RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., AND GORDON W. MACKAY, PETITIONERS, VS. ZOILO B. FERRER, MARIO TATLONG­HARI, SANTOS MARILAG AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Challenged by petitioner on certiorari and prohibition is the
juris­diction of the Court of Industrial Relations [hereinafter referred to as
CIR] to hear and determine a case ^[1]
seeking –

1. Reinstatement with back wages, which accumulated since their
illegal separation, on the ground of unjustified dismissal;

2. Moral and exemplary damages because of such dismissal;

3. Payment of increase in salary and separation pay;

4. Night differential pay; and

5. Premium pay for work done on Sundays and legal holidays.

The present proceeding is an offshoot of the CIR’s
denial of peti­tioners’ motion to dismiss – grounded on want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter – the
principal respondents’ complaint and said court’s refusal to reconsider the order of denial.

1. We start with the demand for additional pay for work performed
on Sundays and legal holidays.  Right to
such pay Etta by explicit arti­culation in Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor
Law, guaranteed a work­man.  Consequently, failure to give
additional compensation for such work is a violation of the said law.  Here, the principal respondents were dismissed from their
employment.  But they seek
reinstatement.  Hence, the case, on this score, is within the coverage of the
prevailing rule enunciated in Campos, et al., vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al. ,
L-17905, May 25, 1962, thus –

“We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the bench and
the bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire
jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. 875, the
following circumstances must be
present:  (a) there must exist between the parties an
employer-employee relationship, or the claimant must seek his reinstatement;
and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the
CIR as one involving national interest, or must have a bearing on an unfair
labor practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or
under the Minimum Wage Law.  In default
of any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.”

And, the CIR has jurisdiction. ^[2]

2. On the claim for night differentials, no extended discussion is
necessary.  To be read as controlling
here is Philippine Engineers’ Syndicate, Inc. vs. Hon. Jose S. Bautista, et
al., L-16440, February 29, 1964, where this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief
Justice Cesar Bengzon, declared –

“Only one issue is raised: 
whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875 the CIR lost its
jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night
work.  Petitioner says that this Act
reduced the jurisdict­ion of respondent court and limited it to specific cases
which this Court has defined as: ’x x x (1) when the
labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national
interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec. 10,
Republic Act 875); (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the
Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602); (3) when it involves hours of employment
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves
an unfair labor practice [Sec. 5 (a) Republic Act 875].’ [Paflu,
et al. vs. Tan, et al., 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz.
No. 13, 5836].

Petitioner insists that respondents’ case falls in none of these
categories because as held in two previous cases, night work is not overtime
but regular work; and that res­pondent court’s authority to try the case cannot
be implied from its ‘general jurisdiction and broad powers under Com­monwealth
Act 103 because Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to
certain specific litigations, beyond which it is not permitted to act.

We believe petitioner to be in error.  Its position col­lides with our ruling in the
Naric case [National Rice & Corn Corp.  (NARIC) vs. NARIC Workers’ Union, et al., 105
Phil., 891] where we held:

‘While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the
aforementioned case, it does not intend
to convey the idea that work done at
night cannot also be an overtime work. 
The comment only served to emphasize that the dem­and which the Shell
Company made upon its la­borers is not
merely an overtime work but night work
and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work.  In fact, the company contend­ed that there
was no law that required the payment of additional compensation for night work
unlike an over­time work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444,(Eight
Hour Labor Law).  And this Court in that
case said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional
compensation for night work, the industrial court has the power to de­termine
the wages that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No, 103,
and so it justi­fied the additional compensation in, the Shell case for “hygienic, medical, moral,
cultural and sociologi­cal reasons.'”

