THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DELFIN MUIT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the Decision of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I (Naga City), in Criminal Case No. R-7 (1847),
convicting the accused Delfin Muit,
a retired PC 2nd Lieutenant, of Murder, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the gunning down of the victim, Rodolfo Torrero.

Before said victim was
shot and killed, he and the accused’s wife, Rosario Muit, played as the leading man and the leading lady in a
drama presentation staged in barrio Tamban,
municipality of Tinamban, Camarines
Sur.^[1] Because of said stage play and the fact that
Mrs. Muit was the Barangay
Zone President while Torrero was the Zone Auditor,^[2] they used to meet frequently.  These meetings spawned rumors around the
barrio that they were having an affair, which eventually reached the ear of the
accused, Delfin Muit,
sometime in December of 1975.^[3]

In the afternoon of February
26, 1976, at around 3:00 o’clock,
Rodolfo Torrero was killed in the front yard of the
house of the accused in Barrio Tamban, Camarines Sur.  Said victim suffered three (3) gunshot
wounds, the one on his chest proving fatal.^[4]

The prosecution narrated the tragic incident as follows:

“On February 26, 1976 at about 2:45 o’clock in the afternoon,
while the deceased Rodolfo Torrero, his wife Purificacion Nidea-Torrero,
mother-in-law Maria Bataller, friend Benigno Gubatan and a child Francia Tresvalles, were passing
by the house of accused Delfin Muit
at barrio Tamban, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, on their way
home from a picnic, the accused invited them to his house to take a rest (pp.
42, 44 tsn., Sept.
6, 1976; p. 130 tsn., Sept. 9, 1976).  At that time Muit
was alone as his wife and children were not around (pp. 5 & 24, tsn., Oct. 24,
1977).  Once the group was
inside his house, accused Muit who is a retired PC
lieutenant remarked that his invitation showed that he had no ill-feel­ing
against the Torreros and that he knew the latter had
no ill-feeling also against him (p. 5,
tsn., Sept. 6, 1976; p. 131, tsn.,
Sept. 9, 1976).  As they engaged in some
amenities, a group of barangay members and PC
authorities in charge of the sanitation and cleanli­ness program on that
particular day, which was Community Day, paid them a visit, and after a short
talk, said group left (p. 57, tsn., Sept. 6,
1976).  The deceased Torrero
conducted the group on their way out and upon his return, accused Muit requested him to take a seat (p.58, id.).

The accused then confronted Rodolfo Torrero
why the latter always visits his
wife even during nighttime and why he often invites her out.  Torrero replied that
being the barangay zone auditor, he had to confer
with the accused’s wife on barangay
matters as the latter was the barangay zone president
(pp. 135-136, tsn., Sept. 9, 1976).  The
accused then asked why Torrero even gave food and money
to his (accused’s) children if he had no bad
intention at all on his wife (id.). 
Torrero’s wife answered that they did it out
of pity because there were times when they would see the accused’s
children in need of food and money (id.).  The accused, however, angrily stood up and
countered, ‘Why should you give when your husband had also a family to
support?’ (p. 138, id.).  To avoid
any trouble, the deceased Torrero likewise stood up
and said, ‘If that is the way we talked about this will end to nothing, so it
is better that I should leave’ (p. 139,
id.), and he proceeded to move out of the house (id.).

When Torrero was already outside the
house of the accused and while walking along the pathway, the accused followed
him and on reaching the door the accused shouted, ‘Wait because we have not yet
finished’.  At that instant, the accused
raised his left hand to­wards Torrero and with his
right hand, he pulled out his .45 caliber pistol and aimed it at the deceased
(pp. 140­-141, id.).  Angrily, he
fired his gun at Torrero who was just 3 1/2 meters
away, hitting the latter at the lower left side below the nape (pp. 22-24,
& 44, tsn., Sept. 6 & 9, 1976; Necrop­sy
Report, Exh. ‘A’, Rec.).  On being hit by the bullet, Torrero spun from his left to the right, with his two hands
inclined to the right, his face writhing in pain, his left elbow raised
parallel to his armpit and his right hand placed on his breast (pp. 65-66, tsn., Sept. 6, 1976).

