RESTITUTO VILLAPANDO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ELVIRO Q. QUITAIN, RESPONDENT.

The reliance in all these five certiorari and prohibition
proceedings is on the oft-reiterated ideal that every litigant, in the language
of the leading case of Gutierrez v. Santos,^[1]
“is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.”^[2]
As was pointed out in Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz:^[3]
“It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the
absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.”^[4]
Petitioner Restituto Villapando,
as a result of an altercation on the evening of Good Friday, April 12, 1974 in a restaurant in San
Antonio, Quezon, was on the
very next day accused of theft of two packs of cigarettes.  It was not until later, and only with the
help of the Office of Civilian Relations of the Philippine Constabulary was he
able to file charges against the other parties in the melee for maltreatment
and less serious physical injuries allegedly inflicted on him on that
occasion.  All of these cases would be triable by respondent Elviro Q. Quitain, the municipal judge of San
Antonio. 
Petitioner is quite apprehensive as to their outcome as the latter had
shown partiality for his alleged tormentors and oppressors.  Accordingly, in his pleading, polemical in tone,
he would have this Court set aside and nullify respondent Judge’s order,
denying a petition for disqualification on the ground of bias, prejudice, and
prejudgment.^[5]
He set forth in his petition words and acts of respondent indicative of
hostility to his person.  Respondent
Judge in his comment, disputing the veracity of the cited instances of
partiality, asserted that he could be trusted to dispense justice with an even
hand.  His labored effort is not too
convincing, but even if it were, it would seem that the desired goal of
detached and impersonal justice could best be promoted by granting the
petition.  Respondent ought to realize
that, considering the bitter and protracted wrangling with the recriminations
coming from both sides and the invectives hurled by one against the other, his
disqualification would be the better solution. 
It is expected of judges, as noted in Palang
v. Zosa,^[6]
that they “decide cases without bias and favoritism.  It does not suffice that they in fact rid
themselves of prepossessions.  Their
actuations must inspire that belief. 
This is an instance where appearance is just an important as the
reality.  Like Caesar’s wife, a judge
must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.”^[7]
So we rule again.

The first petition,^[8]
with the allegations repeated in the subsequent ones, was rather verbose with
55 paragraphs in 19 pages, to which were added Annexes A to O.  No effort was spared to show the bias and
prejudice of respondent, but its impact could have been greater if there was a
curb to the propensity to rely on exaggerated language.  The comment of respondent Judge, treated as
answer, did try hard to meet the factual issues raised, minimizing the alleged
instances of partiality.  It could have
gained more credence if it were more forthright and less evasive.  The memoranda submitted by petitioner and
respondent followed the same approach with the difference that the former was
detailed and factual in his presentation of his litany of grievances and the
latter in his attempt at refutation was quite content with generalities, limiting
himself to explaining only one of the many failings laid at his door.  Nor was he quite successful at that.

Thus in petitioner’s memorandum, it was pointed out that Buendegardo G. Patulayin, a
brother of the Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Leonardo Marasigan,
a brother of the Municipal Councilor, and Miguel Pillerba,
a policeman of said municipality, the three accused in the cases for less
physical injuries and maltreatment filed by petitioner-complainant,
characterized as “all men of consequence in the local government and
political firmanent of San Antonio,” sent for
respondent Judge to go to his office on a holiday, Saturday, April 13, 1974, to
conduct the preliminary examination on the charge of theft against him as a
result of which Criminal Case No. 239 for such offense was immediately filed
with the bail for provisional liberty being fixed at P200.00.^[9]
In view of their difference in standing in the community, petitioner had to
appeal for help to the Office of the Civilian Relations of the Philippine Constabulary
at Canlubang, Laguna, so that his own complaints for
maltreatment and physical injuries could be filed.^[10]
It was then set forth that respondent Judge accompanied the three accused to
the CIS Detachment at Lucena
City to inform the constabulary investigator
that petitioner’s complaint was only in the nature of a countercharge, he
having been accused previously of theft before respondent’s court.^[11]
Mention was then made of his “openly and brazenly” favoring Patulayin, Marasigan and Pillerba in the investigation conducted by Sgt. Ernesto
Jose.^[12]
Nonetheless, as the complaints for less physical injuries and maltreatment were
filed by such Sergeant, respondent had to conduct the preliminary examination
with him exhibiting “his manifest bias and partiality in favor of the
three accused * * *.”^[13]
Thereafter, while his previous actuation where the criminal cases for less
serious physical injuries and maltreatment were concerned was marred with
delay, respondent Judge, so it is alleged, would conduct with haste the hearing
of all the cases.  Hence the motion for
disqualification on the ground of bias and prejudice which, as noted, was
denied.^[14]

