CLAUDIA MEJIA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CASILDA M. DE MEJIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First
Instance of Ormoc City, which has been certified to us by the Court of
Appeals, only questions of law being raised therein.

Alleging that they are “voluntarily recognized illegitimate
children” of Teofilo Mejia, who died in 1942, plaintiffs Claudia,
Feliciano, Narcisa, Felipe, Julita and Alfredo, all of whom claim to be
surnamed Mejia, instituted this case against the widow of the deceased,
defendant Casilda M. de Mejia, for the partition of eight (8) parcels
of land situated in Puerto Bello, municipality of Merida, province of
Leyte, which are said to belong to the conjugal partnership of said
spouses, and recovery of damages on account of defendant’s refusal to
recognized plaintiffs’ claim in and to said properties and to give them
the corresponding share in the products thereof as alleged heirs of the
deceased.

Upon denial of her motion to dismiss the complaint, defendant filed
an answer denying specifically that either she or the deceased had
recognized any of the plaintiffs and that the parcels of land above
referred to belonged to the aforementioned conjugal partnership or to
the deceased alleging, as special defenses, that plaintiffs’ cause of
action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations and that said
parcels of land belong to the Hacienda Casilda, Inc., an agricultural
corporation which should be included as party in this case; and setting
up a counterclaim for damages allegedly sustained owing to the
institution of this case.

Upon the filing of plaintiffs’ reply, the case was, on motion filed
by them, set for hearing. However, on the date set therefor, after
hearing the views expressed by opposing counsel relative to their
respective contentions, the Court, instead of proceeding with the
reception of evidence, required both parties to submit their memoranda
on the issues raised in defendant’s answer. After the presentation of
such memoranda, the lower court issued the order appealed from,
dismissing the complaint without costs, upon the ground that, under the
provisions of the Civil Code of Spain, which were in force in the
Philippines at the time of the demise of Teofilo Mejia, adulterous
children—as plaintiffs seemingly are—are entitled to no more than the
right to support; that, although the Civil Code of the Philippines now
grants to said children some successional rights, the same cannot be
given retroactive effect; and that, accordingly, the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal, in which the main issue raised is
whether, as alleged adulterous children of the late Teofilo Mejia,
plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of the successional rights
granted to such children by the Civil Code of the Philippines, despite
the fact that the same was enacted and became effective several years
after the death of their alleged father. Plaintiffs invoke Article 2264
of said Code, pursuant to which the aforementioned successional rights
“shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity”
thereof. This provision is subject, however, to the qualification,
prescribed in Article 2253 of the same Code, that “if a right should be
declared for the first time” therein—and such is, admittedly, the
nature of the right invoked by plaintiffs herein—”it shall be effective
at once * * * provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired rights“.
(See, also, Report of the Code Commission, p. 167.) When Teofilo Mejia
died in 1942, his heirs, under the Civil Code of Spain, which was then
in force, acquired the right to succeed him in his estate, without the successional rights now conferred to adulterous children
by the Civil Code of the Philippines. As a consequence, plaintiffs
cannot avail of such rights without impairing those of the heirs of the
deceased in 1942, under the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code.
Hence, Art. 2263 of our Code provides that:

“Rights to the inheritance of a person who died * * * before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will die after the effectivity of this Code shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of law
and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be
carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code * * *” (Uson vs. Del Rosario, 92 Phil., 530; Montilla vs. Montilla, L-14462, June 30, 1961; Bulos vs. Tecson, L-18285, October 31, 1962.)

The lower court did not err, therefore, in concluding that
plaintiffs herein have no right to share in the alleged estate of the
deceased Teofilo Mejia. This notwithstanding, the lower court was not
justified in dismissing the complaint herein for, although, as a
general rule, the “obligation to support another ceases with the death
of the person upon whom the obligation devolves”, pursuant to Article
150 of the Civil Code of Spain, this rule is subject to the exception
found in Article 845 of the same Code, reading:

“Illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children shall be entitled to support only.

“The
obligation of the person who is bound to support them shall be
transmitted to his or her heirs and shall continue until such children
attain their majority, or, in case they should be incapacitated, while
the incapacity lasts.”

It is alleged in the complaint herein that three (3) of the
plaintiffs herein, namely, Felipe, Julita and Alfredo Mejia, are
minors. This was on February 14, 1957, when said complaint was filed.
Some of the other plaintiffs might have, also, been minors fifteen (15)
years prior thereto, when their alleged father, Teofilo Mejia, died in
1942. At any rate, the obligation to support his adulterous children
who were minors in 1942, was not extinguished upon his death, but was
“transmitted” to his heirs and “shall continue until such children
attain their majority, or, in case they are incapacitated, while their
incapacity lasts”. In other words, assuming hypothetically that the
allegations of the complaint are true, such of the plaintiffs as were
minors in 1942 had a cause of action against the defendant, though
neither for partition nor for accounting, but merely for the
enforcement of said right of support.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and
the record of this case hereby remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, with the costs of this instance against
defendant-appellee, Casilda M. de Mejia. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.