certification of the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of petitioner company, numbering about 300.

In a Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent MFL, the jurisdiction
of respondent CIR was placed in issue on the ground that petitioner company
covered by the Petition for certification is an agricultural enterprise.

On March 1, 1967,
respondent ALU filed a Motion for Intervention contending that it had actual,
real and material interest in the case as majority of the employees are its
members.  ALU then prayed either that the
petition be dismissed or that it be certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of petitioner
company should respondent Court decide that it had jurisdiction, and
that a certification election be held to determine the representative of the
rank and file workers for purposes of collective bargaining.

Respondent Court thus ordered a Hearing Examiner, to proceed to Zamboanga City
to conduct the hearing and investigation.

On July 29, 1968,
respondent Court ordered both parties to submit their respective memoranda on
the issue of jurisdiction.  On even date,
respondents PAFLU and ALU also agreed to a consent election in the event that
respondent Court declared it had jurisdiction over the case.^[1]

After the submission of evidence, respondent Court then issued
its first challenged Order of April 16, 1969 upholding its jurisdiction on the
ground that petitioner company was engaged in both industrial and agricultural
pursuits and could fall under its jurisdiction or that of the Court of Agrarian
Relations but that having first taken cognizance of the case it has acquired
jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other. 
It then scheduled the consent election for April 16, 1969 at the premises of petitioner
company in Kabasalan, Zamboanga
del Sur.  In
denying dismissal, respondent Court held:

“During the proceedings, it came about that the Philippine
Rubber Project is a business entity engaged in the production of crude rubber,
and the processing, not only of its latex products, but also those of the Zamboanga and Mindanao Rubber Corporation and some other
small rubber planters.  A good number of
the workers involved here are
assigned to the company’s processing plant, except during the withering season
when they are invariably transferred or assigned to work in the rubber
fields.  However, workers in the
plantation may themselves be assigned in the processing plant, depending on the
need of the corporation.  In other words,
this is a case where the company plays a dual role, one industrial, and the
other agricultural.  It cannot even be
said that the employment of industrial workers is merely incidental to the
agricultural phase of the business, because both functions are equally
important, as well as necessary.  Yet, it does not escape the attention
of this Court that the corporation is engaged in an industry, since it was
admitted during the hearing that, as a matter of fact, latex products of other
plantations are being processed by the corporation.  The processing of latex products is, no
doubt, industrial, and being so, it necessarily follows that the workers
involved herein are industrial workers. 
But this does not totally erase the fact that the company is likewise
engaged in agricultural pursuit.  Here
is, therefore, a business concern that is part industrial and part
agricultural.  This is not simply a case of one business corporation where one phase is a necessary part of
the other, because both functions, whether agricultural or industrial, are
equally important.  This is neither a case
where a categorical classification or a distinction may be made on those who
are agricultural or industrial workers (VICMCO, INC., vs. CIR, FREE VISAYAN
WORKERS G.R. L-17281 March 23, 1963, Pampanga Sugar
Mills vs. PASCUAL WORKERS UNIONS G.R. No. L-7668 February 28, 1956) because invariably field workers are assigned to the plant and
vice-versa.  Work and assignment
of employees are entirely dependent upon the need of the company.  On top of this, it is not even established that
workers in the plantations perform agricultural work throughout the year.  On the contrary, as borne by the record, they
are oftentimes called and assigned to work in the processing of latex products.  There is
simply no definite pattern that will provide as a guideline for the
Court to segregate the agricultural workers from the ranks of industrial
employees.