There was a memorandum submitted by respondent Judge.  Instead of meeting the facts squarely, he
limited himself to two points, the general assertion that there was lack of
evidence presented to support the charge of bias and prejudice, for him being
“merely the product of generalization, conjecture, imagination and
suspicion of petitioner and his counsel.”^[15]
There was equally lack of persuasiveness in his attempt to refute the rather
patent and obvious fact that notwithstanding that it was petitioner who
suffered injury in the altercation with the three accused, the preliminary
examination for the charge of theft against him was hurriedly conducted on a
day after Good Friday, April 13, 1974, a legal holiday, resulting in the order
of arrest against the accused. 
Thus:  “With respect to the
second point that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary examination on
a Saturday and a holiday.  This simply
was a case of forgetfulness and an instance where the frailty of the human
memory has asserted itself.  The
respondent Judge has been used to work on Saturdays in his office to
accommodate lawyers who are busy with their other cases in other courts.  On April
13, 1974, unmindful that said Saturday was a holiday, since Good
Friday had already passed, the respondent Judge went to his office as
usual.  It was on his arrival at his
office that the Chief of Police filed the criminal case for theft against the
petitioner who was then presently detained at the Municipal Jail already.  In fact, what actually happened benefited the
accused (petitioner herein) because had he desired so he could have filed a
bail bond (since after the preliminary examination the bail bond has been
fixed) that Saturday and spared himself the agony of languishing in jail that
Saturday and on Sunday.”^[16]
That is to indulge in irony considering that petitioner belongs to a family of
modest means.  There was no explanation
either as to why he had to invoke the aid of the military authorities in
connection with his own charges against the three accused for maltreatment and
less serious physical injuries.  Also,
respondent Judge’s tone of levity in his memorandum was, to say the least, in
bad taste.  Instead of clarifying why he
was not as prompt in the case of petitioner’s grievance, he waxed
sarcastic:  “But criminal cases and
any case for that matter are not decided on who filed a case first.  It matters not who is first to file a
case.  This is not track and field.”^[17]
There was, of course, a previous attempt in his answer to explain the delay,
but at most it has surface or deceptive plausibility.  The memorandum afforded him another
opportunity to refute, but he failed to take advantage of it.  What it amounts to is that there is not
enough to dissipate the well-founded doubts as to his lack of objectivity and
neutrality.

The petition for disqualification, as noted at the outset, must
be granted.

1.     
The commitment of this Court to a strict
application of the procedural due process mandate of every litigant being
entitled, to follow the language of Gutierrez, to “nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge” is firm and deep-seated.  The aforecited Villaluz decision could refer to at least five cases
starting from Del Castillo v. Javelona^[18]
up to and including Paredes v. Gopengco.^[19]
Since then, seven more cases may be cited from Umale
v. Villaluz^[20]
to Balieza v. Astorga,^[21]
promulgated last April.  It would be an
unwarranted departure then from a norm so consistently adhered to if on the
situation presented by these petitions, respondent Judge would be allowed to
continue with the trial of these cases. 
Even he should realize, even if his good faith in the premises may be
assumed, that his deportment left much to be desired.  Anyone in the position of petitioner cannot
view what had transpired in any other light. 
Hence the merit in the petitions.

2.     
What is even less commendable is that respondent
Judge’s actuation clearly leaves the impression that he was not immune to the
disparity in the economic, social, and political standing of the
litigants.  Favoritism is not to be
tolerated, but it is much more odious if directed against one coming from the
poor and the dispossessed.  More consideration
should be shown to one having less in life. 
That certainly would inspire a deeper sense of loyalty to the government
from the greater segment of our people, who are economically underprivileged.  The judiciary should try to redress the
imbalance, not magnify it.  More to the
point, the professed ideals of the New Society would be reduced to a barren
form of words if it were otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari prayed for are
granted.  Respondent Judge is ordered disqualified
and restrained from taking any further action in the respective cases involved
in the petitions before this Court, whether petitioner Villapando
is the accused or the complainant.  The
Executive Judge of the Quezon Courts of First
Instance is ordered to designate a Municipal Judge of such province to try such
cases.  This decision is immediately executory. 
Respondent Judge is given a period of thirty days from receipt of this
decision to explain why no administrative action should be taken against
him.  No costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
112 Phil. 184 (1961).

^[2] Ibid,
189.

^[3]
L-34756-59, March 31, 1973,
50 SCRA 18.

^[4] Ibid,
23.

^[5]
Petition, Annexes G & H.

^[6]
L-38229, Aug. 30, 1974, 58
SCRA 776.

^[7] Ibid,
778.

^[8] L-41333.

^[9]
Memorandum of Petitioner in L-41333, pars. 14-16.

^[10] Ibid,
pars. 17-19.

^[11] Ibid,
par. 20.

^[12] Ibid,
pars. 21-24.

^[13] Ibid,
par. 25.

^[14] Ibid,
par. 26.

^[15]
Memorandum of Respondent Judge in L-41333, 7.

^[16] Ibid,
8.

^[17] Ibid,
8-9.

^[18]
L-16742, September 29, 1962,
6 SCRA 146.

^[19]
L-23710, September 30, 1969,
29 SCRA 688.  The three other cases are
People v. Gomez, L-22345, May
29, 1967, 20 SCRA 293; Pimentel v. Salanga,
L-27934, September 18, 1967,
21 SCRA 160; Luque v. Kayanan,
L-26826, August 29, 1969,
29 SCRA 165.

^[20]
L-33508, May 25, 1973, 51
SCRA 84.

^[21]
Adm. Case 202-MJ, April 30, 1976,
70 SCRA 444.  The other cases are:  Paredes v. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522; Palang v. Zosa, L-38229,
August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 776; People v. Ancheta,
L-39993, May 19, 1975, 64 SCRA 90; Marcos v. Domingo, Adm. Case No.
203-CJ, May 29, 1975, 64 SCRA 206; Martinez v. Gironella,
L-37635, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA 245.