G. R. No. L-23731. February 26, 1965

PEDRO ACHARON, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. FIDEL P. PURISIMA, ET AL.,RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions February 26, 1965 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
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BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:


Pedro Acharon seeks to restrain the Municipal Judge of General
Santos, Cotabato, from trying certain criminal cases
filed against him for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 303 pending final
disposal of the instant petition for certiorari.

The present petition requires an
inquiry into the antecedents of the incident that gave rise to the petition for
certiorari instituted by Pedro Acharon before the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato.

Acharon was charged with a violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 303 in four separate informations
before the Municipal Court of General Santos, Cotabato, which were set for preliminary investigation on
April 28,
1962
.
Sometime prior to said date, Acharon filed a motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because (1) the administrative
remedies provided for by the rules and regulations promulgated under the Minimum
Wage Law as a condition precedent for the filing of a criminal action thereunder were not exhausted and (2) the certification
issued by the Secretary of Labor as a prerequisite for an action to be taken
under Commonwealth Act No. 303 has not been obtained. This motion was denied.
And his motion for reconsideration having been disregarded Acharon filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato alleging lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the municipal
court.

The petition was given due course
and in due time respondents filed their answer justifying the action taken by
the Municipal Court of General Santos. However, after the court a quo has set
the case, for hearing and allowed respondents to submit a memorandum in their
behalf, it dismissed the petition on the ground that neither the information
filed before the court of origin nor the order denying the motion to quash were
incorporated into the petition thus rendering it impossible for the court to
lender a decision on the merits. The court said: “For this failure of the
petitioner to plead the complaint and the order in question, from which the
court should have gathered the facts which constitute alleged lack of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, the Court is not in a position to
render a judgment in this case.” From this order of dismissal Acharon took the present appeal and now petitions that,
pending the disposal of this appeal, the Municipal Court of General Santos be
enjoined from hearing the criminal cases above adverted
to.

We are of the opinion that this
appeal has no merit for the reason that the step Acharon should have taken to obviate the technical defect
observed by the court a quo on which it predicated its order of dismissal was
not to appeal but to file a motion for reconsideration furnishing the court with
the two pleadings which it considered vital for an intelligent determination of
the case. Apparently this was not done because no such step appears in the
record. Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon that neither the information filed before the court
of origin nor the order denying the motion to quash were incorporated into the
petition thus rendering it impossible for the court to render a decision on the
merits, the court said: “For this failure of the petitioner to plead the
complaint and the order in question, from which the Court could have gathered
the facts which constitute the alleged lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion, the Court is not in a position to render a judgment in this case.”
From this order of dismissal Acharon took the present
appeal and now petitions that, pending the disposal of this appeal the Municipal
Court of General Santos be enjoined from hearing the criminal cases above
adverted to.

We are of the opinion that this
appeal has no merit for the reason that the step Acharon should have taken to obviate the technical defect
observed by the court a quo
on which it predicated its order of dismissal was not to appeal but to file a
motion for reconsideration furnishing the court with the two pleadings which it
considered vital for an intelligent determination of the case. Apparently this
was not done because no so such step appears in the record. Moreover, when the
motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the
criminal cases filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General
Santos his remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial
without prejudice on his part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked
in his motion and, if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized
by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as authorized by law
and precedents. Instead, he took the unusual step of filing a writ of certiorari
before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is unwarranted it being
contrary to the usual course of law. We find, therefore; of no useful purpose to
continue with the present appeal making the parties spend unnecessarily for the
printing of their briefs only to have it dismissed in the end. As a corollary,
we likewise find unnecessary to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is
dismissed. The petition for preliminary injunction is denied. No
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.