Under the circumstances, it would certainly be logical to consider
that the employees employed in the processing of latex products or raw rubber
materials are industrial workers and are, no doubt, included in this case.  The agricultural workers, however, granting
that they are such, but are, at times, assigned on the plant, may either fall
under the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, or this Court.  Incidentally, this Court has already taken
cognizance of this case and had actually terminated the hearing of its
merits.  Jurisdiction has, therefore, been acquired and if
we are to follow the recent principle enunciated by the Honorable Supreme Court
that the parties must not be allowed to shuttle from one court to another, this
Court should take cognizance of all the allied incidents related to this
case.  x x x x x“

On May 5, 1969,
petitioner company mailed its Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 3, 1969 and at the
same time prayed for an extension of 15 days within which to file a formal
“Motion for Reconsideration with Supporting Arguments”.^[2]

Petitioner company filed its
“Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration” on May 13, 1969 in two (2) copies.^[3]

On the grounds that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 3, 1969 was not verified
and was filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period
provided for in Rules 15 and 16 of respondent Court, respondent ALU moved for
its denial.^[4]

On June 2, 1969,
petitioner company submitted four more copies of
“Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.”

In its Resolution of June
3, 1969, respondent CIR denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration “considering the no-extension of time policy enunciated in
earlier cases”.^[5]

On June 18, 1969,
petitioner company opposed respondent ALU’s “Motion to Dismiss Motion for Reconsideration”
averring that its pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration dated May 3, 1969 was filed on time, or five
days after April 28, 1969
when it received
a copy of said Order in question. 
However, the Motion for Reconsideration was mailed only on May 5, 1969 as May 3, 1969
was a Saturday and the Post Office at Zamboanga City
was closed.  Petitioner company further averred that the mailing of only two copies
of the “Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration” was
due to inadvertence of a clerk in the Blanco and Go Law Office which rectified
it by submitting four more copies immediately upon
discovery.

On August 28, 1969,
respondent Court released the second challenged Order dated July 1, 1969 dismissing petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, the pertinent portion of which is quoted hereinbelow:

“Before this Court for resolution is the Philippine Rubber Project Company, Inc.’s Motion dated May 3, 1969, seeking the
reconsideration of the Order of the trial Court dated April 16, 1969. 
A perusal of the records show that
only two (2) copies of said motion have been filed instead of six (6) and that
the same is not verified contrary to the rules of this Court.  Consequently,
said motion should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.”^[6]

In the same Order, the certification
election was rescheduled to September
30, 1969.  However, upon
petitioner’s instance, the execution of said Order was ordered stayed.

Petitioner company then resorted to the
present recourse.

On October 7, 1969, we gave due course to this Petition
and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on October 28, 1969 upon petitioner’s posting of a bond of P1,000.00.^[7]

On July 29, 1971,
we considered this case submitted for decision without the respective Briefs of
respondent PAFLU and MFL and without petitioner’s Reply Brief.^[8]

Five years later, or on August 4, 1976, respondent ALU moved for the
dismissal of this Petition on the ground that it had become moot and academic
in view of the promulgation of the New Labor Code (PD 442), specifically Articles 225 and 289, which vests jurisdiction on inter-union conflicts
and disputes affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether
agricultural or industrial in the corresponding Labor Relations Division of
the Bureau of Labor Relations,^[9]
and prayed that the records be remanded to the Labor Relations Division, Regional
Office No. IX, Department of Labor, Zamboanga City, for further proceedings.

Respondent PAFLU agrees that the case has become moot and
academic.^[10]

Petitioner company rejects the theory of
mootness and contends that if the proceedings before
respondent CIR were null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the nullity cannot
be cured by transfer to the Bureau of Labor Relations, the agency which took
over pending cases of respondent Court when the latter was abolished.

On September 27, 1976,
we deferred action on respondent ALU’s Motion to
Dismiss until the Decision on the merits.

Petitioner ascribes the following assignments of error to
respondent CIR:

I

That the Honorable Court of Industrial Relations erred in holding
the processing of latex to be an industrial activity and in exercising jurisdiction
over workers of an agricultural enterprise when all the work performed in such
company is incidental to the production of crude rubber;

II

Granting arguendo that the processing of
latex into crude rubber entails some industrial activity, the Honorable Court
of Industrial Relations still erred in exercising jurisdiction over all
employees of the petitioner some of whom are performing functions undoubtedly
agricultural in nature;

III

The Honorable Court of Industrial Relations erred when in the
determination of whether employees involved are agricultural or industrial the
nature of the enterprise in which they were employed was not considered;

IV

The Honorable Court of Industrial Relations erred when it dismissed
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the basis of trivial
technicalities rather than considering the same on the basis of substantial merits.

