FELICIANO AUREUS, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE DISTRICT LAND OFFICER OF NAGA, CAMARINES SUR, RESPONDENTS…

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur commanding the respondents to desist from enforcing a
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which said court declared
null and void.

Said decision was rendered on the application of Feliciano
Aureus for a revocable permit to occupy and use a parcel of public land situated
in the poblacion of Naga, Camarines Sur, and the opposition thereto of Jovetillo
Abiog. By that decision the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce authorized
Jovetillo Abiog “to occupy the land in controversy upon payment to the Bureau of
Lands of his back rentals for the years 1939, 1940, and 1941, plus 4% interest
thereon, and the rentals for the period beginning June 1, 1945, up to May 31,
1946”; sustained the order of the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands
dropping the revocable permit application of Feliciano Aureus; and ordered the
latter to vacate the premises within thirty days .

It appears that on March 7, 1931, Jovetillo Abiog obtained
revocable permit No. 3008 for the temporary occupation and use of the parcel of
land above mentioned, on which he had then already constructed his residential
house. He occupied the land continuously until his house was burned in 1942,
when he evacuated from Naga and lived somewhere else during the period of the
war. On June 8, 1945, he returned to Naga and had the land in question cleared
of the ruins of his burned house with the intention of reoccupying the premises.
On June 25, 1945, however, Feliciano Aureus commenced the construction of a
house on the land in question over the verbal and written protests of Abiog.
Subsequently, that is to say, on August 17, 1945, Aureus filed with the district
land officer of Camarines Sur an application for a revocable permit to occupy
said land. That application was opposed by Jovetillo Abiog on the ground that as
a prewar permited and occupant of said land he had a better right thereto.
Abiog’s revocable permit was good and valid for a period of one year from
November 1, 1940 to October 31, 1941, subject to renewal upon due notice and
payment of the permit fee 45 days in advance of the date of the expiration of
the permit. The said permit has never been expressly renewed nor canceled. The
permittee Ablog was in arrears in the payment of the rentals, so much so that
the last payment made on November 24, 1941, was credited to the rental for the
year 1938.

After investigating the case, and finding the facts to be as
above narrated, the district land officer decided “that Jovetillo Abiog should
be as he is hereby given further privilege to occupy the land in controversy
upon payment to the Bureau of Lands of his back rentals for the years 1939,
1940, and 1941, plus 4% interest thereon, and [the rentals] for the period from
June 1, 1945, to May 31, 1946. The revocable permit application (new) of Feliciano Aureus is hereby rejected and he is hereby ordered to vacate the
premises within thirty days from the date he receives a copy of this decision.”
Upon motion for reconsideration presented by Feliciano Aureus, the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands issued an order whereby he canceled
Abiog’s revocable permit, dropped the application of Feliciano Aureus, and
declared the land in question vacant. Prom said order only Jovetillo Abiog
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, who rendered the decision
hereinabove mentioned. Thereupon Feliciano Aureus commenced the present action
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur by filing a petition for
prohibition and mandamus against the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the
Director of Lands, and the district land officer of Naga, Camarines Sur, praying
that the said respondents be ordered to desist from enforcing the decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and that a writ of mandamus be issued
against the respondents commanding them to cancel the revocable permit of
Jovetillo Abiog and immediately approve the revocable permit application of the
petitioner Feliciano Aureus. Judge Jose T. Surtida of said court granted the
petition for prohibition on the ground that the decision was null and void, but
denied the petition for the writ of mandamus on the ground that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce had authority and discretion to decide the case the
exercise of which cannot be controlled by the court.

The trial court based its decision annulling that of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on the ground that “the land in
question was abandoned by Jovetillo Abiog in 1942, when his house thereon was
burned, and that when he returned to Naga in June of 1945 he found it already
occupied by the petitioner”; that Abiog did not renew his old permit upon its
expiration; that he was very much in arrears in the payment of the permit fee;
and that the fact that his permit was not formally canceled did not entitle him
to claim any right thereunder.

On the other hand the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, in
deciding the case in favor of Abiog, reasoned as follows: “Feliciano Aureus [the
petitioner] had no right whatsoever to enter upon the land in question and
introduce improvements thereon against the verbal and written protests of
Jovetillo Abiog. His unauthorized, not to say unlawful, entry upon the premises
could not confer upon him any right thereto, and his attempt to legalize said
entry by filing a revocable permit application therefor is not a sufficient
justification for the Bureau of Lands to disregard Abiog’s long, continuous, and
recognized occupation of the land in question by declaring the same vacant and
disposable under the provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3. In other
words, this office is of the opinion that Aureus’ unlawful entry upon the land
in controversy could not in any way affect Abiog’s long and continuous
occupation thereof which had been tacitly and impliedly recognized by the Bureau
of Lands, and for that reason said unlawful entry either in law or in equity
could not be a basis for that bureau to declare the land aforementioned as
vacant and disposable under Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3 . . .*

In order that the writ of prohibition applied for by the
petitioner-appellee may prosper, it must be shown that the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. (Section 2, Rule 67.) It is admitted that he had
jurisdiction to act. (Section 3, Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public
Land Act.) Did he commit a “grave abuse of discretion”? Did he violate any
provision of law to the prejudice of any right of the petitioner? The answer to
these questions will decide this case.

We find no basis for an affirmative answer to these questions.
The petitioner has not acquired any right whatsoever over the piece of public
land in question which he could enforce by invoking the aid of the court. The
mere filing by him of an application for a permit to occupy a piece of public
land did not create an obligation on the part of the respondents to grant his
application. If it did, the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (now Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) would be a
mere robot of every such applicant. It is discretionary in the said officials to
grant or not to grant such application.

Under paragraph 1 of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3,
permits for the temporary occupation and use of nontimber, nonmineral public
lands and lands and other real properties of the Republic of the Philippines may
be issued only when such lands are vacant and the use thereof will not be
prejudicial to public interest; and paragraph 2 of said order defines “vacant
land or property” as “land or property of the Commonwealth [Republic] of the
Philippines which is not occupied by any person, or is occupied by a person
disqualified to acquire it or by a person who, being qualified to acquire it,
refuses or fails to exercise his preferential right thereto.” In the present
case the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce considered the land
applied for by the petitioner as being occupied by Jovetillo Abiog for the
reason that the latter had previously obtained a permit to occupy it and had
actually occupied it although his occupation was interrupted by the war but was
resumed after the war. In holding that Abiog had preferential right to the land
in question and in authorizing him to occupy it upon payment of the back rentals
with interest thereon, the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce made
a lawful and just exercise of his discretion. We find no valid ground for
annulling his decision. In any event, the court cannot substitute its own
discretion for that of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in
deciding the application of the petitioner. The court is only authorized to
correct a grave abuse of such discretion; and not only is there no such abuse of
discretion but, as we have noted, it was lawfully and justly exercised.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, with costs against the
appellee.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes,
and Torres, JJ., concur.