Apropos the issue of jurisdiction, this Court in the same Shell
case spoke in this fashion:

‘La cuestion que,
a nuestro juicio, se debe determinar es si entre
las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones
Industriales que estan adrmitidas sin disputa, esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una
jornada completes de trabajo;
la de estimarla como mas gravosa que
la jornada de dfa; y consiguientemente, la de proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares
diurnos.  Nuestra con­testacion es afirmativa:  todo esto se halla comprendido
entre los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales.  Si este tribunal tiene, en casos de disputa, el poder fijar los
salarios que estime justos y razonables
para el trabajo de dia., no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche; es tan trabajo
lo uno como lo otro.  x x x.’ [Shell Co.  contra  National Labor Union, ibid, at
325-326].

True, in PAFLU ET AL. vs. Tan et al., supra, and in a
series of cases thereafter, we held that the broad powers conferred by
Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which
limited them to the four categories therein expressed in line with the public
poli­cy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via the col­lective
bargaining process; but we find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of
this nature – for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of
the industrial court.  Withal, the record
does not show that the employer-employee relation between the 65 respondents
and the petitioner had ceased.

After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only
upheld the industrial court’s assumption of juris­diction over cases for salary
differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. City Automotive
Co. et al., G.R. No. L-11655, April
29, 1959; Prisco vs.
CIR, et al., 108 Phil., 134] or for payment of addi­tional compensation for
work rendered on Sundays and ho­lidays and for night work [Nassco
vs. Almin, et al., 104 Phil., 835; Detective &
Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Felipe Guevara, et al., G. R. No. L­8738, May 31,
1957] but has also supported such court’s ruling that work performed at night
should be paid more than work done at daytime, and that if that work is done
beyond the worker’s regular hours of duty, he should also be paid additional compensation
for overtime work.  [Naric
vs. Naric Workers’ Union, et al., G. R. No. L-12075,
May 29, 1959, citing Shell Co.
vs. National Labor Union, 81 Phil. 315]
Besides, to hold that this case for extra compensa­tion now falls beyond
the powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a further
curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the
purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of
labor.  [Luis Recato
Dy, et al. vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-17788, May 25, 1962]

Again, we hold that the CIR is with
authority to act on this grievance.

3. The other demands, namely, reinstatement, and back wages and the damages incident
thereto, and payment of salary increases and
se­paration pay, are matters which arose out of the same employment.  Since employer-employee
relationship is sought to be reestablished, the Industrial Court “has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in
connection with, employment”.  ^[3]

Earlier, we held herein that the claim for Sunday and legal holiday pay and that for night
differentials are within the compass of the CIR’s jurisdiction.  It is
because of this that we say that no reason exists why we should pull said
demands – for reinstatement, and back wages and damages incident thereto, and
payment of salary increases and separa­tion pay – out of the CIR’s jurisdiction and place them in the hands of ordinary
courts, Just recently, we had occasion to remark that: ^[4]
“No draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor
litigations.  A piecemeal resort to one
court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits.  To force the employees to shuttle from one
court to another to secure full redress is a situation gravely
prejudicial.  The time to be lost, effort
wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expense incurred – these are
considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction.  Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly
administration of justice that all the causes of action here ‘be cognizable and
heard by only one court:  the Court of
Industrial Relations.'” ^[5]

Upon the view we take of this case, the petition herein for
certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed. 
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
CIR Case No. 1900-V, entitled “Zoilo R. Ferrer, Mario Tatlong­hari and
Santos Marilag, plaintiffs, versus Rheem of the Philippines Inc and Gordon W. Mackay,
defendants.”

^[2]
See: National Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. Almin et al., 104 Phil., 835; Bay View Hotel,
Inc. vs. Manila Hotel Workers’
Union-PTGWO, et al., L-21803, December 17, 1966. See also: Manila
Electric Co. vs. Ortañez, et al., L-19557,
March 31, 1964.

^[3]
PRISCO vs. CIR, et al., 108
Phil., 134; emphasis supplied.

^[4]
Bay View Hotel, Inc. vs. Manila hotel Workers’ Union-PTGWO et al., supra.

^[5]
Citing  Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. 104 Phil., 294.