Upon hearing the gunshot, witness Gubatan
immediately grab­bed and held the accused from be­hind with an embrace, and
said, ‘Manoy Delfin, why
are you like that?’ (pp. 63-64, id.). 
But as soon as Gubatan embraced the accused
from behind, a second shot was fired, this time hitting the elevated left hand
of Torrero, with the bullet penetrating through the
breast (pp. 11-12, & 88, id.; Necropsy Report, Exh. ‘A’,
Rec.).  Consequently, Torrero
fell on his knees, bent forward with face downward and body in a prone position
his left elbow supporting him on his left lap while his right hand extended to
the ground (p. 145, tns., Sept. 9, 1976). 
Witness Gubatan on the other hand tightened
his grip around the accused as he tried to wrestle with him (p. 67, tsn., Sept. 6, 1976).

The wife of Torrero, who was shocked by
the first shot thereupon rushed towards her fallen husband (p. 143, 145-146, tsn., Sept. 9, 1976). 
But the accused on seeing Mrs. Torrero rushed
towards the deceased, aimed his gun at her (p. 68, tsn.,
Sept. 6, 1976).  Fortunately, witness Gubatan quickly grabbed the right forearm of the accused
that held the gun and jerked it upward so that the third shot was fired towards
the sky, thus missing its target (id.). 
Witness Gubatan then said, ‘Manoy Delfin, that is enough’ (id.).  Gubatan thereafter
moved the accused away and brought him near a coconut tree (id.).  Mrs. Torrero, on
the other hand, hugged her husband and cried for help, even as blood was oozing
out from the deceased’s body and mouth (pp.
67, 146-147, id.).  Shortly
thereafter, Torrero died (Exh.
‘B’, Rec.).

Near the coconut tree, the accused tried to free himself from the
hold of Gubatan. 
He even pointed his gun
at Gubatan and said, ‘Set me free Benny or I will
shoot you.’ (p. 69, tsn., Sept. 6, 1976). 
When Gubatan could no longer hold the accused
as the latter kept on struggling, he let him go and said, ‘Alright Kuya Delfin, shoot me, after all
I have no fault’ (pp. 69-70, id.).  Slowly, the accused put down his arm, his eyes at static condition (id.).  He (appel­lant) then started to move away,
and as he did, he made a short last look at his victim, after which, he
continued on his way (id.).  x x x“^[5]

The evidence discloses
that the accused surrendered himself and turned in the pistol he had used to the Detachment Commander of the Tamban Police Patrol Base soon after the incident.

On the other hand, the
defense presented this version:

“x x x At
about 2:45 p.m., 26 February 1976, the late Rodolfo Torrero,
accompanied by his wife, Purificacion Nidea-Torrero, Benigno Gubatan, Frances Tresvalles, and
his mother, Maria Bataller, had come from a picnic
(it was a Sunday), when they passed by the house of Muit
(in barrio Tamban, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur).  Muit was at the
door of his house, because he was about to leave to visit his farm and had
tucked his 45-caliber pistol in his front waistline, under his T-shirt.  Muit invited Torrero and his companions to drop by.  The invi­tation was accepted.  Muit was alone in
his house, because his wife and children were in Naga City
at that time.

After the usual amenities between host and guests, another group,
which was conducting an inspection of the houses in the zone in connect­ion
with community activities, arrived.  This
second group soon left, and Muit and the group of Torrero resumed their conversation.

Torrero was carrying a bolo which was
slung in its scabbard and was hanging from his right shoulder.  He was left-handed.

When the conversation was resumed, Torrero
took offense at what Muit brought up and, in a huff,
stood up and walked toward the door.  Muit followed him, asking
Torrero not to leave, then a shot was fired.  Other shots – the number is controverted – were fired and Torrero
fell.

Gubatan embraced Muit
from behind before or after — this is also controversial — the second shot.

Torrero suffered from 3 gunshot
wounds:  1) on the left arm; 2) on the
chest, the fatal one, the bullet entering from the front and exiting at the
back; and 3) a superficial one on the nape.

