PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RHODA MARSON Y OFREDO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REYES, JR., J.C., J.:
The Information in Crim. Case No. Q-11-173110 dated November 9, 2011, charged appellant of Theft, as follows:
“That on or about the 1st day of November 2011, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away:
1.One (1) Diamond ring $ 10,000 2. US dollar bills $ 20 or in the total amount of P430,860.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elenita Alvero y Kalaw, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law.” (Records, p. 3).
The appellant pleaded “not guilty.” (Records, p. 37).
Trial ensued and the prosecution presented the testimonies of Agnes Roa (Roa) appellant’s employer, and Roa’s cousin (Elenita Alvero), owner of the missing items.
According to the prosecution: Alvero, a balikbayan and visitor at the Roa residence, asked herein appellant, a helper in the house of Roa, on November 1, 2011 at around noon, to clean her (Alvero’s) bedroom. While appellant cleaned the room, Alvero went to the living room to read the newspaper. Alvero returned to the bedroom to rest soon after appellant finished cleaning. Around 1:30 p.m., appellant asked permission to leave the house to go to Cavite, promising to return the same day. A few minutes after appellant left, Alvero realized that her rings, which were placed on top of a dresser inside her room, were missing. One of the rings costs less than US$5,000.00 which she bought in New York while the other was given to her by her mother and had seven diamonds. They tried looking for the rings to no avail. They also could not contact appellant who returned only on November 3 to get her things. (TSN, Agnes Roa, March 13, 2012, pp. 3-10; Elenita Alvero, May 15, 2012, pp. 3-17).
The appellant took the witness and in her defense denied the the allegations against her. According to her, she was cooking around 10 a.m. of November 1, 2011, when Jessica, another helper told her to take a bath, saying that Jessica will cook instead. She denied cleaning Alvero’s room saying that it was Jessica who was inside the room when appellant finished taking a bath. She averred that she was not able to return until November 3, as it was raining hard on November 2 and her aunt asked her to accompany her to the cemetery. (TSN, July 30, 2012, pp. 6-11, 14).
On August 29, 2012, the RTC rendered the herein assailed Decision in Crim. Case No. Q-11-173110 which disposed:
“WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rhoda Marson y Ofredo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft defined and penalized under Article 308 in relations to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correctional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay private complainant Elenita Alvero y Kalaw the amount of Two Hundred Four Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos and Sixty-Nine Centavos (P204,785.69) as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
The RTC held the prosecution was able to prove that appellant was guilty of theft for the loss of Alvero’s ring worth US$4,804.92. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
“The accused was positively identified by complainant Elenita Alvero y Kalaw as the only person who entered her room on November 1, 2011 at around 12:00 to 12:15 in the afternoon in order to clean it. The other maid was doing gardening chores outside the house. There was no instance that she saw Jessica, also a maid of Agnes Roa, entered (sic) her room. While accused is cleaning the room, she went to the living room but she still saw her rings placed on top of the dresser. It was only when accused left that she noticed her rings already missing.
…
There was no indication that prosecution witness Elenita Alvero had any motive to testify falsely against the accused. Her testimony is truthful even with the gruelling cross-examination, she did not falter but rather stand (sic) pat on her testimony that the accused is the perpetrator.” (Rollo, p. 40).
The appellant is now before the Court claiming that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [HER] THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RHODA MARSON GUILTY OF THEFT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Rollo, p. 18).
The appellant avers that there are several vital circumstances in this case which were misapprehended by the lower court that entitles her to an acquittal. Her conviction was based on circumstantial evidence: that as a house helper of Roa, she had access to Alvero’s room, and; that after the discovery of the loss of Alvero’s jewelry, she (appellant) left Roa’s residence. These circumstances are insufficient because appellant is not the only stay-in helper of Roa and there was no showing that said room was ever locked at any instance to prevent the other helpers from entering it. The house had four entrances and Alvero did not have her eyes on appellant the whole time she cleaned the room. Her departure after the discovery of the loss of the valuables also cannot be considered as flight as she had earlier asked permission from Roa that she would visit her aunt. Alvero claimed that she noticed that her two rings were missing at around 12 noon yet she did not do anything about it. Thus, appellant was still able to ask permission from Roa to leave by 1:30 in the afternoon. It was only on November 4 that Roa and Alvero went to the police to report to supposed theft. (Rollo, pp. 23-26).
