PURIFICACION PASCUA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JESUS Y. PEREZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Purification Paseua mortgaged on December 13, 1956 two parcels of
land in favor of Elisa Paraiso Vda. de Verzosa to secure a loan of
P25,000.00 on condition that the mortgage may be redeemed within one
year from said date. When Pascua failed to redeem the mortgage as
stipulated, Verzosa took steps to foreclose it extra-judicially thru
the sheriff of Manila. At the foreclosure sale Verzosa purchased the
property for P35,000.00 and on May 8, 1959 the sheriff issued in her
favor the corresponding certificate of sale. The sheriff fixed the
expiration of the redemption period on April 29, 1959. When Verzosa
tried to take possession of the property as a result of its sale in her
favor, Pascua commenced an action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila to annul the foreclosure sale on the ground that the mortgage
was null and void because it involved a usurious transaction. On
November 16, 1960, the court rendered decision finding the transaction
to be usurious and annulling the sale made by the sheriff in favor of
Verzosa. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders
judgment annulling the deed of sale of the parcels of land in favor of
defendant issued by the Sheriff and ordering the defendant Elisa
Paraiso Vda. de Verzosa to allow plaintiff to redeem the two parcels of
land in question upon payment of the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED P20,100.00) PESOS plus interest at the legal rate from the date
of the sale until the redemption is made without pronouncement as to
costs.”

Because of the failure of Pascua to redeem the property within the
period of one year from the date of the receipt of the decision,
Verzosa filed a motion on January 17, 1962 in the same ease praying
that, since Pascua failed to redeem the property as stated in the
decision an order be issued vesting in her the title to the property
and directing the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
that was annotated on the two titles covering the property. And
acceding to the motion, over the opposition of Pascua, the court a quo issued on February 6, 1962 an order the dispositive portion of which read:

“WHEREFORE, as prayed for by defendant Vda. de
Verzosa, the Court hereby declares that title to the properties
mortgaged under the mortgage deed Exhibit ‘B’ is already vested in
defendant Elisa P. Vda. de Verzosa and the Register of Deeds of Manila
is hereby ordered, upon payment of the proper legal fees, to cancel the
notice of lis pendens of this case appearing annotated on transfer
certificates of title Nos. 60626 and-60627 of the land records of
Manila.”

In due course, Pascua interposed the present petition for certiorari contending (1) that the court a quo
erred in holding that Pascua failed to redeem the property within one
year from the receipt of the decision in the annulment case, there
being no legal and factual basis thereof; and (2) assuming that Pascua
has incurred in such failure, the court a quo erred in vesting the
title of the property in Verzosa without the corresponding appropriate
action and without due process of law.

There is merit in the contention that the court a quo erred
in holding that petitioner has failed to redeem the property within the
period of one year from the date the decision in the annulment case has
become final for there is indeed no such period fixed either in the
body of said decision, nor in its dispositive part, as we have quoted
elsewhere in this decision. Verily, that was the intention of the court
when it allowed petitioner to redeem the property upon payment of the
sum of P20,100.00, plus interest thereon from date of the sale until
the redemption is made, but it overlooked to specify or mention the
period within which the redemption should be effected. There being no
such specification, it is unfair to hold petitioner delinquent in
exercising the option given to her when the period for doing so is not
stated. As a matter of fact, petitioner was of the impression that her
right to redeem could be exercised within what she believed to be a
reasonable period of time, and at the time the motion for vesting was
filed in court she had almost completed negotiation to obtain the money
with which she expected to effect the redemption.

Assuming that petitioner has been delinquent in exercising her
option within the period which in the opinion of the court she should
have exercised it, still we are of the opinion that the court a quo erred in vesting in respondent the title of the property outright
without taking the necessary appropriate action for that purpose, or
without due process of law, since petitioner, at the time the motion
was filed, was then the owner of the property in view oi the annulment
of the sale executed by the sheriff in favor of respondent in the
annulment ease instituted by petitioner against respondent. Note that
what was ordered by the court a quo in said case was to allow
petitioner to redeem the property upon payment of the sum of P20,100.00
which is contrary to its decision annulling the deed of sale in favor
of respondent. The most, therefore, that respondent could do upon
failure of petitioner to pay the above amount, was to ask the execution
of the decision, and not the vesting of title to the property in her,
as the court did. The only right of respondent in the premises was
merely to collect the amount of the loan, plus the interest due
thereon, which can be effected by filing a motion for execution in the
annulment case. This respondent can still do.

Wherefore, petition is granted. The order of respondent court dated
February 6, 1962 is hereby set aside. Costs against respondent Verzosa.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.