These wounds were inflicted by shots fired from the .45-caliber pistol
licensed in the name of Muit as a retired PC second
lieutenant.  The first shot, deliberately
fired by Muit, hit Torrero
on the left arm; the second shot, fired while the gun was still held by Muit, hit Torrero on the chest;
while the third wound was obviously inflicted last, although none of the
witnesses could tell the precise moment of its infliction.  It was, however, the opi­nion of Dr. Froyalde (TSN-trial of 6 Sept. 1976, p. 23) that this wound
was inflicted when Torrero was already lying on the
ground.

The bolo of Torrero was already drawn
from its scabbard when the sketch of the scene was drawn by Patrolman Darilay, minutes after the shooting, and was also shown in
the photographs taken of the body of Torrero where it
fell (Exhs. 1, 1-B & 1-C).  This fact was also confirmed by Gubatan (TSN-trial of 6
Sept. 1976, p. 79), and by Mrs. Torrero (TSN-trial of
9 Sept. 1976, p. 159).

Muit did not get near the body of Torrero after the latter fell, but immediately proceeded to
the PC detachment to surrender himself and his gun.”^[6]

The Trial Court accorded
credence to the version of the prosecution and, on July 24, 1978, rendered its Decision with the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Delfin
Muit, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder for having gunned down the late Rodolfo Torrero
treacherously to death (People vs. Aguilar, 86 Phil. 693), with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation (People vs. Causi,
G.R. No. L-16498, June 29, 1963).  However, the accused Delfin
Muit, after the dead­ly incident surrendered himself
including the 45 caliber pistol and its license to the detachment commander of Tamban, which act is considered a mitigating cir­cumstance
which offsets the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, hereby
sentences him to suffer the pe­nalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA (life) and to pay
the following damages to the heirs of the victim, as itemized, to wit:

(a)   
P12,000.00 by reason of the death
of the victim, Rodolfo Torrero;

(b)   
P5,000.00 in concept of actual and
moral damages; and

(c)   
P5,000.00 in concept of exem­plary
damages, and to pay the costs.”^[7]

In this appeal, appellant
maintains that the Trial Court erred:

“1.  In denying the
accused his right to be heard by refusing to allow the accused to present a
vital witness in his defense who could have proved that the principal witness
for the prosecution, far from being the disinterested person that he claimed to
be, was actually interested personally in prosecuting the accused;

2.  In denying the accused
his right to due process of law, by –?

2.1 – Ignoring facts established clearly in evidence, and relying
instead on baseless presumptions;

2.2 – Violating the accused’s right to remain silent; and

2.3 – Being palpably
biased against the accused; and

3.  In rejecting the accused’s
plea of self-defense and accident; and in convicting the accused.”^[8]

The appeal is without
merit.

1. After trial had terminated and within the period to file
memoranda, the defense moved to reopen trial “so that Jesus Evangelista
may be allowed to testify and the defense could prove the bias of the said
principal witness (Benigno Gubatan)
for the prosecution”.  Jesus
Evangelista was to testify on the alleged illicit relations between prosecution
witness Benigno Gubatan and
Mrs. Evangelista, formerly the victim’s wife, who remarried after she was
widowed.  The Trial Court denied
reopening on the ground that even assuming such liaison, it had happened in
1977 whereas Gubatan had submitted himself as
government witness as early as March 4,1976, besides the fact that it would not
prove bias on the part of Gubatan, who was an
eyewitness to the tragic incident, nor the culpability or non-culpability of
the accused.

We find no reversible
error.  The reopening of a case for the
reception of further evidence lies within the sound discretion of the Trial
Court.^[9] Besides, as pointed out by said Court, it is
very possible that Jesus Evangelista was merely smitten with jealousy, and the
alleged illicit relationship pure
conjecture.  Additionally, even if Jesus Evan­gelista’s
testimony could prove bias on the part of Benigno Gubatan, the latter was not the only prosecution witness
who testified as to the culpability of appellant.  It should also be noted that Benigno Gubatan, was subjected to
rigid cross-examination by the defense counsel, who was thereby given all the
opportunity to impeach the credibility of said declarant.^[10]

2. Contrary to the defense posture, the accused was fully
afforded his right to be heard and to present his defense.  The criterion is:

“x x x if
an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law.  x x
x“^[11]