The main issues, therefore, may be framed, thus:

1)      Whether or not respondent Court had
jurisdiction over the certification proceedings sought to be held in petitioner
company alleged to be an agricultural enterprise; and

2)      Whether or not respondent Court erred in
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that it was not
originally filed in the correct number of copies and was not verified as
prescribed by its Rules.

We find the first issue raised now moot and academic under the pertinent provisions
of the Labor Code (PD 442), quoted hereinbelow:

Art. 226.  Bureau of Labor
Relations – The Bureau of Labor Relations and labor relations division in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive
authority to act, at their own
initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural,
except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration” (underscoring supplied)

“Sec. 1 – Where to file – A petition for certification
election may be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the employer. 
x x “^[11]

Thus, it is clear that labor-management
disputes in all work places, whether agricultural or non-agricultural,
fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Offices of the Ministry of
Labor.  The Court of Agrarian Relations
has been divested of jurisdiction over labor disputes concerning even
agricultural laborers.  Petitioner’s
contention that it is basically an agricultural company and within the
jurisdictional limits of the Court of Agrarian Relations, or that its employees
are partly agricultural (those working in the plantation) and partly industrial
(those working in the processing plant) and thus fall under the jurisdiction of
both Courts, has become futile considering the clear import of the aforequoted Labor Code provisions.  The desire of petitioner company to
characterize the kind of its employees into agricultural or industrial, or
both, for purposes of determining their rate of pay is
not proper in these proceedings.  The
heart of the matter is confined to the question of certification elections and
the proper body to take cognizance of it, an issue already decisively settled
by the Labor Code.

Petitioner’s other contention that respondent CIR erred in
denying its Motion for Reconsideration for non-compliance with Rule 15 of
respondent Court’s Rules is meritorious. 
That Rule provided:

“15. 
The movant shall file the motion, in
six copies within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of
the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be
verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact,
and serving a copy thereof personally or by registered mail on the adverse
party.  The latter may file an answer in
six (6) copies duly verified under oath.”

An examination of the Motion for
Reconsideration in question reveals that it contains no verification and that
the same was originally filed only in two copies instead of six.  However, petitioner’s “Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration” was verified and filed on time and
four more copies of the Motion were filed by petitioner later.  This should have been considered substantial
compliance with said Rule.^[12]
For certification proceedings are not a litigation in
the sense that the term is commonly understood. 
As such, formality and rigidity are altogether lacking.^[13]
However, said error committed by respondent
Court accords insufficient basis for the allowance of this Petition.

ALU has asked that the records of this case be remanded to the
Labor Relations Division, Regional Office No. IX, Ministry of
Labor, Zamboanga City, for further proceedings. 
That indorsement is based on the provisions of
the new Labor Code providing that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have
original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes affecting labor-management relations.

Considering, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations, has been abolished, it is our considered opinion
that the indorsement of the records of this case to
Regional Office No. IX of the Ministry of Labor has no practical justification
and might only produce technical problems which can be based or connected with
pleadings and actuations taken in the original case.  It should not be a difficult task to initiate
new proceedings for certification election before the proper Regional Office.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
with Preliminary Injunction is hereby denied. 
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on October 28, 1969 is hereby lifted and the bond
posted by petitioner cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1] p.
126, Records.

^[2] pp. 166-167, Ibid.

^[3] pp. 171-174, Ibid.

^[4] p. 180, Ibid.

^[5] p. 203, Ibid.

^[6] p. 279, Ibid.

^[7] p. 109, Rollo.

^[8] p. 258, Ibid.

^[9] p. 261, Ibid.

^[10] p. 267,
Ibid.

^[11]
Implementing Rules and Regulations of New Labor Code, Rule V.

^[12] Philex vs.
CIR, 6 SCRA 992, 1962.

^[13] National Labor Union vs. Go Soc, et al. 23 SCRA 431 (1968);
Airline Pilots Asso. vs.
CIR, 76 SCRA 274 (1977).