THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS.. IRENE DE GUZMAN, TAN BOC SIU, LIM-BENG HOK, AND ALFREDO LIM, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The defendants, Irene de Guzman, Tan Bock Siu, Lim Beng Hok and
Alfredo Lim, have appealed from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, finding them guilty of a violation of Ordinance
No.. 1, series of 1946, of the municipal council of Lucena, and
sentencing each of them to imprisonment for one month, to pay a fine of
P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of
P1 per day, and to pay the costs.

The appellants were originally charged in the justice of the peace
court of Lucena which found them guilty and sentenced each of them to
pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The separate informations filed against the appellants were of the
following tenor: “That on or about the 30th day of June, 1947, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Lucena, province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the owner and proprietor of a
lumber yard (Tableria) located inside the prohibited zone of said
Municipality, with the deliberate intent of disobeying, the permit
given her by the Local Authority for a temporary lumber establishment
in the restricted area and the provisions prescribed in the Municipal
Ordinance, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fail to remove and transfer her lumber establishment within the time
granted her to do so.”

Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1946, of the municipal council of Lucena, provides as follows: :

“SECTION 1. Ordinances Nos. 19 and 32, series of
1938 regarding lumber yards (Tablerias) are hereby revoked and all
ordinances or parts thereof inconsistent with the present are hereby
repealed.

“SEC. 2. Definition: Lumber yards
(Tablerias) arc those establishments which are. dedicated to the sawing
of timber either by hand, .or motor and those establishments which
although not sawing timber, have lumber for sale.

“SEC. 3.
Lumber yards {Tablerias) utilizing motors in’the process of their
business can be located in any part of themunicipality provided that
said establishment shall be away, from the nearest house by at least
100 meters from the place of the motor.

“Lumber yards (Tablerias) without motor can be located in any part of the municipality except within the following zone:

“SEC. 4. Permit: No lumber yard (Tablerias)
should be allowed to operate without the written permit of the Mayor
and the Municipal Treasurer shall not issue any license unless said
permit is secured by the interested parties.

“SEC. 5.Penal Provisions.—Any
person, company, corporation or entity who shall violate this ordinance
or any portion thereof, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine
of not more than P200 or imprisonment by not more than two months or
both fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court. In case of
insolvency, subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P1 per day shall be
imposed.”

It appears that appellants Irene de Guzman, Tan Bok Siu, Lim Beng
Hok and Alfredo Lim were the owners respectively of the Victory Lumber
Yard, Pacific Lumber, Capitol Lumber, and International Construction
& Supply, located within the area prohibited by the above-quoted
ordinance. They had been operating the lumber yards prior to the
enactment of the ordinance on February 26, 1946, and continued to do so
thereafter. In January, 1947, they were duly notified by the Mayor of
Lucena to comply, with said ordinance by moving their lumber yards out
of the prohibited zone on or before April 1,1947. Upon their failure to
do so, the Mayor, on May 28, 1947, went to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Quezon wherein he met appellant Irene de Guzman and Eleuterio
Lim, the latter in representation of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce
and the other appellants. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Reyes gave the
appellants another thirty days within which to comply with the
ordinance. Upon their failure to do so, the present prosecution was
instituted.

The principal contention of the appellants is that the ordinance is
unconstitutional, in that it is an invasion of the property rights of
lumber yard owners without due process of law, denies equal protection
of the laws, and discriminates against Chinese. In answer to this
contention, it is sufficient to quote hereunder the syllabus of the
decision in the case of Benito Tan Chat et al., vs. the Municipality of
Iloilo, 60 Phil., 465, in which the constitutionality of a similar
zoning ordinance was upheld by this Court:

1. Municipalities; power to abate nuisances.—The
   defendant municipality, in the exercise of the powers delegated to it
   by the Legislature, and by virtue of the police power conferred upon it
   by the .express provisions of section 2242 ( h) of the
   Kevised Administrative Code, has the power to enact ordinances for the
   purpose of regulating and abating public nuisances particularly when
   the measure is sound and redounds to the benefit of the inhabitants of
   the locality and is reasonably exercised.