The appellant avers that it was the other maid, Jessica who pointed to her as the perpetrator of theft. It is possible however that it was Jessica who actually stole the rings as she also had access to Alvero’s room. While the trial court gave weight to Jessica’s Sworn Statement, the prosecution did not present her in court. The failure to present her in court weakens the prosecution’s case as her testimony is very crucial. (Rollo, pp. 27-29).
The People through the Office of the Solicitor General meanwhile asserts that the circumstances, which the prosecution had proven, constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was the author of the crime of theft. (Rollo, p. 62).
The Court finds MERIT in the appeal.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”
Its elements are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. (People v. Bayon, 622 SCRA 702, 710 [2010]).
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. (People v. Anabe, 630 SCRA 10, 28 [2010]). Corpus delicti in theft meanwhile has two elements: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. (Gulmatico v. People, 536 SCRA 82, 92 [2007]).
In this case, there was no eyewitness who actually saw appellant take Alvero’s jewelry. The trial court, in finding appellant guilty of the offense gave weight to Alvero’s testimony that appellant was the only person who entered her room on November 1, 2011 at around 12 noon and that there was no instance that she (Alvero) saw Jessica, the other maid, enter the room. The trial court also gave consideration to Alvero’s lack of motive to testify falsely against the appellant and that she did not falter even under gruelling cross-examination. (Rollo, p. 40).
While an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, it is important however that the circumstantial evidence presented be sufficient for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. (Rebucan v. People, 507 SCRA 332, 344 [2006]).
Under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. (People v. Anabe, supra, p. 21).
Here, the Court finds, contrary to the trial court’s appreciation that the prosecution has failed to provide sufficient evidence pointing to appellant, to the exclusion of others, as the person guilty of the offense.
The general rule is that factual findings of trial courts are accorded great respect. Appellate courts however may disregard such findings when they are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjecture, or when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based or are premised on the absence of evidence, among others. (People v. Bayon, supra, p. 713).
It is basic that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution. The accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf as the constitutional mandate of innocence prevails, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving by satisfactory evidence the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused. (People v. Bayon, supra, p. 713).
In this case, the owner of the house admitted on cross-examination that her house has four entrances. (TSN, Agnes Roa, April 30, 2012, p. 5).
Roa further testified that apart from appellant, they also had another helper, Jessica, who at the time of Roa’s testimony was no longer working for them. (TSN, March 13, 2012, pp. 10-12). Alvero also testified that Jessica, the other maid, used to clean her room. (TSN, May 15, 2012, pp. 27). This is consistent with the Filipino practice of letting househelps have access of their master’s rooms as they are normally tasked to clean the rooms of their employers. (People v. Bayon, supra, p. 712).
Alvero likewise admitted that she did not actually see appellant get the rings. Also, she could not longer see her bedroom from the living room. (TSN, May 15, 2012, pp. 27, 38-39).
In appreciating circumstantial evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the offense. Courts must judge the guilt of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions or suspicions. (People v. Anabe, supra, p. 27).
While all appellant could offer in her defense was denial, which is weak and looked upon with disfavor, the weakness of such defense cannot be the basis of conviction. Again, the primary burden lies with the prosecution whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight. Under this rule, the defense of denial finds its special place and assumes primacy when the case for the prosecution is at the margin of sufficiency in establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt.(People v. Anabe, supra, p. 30).
Finding that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proving the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds that a reversal of the trial court’s decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 29, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87 of Quezon City, in Crim. Case No. Q-11-173110 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Rhoda Marson y Ofredo is ACQUITTED of the crime charged based on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Correctional Institute for Women is DIRECTED to release Rhoda Marson y Ofredo from confinement without DELAY, unless she is being lawfully held for other cause/s, and to INFORM the Court of her release or the reason/s for her continued confinement within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Lopez, M.V., and Inting, S.B., JJ., concur.
[1] In Crim. Case No. Q-11-173109 for Qualified Theft, which was tried together with Crim. Case No. Q-11-173110, the appellant was acquitted by the trial court in its August 29, 2012 Decision for the prosecution’s failure to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (See Rollo, p. 40).