🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, INC. – QUEZON CITY/ATTY. BENJAMIN PAULINO/DR. JUAN LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SIXTH DIVISION) AND L…

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Philippine School of Business Administration versus National Labor Relations Commission

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by the Philippine School of Business Administration of Quezon City, together with its President and its Vice-President of Finance, against the National Labor Relations Commission and a retired faculty member, Leticia Perez. The school asks the Supreme Court to strike down the Commission's ruling that affirmed an award of retirement benefits in her favor. The case matters because it settles two questions every labor lawyer must know: which retirement formula prevails when a collective bargaining agreement gives less than the law, and how a teacher's years of service are counted across summer terms.

Procedural History

Perez filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for non-payment of thirteenth month pay, retirement benefits, and service award. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor, ordering the school to pay her retirement benefits computed on the average daily salary rate. The school appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter in its Decision of December 2012 and denied reconsideration in its Resolution of February 2013. The school then went up to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Commission. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Commission.

Facts

Perez served as an academic faculty member of the school from November 1985 until her retirement on July 4, 2011. The collective bargaining agreement between the school and its faculty association provided a formula for one-half month pay: annual basic salary divided by twelve months, then divided by two. Using that formula, the school computed her retirement pay at 955,974.75 pesos before withholding tax, together with her thirteenth month pay and a service award. It required her to sign a quitclaim as a condition for releasing the benefits.

Perez refused the checks and the quitclaim. She pointed out that the school had used a different formula, average daily salary multiplied by fifteen days, in computing the retirement benefits of Pacifica Camba, another faculty member who retired in June 2010. She insisted on that same formula and claimed twenty-six years of service, which would yield a higher premium and retirement pay of 1,312,118.34 pesos.

The school stood by its computation under the collective bargaining agreement and added that Perez had served only twenty-five years and one month, because she did not teach during the summer terms of 1986, 1988, and 1989. The Labor Arbiter and the Commission both ruled for Perez, finding no reasonable distinction between her and Camba, holding that the agreement's benefits fell below what the law requires, and counting her service from hiring to retirement.

Issues

  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding a retirement computation that departed from the formula in the collective bargaining agreement.
  • Whether or not the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that Perez served twenty-six years despite the summer terms in which she had no teaching load.

Applicable Provisions

Article 293 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7641, provides:

ART. 293. Retirement. - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

This fixes the retirement age by agreement but subjects the benefits to the floor set by law.

In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.

This is the provision that defeats the school's reliance on the agreement, because the agreement may not give less than the law.

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

The last clause on fractions governs the counting of Perez's years.

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.

This defines one-half month salary as twenty-two and one-half days, which is the formula the Court applies.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition must fail because a petition for certiorari reaches only errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, not errors in the evaluation of evidence, and the school showed nothing patent and gross in the Commission's action. On the merits, the Court held that while a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law are deemed written into it and limit it. Following its earlier ruling in Grace Christian High School versus Lavandera, the Court explained that the statutory retirement scheme applies either where there is no agreement, or where the agreement provides benefits below the requirement of law, and that the determining factor is which scheme is superior in benefits. Because the agreement's formula yielded less than the statutory formula of average daily rate multiplied by twenty-two and one-half days, the law prevailed.

On the second issue, the Court held that it would be absurd to compute service by months rather than years, and that a teacher continues to be employed during summer terms even without a teaching load, since the employment has not been terminated by any valid or just cause. Counting from November 1985 to July 4, 2011, Perez served twenty-five years and eight months, and because a fraction of at least six months is a whole year, her total service is twenty-six years.

Doctrine

First, a collective bargaining agreement on retirement benefits is read together with Article 293 of the Labor Code, and its stipulations may not fall below the statutory minimum; where the agreement gives less, the statutory formula applies. Second, one-half month salary means twenty-two and one-half days: fifteen days plus one-twelfth of the thirteenth month pay plus the cash equivalent of five days of service incentive leave. Third, a fraction of at least six months of service counts as one whole year. Fourth, a teacher remains an employee during summer terms without a teaching load, so those terms are counted in the length of service.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Commission's Decision and Resolution, leaving intact the award of retirement benefits to Perez.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the determining factor in choosing a retirement scheme is the superiority in terms of benefits, so the law displaces a lesser agreement. Examiners use this case for the twenty-two and one-half day formula and for counting a teacher's summer terms as service.