The appealed Decision sufficiently meets that standard.  The judgment of the Trial Court is substantiated
by the evidence.  The contention that it
had ignored and unreasonably rejected the testimonies of defense witnesses Herminigildo Bermido and Alfredo
Martinez is untenable.  Bermido’s story that he had gone to barrio Tamban, precisely to see the accused in connection with the
purchase of railroad ties; that he had witnessed the shooting incident from a
distance and that he saw the deceased try to hack the accused, but that he left
immediately after; that he never mentioned the incident to the authorities, nor
did he approach the accused after the incident, is unnatural behavior and does
not inspire belief.  Having gone
precisely to meet with the accused he could have shown concern at the very
least.  Martinez did not witness the
actual incident because he was buying a cigarette but merely corroborated Bermido’s story that they had gone to Barrio Tamban precisely to see the accused.  A reading of their declarations, indeed,
casts doubt as to their presence near the scene of the crime.  Their version was unconvincing compared to
the forthright testimonies of the prosecution wit­nesses.  Besides, the appraisal by a Trial Court of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the greatest respect in the absence
of established exceptions.

The defense faults the Trial Court for having violated the accused’s right to remain silent in that the Court took
against the latter his failure to report to the Detachment Commander at the
time of his surrender his plea of self-defense. 
What the Trial Judge did, however, was merely to draw an inference from
the accused’s failure to volunteer that information,
which would have been the most natural reaction.  It
should also be noted that the accused was neither under investigation nor
interrogation so that his right against self-incrimination was never
endangered.

The alleged bias of the Trial Judge against the accused is
without basis.  The clarificatory
questions propounded by him during the trial were intended to test the
credibility of witnesses and to extract the truth.  That the Trial Judge had ordered the accused
transferred to Muntinlupa after conviction is no manifestation
of bias considering that this Tribunal had upheld said action in its Resolution
dated February 21, 1979.

3. The accused’s plea of self-defense and
accident is unavailing for being inconsistent with the environmental milieu of
the case.  Having invoked self-defense,
he has the burden of proving it^[12],
and must establish the same by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.^[13]

The defense submission is that the accused had no intent to kill
and that he drew his gun in self-defense and to disarm the victim of his bolo;
that the first shot, which he had deliberately fired, hit the victim on his
left arm; that the fatal second shot which hit the victim on his chest, was
fired accidentally as a direct consequence of Gubatan’s
embracing the accused from behind; while the third shot hit the victim at the
nape of the neck when the victim was already prostrate on the ground.

That was not the sequence of the occurrence as established by the
evidence.  The victim did not try to hack
the accused with his (victim’s) bolo that hung from his right shoulder.  There was no reason for him to physically
harm the accused having already decided to leave the accused’s
house in order to avoid trouble.^[14]
He was already out of the front yard of
the accused’s house, about four meters more or less
from its “lean to”,^[15] when he was shot at.  The fact that the bolo was found lying on the
victim’s side out of its scabbard is no proof that the victim had used it.  It must have dropped as the accused fell to
the ground after having been hit.  What
is established by the evidence is that the victim was hit by a bullet at the
nape or back portion of the neck at the first shot.  The victim spinned
around from left to right involuntarily, at which point he was hit by the
second shot on the left arm and on his chest. 
The third shot did not hit its mark as it was deflected upward by Gubatan who jerked the accused’s
hand skyward.  Clearly, therefore, the
accused had treacherously shot the victim at the back thereby disproving the
element of unlawful aggression on the victim’s part, which the defense seeks to
establish as an essential element of self-defense.

Appellant’s submission
that the fatal second shot was unintentional and was the direct consequence of
the act of Gubatan in embracing him from behind is
also untenable.  As demonstrated by Gubatan during the trial, Gubatan
had embraced appellant around the chest in such a way that appellant was still
free to use his right hand which was holding the gun.

“COURT

Q    How come that he was able to fire for
the second time when you were holding the accused?

A     You
noticed, sir, that in my demonstration I was holding him like this, instead of
down there, so this was free, the right hand. 
(witness referring to the right hand.)”^[16]

Treachery has been
undeniably proven.  The accused was armed
with a .45 caliber pistol and made full use of it.  The victim was first hit at the nape or back
portion of the neck.^[17] He was fired at suddenly and unexpectedly,
devoid of any opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.