2. Id.; Nuisances “per se” and nuisances “per accidens”.—Taking
   into consideration the nature of the plaintiffs’ business which
   consisted of a saw mill and lumber yards, and the indisputable fact
   that the conduct thereof necessarily disturbs passers-by and the
   neighbors, Held: That such business constitutes nuisances per accidens or per se.
   
3. Id.; Zoning Ordinance.—The
   power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
   industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized, in almost
   all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power
   itself and is exercised for the benefit and protection of their
   inhabitants.

4. Id.; Id.; Constitutionality.—In
   enacting the ordinance in question, the defendant municipality does not
   appropriate the properties of the plaintiffs but simply prohibits the
   conduct of said industry or business within the limits established
   therein, the provisions of which are in accordance with the old and
   well-known maxim: salus popuh suprema lex (the welfare of the
   people is the supreme law). For this reason, it does not violate the
   constitutional rule prohibiting confiscation of property without due
   compensation.

It cannot be seriously contended that’there, is discrimination in
favor of Filipinos, because .the prohibition in the ordinance in.
question, applies to all lumber yards regardless of the race of their
owners. As a matter of fact, appellant Irene de Guzman is, by her own
admission, a Filipina. Engracio Jalbuena and Nestorio Tolentino, who
are alleged to have lumber yards within the prohibited zone, no longer
had the same when the trial Judge made an occular inspection; and
Tolentino now runs only a furniture store therein.

There can be no dispute that the passage of the ordinance was
prompted by a desire to abate nuisances resulting from the operation of
lumber yards within residential zones, and this falls under the
legitimate exercise of police power by the municipal council.

The fact that, as contended by appellants, the municipal
authorities of Luceha might have been lax in the enforcement or allowed
violations of other ordinances, is not a valid defense against the
instant prosecution. Proper’action, if any, should be taken against the
erring officials.

Under section S of the ordinance, lumber yards with motors “can be
located in any part of the municipality provided that said
establishment shall be away from the nearest house by at least 100
meters from the place of the motor,” (first paragraph), and lumber
yards without motors can be located in any part of the municipality
except within the following zone: North—Burgos Street; East—Gardiner
Street; South—Salvador and Perez Streets; West—Abellana Street (second
paragraph). It is now insisted for, the appellants that, as the trial,
court found that their lumber yards are with motors, they should be
acquitted, because the prosecution has failed to prove that said yards
are not at least 100 meters away from the nearest house. This
contention is not tenable. In the first place, the appellants virtually
admitted that their yards are within the prohibited area (and this
fairly means that they are loeated within the prohibited 100meter
radius). Indeed, appellants’ evidence only emphasizes the allegations
(1) that although there are other lumber yards similarly situated,
their owners were not prosecuted, (2) that appellants’ lumber yards do
not create nuisances or fire hazards, and (3) that ordinances against
obstruction of sidewalks and traffic were not enforced rigidly, all
these to justify the retention of appellants’ present locations. In the
second place, section 3 of the ordinance must be read and construed in
its entirety and in a sense that will prevent absurdity. In other
words, it is quite plain that, if lumber yards without motors cannot:
be located within the area bounded by the streets mentioned in the
ordinance, lumber yards utilizing motors cannot, with more reason
(having in mind the purpose of the ordinance), be operated therein.
The. restricted zone is admittedly in the center of the poblacion of
Lueena, and it is just to assume that no lumber yard may exist therein
without necessarily coming very near residential buildings.

With reference to appellants’ argument that the trial court erred
in considering marked obstinacy in disobeying the ordinance as a
circumstance justifying the imposition of a penalty higher than that
imposed by the justice of the peace court, it may be stated that, under
section 5 of the ordinance, the court has the discretion to impose a
fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more’ than 2 months,
or both fine and imprisonment The appellants’ sentence is clearly
within this range.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the appellants.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.