“COURT

Q    When he was shot at, was the back of your husband towards Mr. Muit or Mr. Muit was facing your
husband or your husband facing Mr. Muit?

A     His
back was towards Mr. Muit.

Q    In other words, he was shot at the
back?

A     Yes,
sir.

x x x                 x x x                 x x x

“COURT

Q    The
first time you said he was hit on the side, will you indicate that?

A     Her
(witness touching the lower part of the neck at the back of the interpreter).

Q    That
was the first time he was hit there at the first shot?

A     Yes,
sir.”^[18]

There should be no
question then that the crime committed is Murder with the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery.

We agree with the
defense, however, that evident premeditation, as a generic aggravating
circumstance, has not been adequately shown. 
To properly appreciate that circumstance, it is necessary to
establish:  (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit has clung to this determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect.^[19] As there is dearth of evidence as to when
appellant first conceived of killing the deceased and that he was afforded
sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of his contemplated crime before
its final execution, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.

On the other side of the
coin, to be appreciated in favor of the accused are the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, and passion and obfuscation.  There can be no question that the accused was
driven strongly by jealousy because of the rumors regarding the amorous
relationship between his wife and the victim. 
The feeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relations
with a woman is a powerful stimulant to jealousy and is sufficient to produce
loss of reason and self-control.  In
other words, it is a powerful instigator of jealousy and prone to produce anger
and obfuscation.^[20]

The crime of Murder,
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 
Considering the two mitigating circumstances present, without any
aggravating circumstances to offset them, the penalty next lower to that
prescribed is imposable, or,
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment appealed from,
the accused Delfin Muit, is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as
maximum, with the judgment being affirmed in all other respects.

Costs against the accused-appellant, Delfin
Muit.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
t.s.n., October
24, 1977, pp. 17, 30-31; Appellee’s
Brief, pp. 8-9, Rollo, p. 109.

^[2]
t.s.n., September
9, 1976, pp. 135-136.

^[3]
t.s.n., October
24, 1977, pp. 31-32.

^[4]
Exhibit “A”, p. 19, CFI Rollo; t.s.n., September
6, 1976, pp. 10-40.

^[5]
pp. 2-6, People’s Brief.

^[6]
pp. 4-5, Appellant’s Brief.

^[7]
p. 24, Judgment, p. 28, Rollo.

^[8]
p. 1, Appellant’s Brief, p. 68, Rollo.

^[9]
U.S. vs.
Visquera, et al., 4 Phil. 381 (1905); U.S.
vs. Cinco, et al., 8 Phil. 388 (1907); U.S.
vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910); Alvarez vs. Guevara Wee,
47 Phil. 13 (1924); Gaas vs. Fortich, 54 Phil. 196, 200 (1929).

^[10]
t.s.n., September
6, 1976, pp. 74-93.

^[11]
People vs. Castillo, 76 Phil. 73 (1946).

^[12]
People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946);
People vs. Clemente, 21 SCRA 261 (1967);
People vs. Diva, 23 SCRA 333
(1968); People vs. Talaboc, Jr., 30 SCRA 87
(1969); People vs. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600-601 (1977).

^[13]
People vs. Davis, L-13337, February 16, 1961; People vs. Solaña, L-13967, September
29, 1962; People vs. Mendoza,
L-16392, January 30, 1965;
People vs. Libed, L-20431, June 23, 1965; People vs. Ordiales, 42 SCRA 239 (1971); People vs. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484
(1976); People vs. Pay-an, 84 SCRA
354 (1978).

^[14]
t.s.n., September
6, 1976, pp. 59-60.

^[15]
Exhibit “2”, p. 9, CFI Rollo.

^[16]
t.s.n., September
6, 1976, p. 66.

^[17]
t.s.n., September
6, 1976, pp. 21-23; September
9, 1976, pp. 141-144.

^[18]
t.s.n., September
9, 1976, pp. 143; 144

^[19]
People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 (1974); People vs. Ramolete,
56 SCRA 66 (1974); People vs.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631 (1974); People vs. Manzano, 58 SCRA 250
(1974); People vs. Lacao, 60 SCRA 89 (1974).

^[20]
Aquino’s Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, Book I, p. 251,
1976 ed. citing U.S.
vs. Santillan, 4 Phil. 170 (1905).