REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. CLEOFE RAMOS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. CLEOFE RAMOS, ET AL., THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. FELIPE ASUNCION, ET AL., THIRD-PARTY D…

Plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint
containing two causes of action:  (1) for
the annulment of the registration of Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-117285 and of the
corresponding original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds for
the province of Bulacan in the name of defendants
(and third-party plaintiffs-appellants), and for the reversion of said lot to
the plaintiff as part of the public domain; and (2) for an order prohibiting
defendants from further excavating the Wawang Dapdap River and from constructing works on the land
covered by their Foreshore Lease Application bordering said river, as well as
for recovery of damages occasioned by such illegal excavations and
appropriation of the public domain.

Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim, denying the
alleged illegal excavations and constructions on the Wawang Dapdap
River, but admitting that they are
the registered owners of Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-117285.  In the same answer, defendants countered that
if there are any illegal excavations and constructions they were made and are
being made not by defendants but by third-party defendants.  Thus, paragraph 5 of defendants’ answer
reads:

“5. That they specifically deny the allegation in par. 7 of
the first cause of action in the complaint to the effect that they have
illegally appropriated unto themselves through artificial means portion of the Wawang Dapdap River flow­ing out
of the Manila Bay, by systema­tically filling the banks of said river adjacent
to Lot No. 2 as described in Plan Psu-117285. 
They also deny the rest of the allegation in said paragraph as it is
imaginary, fanciful, and made with­out any basis in fact and in law and in­spired
by Felipe F. Asuncion x x x
who is the very same person who has in fact sys­tematically reduced not only
the width of the river but also of Manila Bay through, artificial accretion by
putting stakes and adobe stone right on the bed of said river and for which
reason the herein defendants will respectfully request this Honorable Court to
bring him as third-party defendant, he having increased the inherited holding
of his wife artificially and illegally from a mere twenty-seven (27) hectares
of fishpond to almost 200-hectares with a length of almost two (2) kilometers,
thereby considerably reducing the width of the Wawang
Dapdap River and appropriating a great portion of
Manila Bay to the great prejudice of the public.”

Accordingly, with prior leave of court, defendants filed a
third-party complaint against third-party defendants, alleging among other
things that it is not defendants and third-party plaintiffs “who have
illegally appropriated through artificial and illegal means portion of the Wawang Dapdap River and Manila
Bay, but the third-party defendants Felipe F. Asuncion and his wife who have
increased their holdings from a mere 27-hectare to around 200-hectares
occupying almost half of the Wawang Dapdap River throughout its length of about two (2)
kilometers, and a big portion of Manila Bay x x x; that had it not been for the said illegal and wrongful
appropriation on the part of the third-party defendants of the greater portion
of the Wawang Dapdap River,
who have placed stakes and adobe stones (cascajo) and
constructed dikes on the very bed of the said Wawang Dapdap River x x x, (it) would not have bent toward third-party plaintiff’s
property and become shallower and narrower.”

Defendants and third-party plaintiffs prayed that “the
third-party defendants be ordered to remove their dikes – throughout the length
of two (2) kilometers x x x
and to remove all the stakes and adobe stones (cascajo)
that they placed on the bed of the Wawang Dapdap River illegally to a width of around 30 to 40 meters
away from the river bed.  x x x“

Third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint.  Over the opposition of
defendants and third-party plaintiffs, the lower court granted the motion, and
reconsideration of the order having been denied, appeal was seasonably made by
them to this Court.

The motion to dismiss filed by third-party defendants and
sustained by the lower court enumerated three grounds, to wit:

“1. That the third-party complaint is improper and the third-party
defendants have been improperly brought into this action;

“2. That the third-party plaintiffs have no legal capacity to file
the third-party complaint;

“3. That the third-party complaint states no cause of action.”

From the welter of pleadings filed by the contending parties, the
fundamental issue herein presented is the propriety or impropriety of the
third-party complaint.

Rule 6, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:

“Third-party complaint.  – A third party-complaint is a claim that a
defend­ing party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action, called the third-party defendant, for con­tribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.”

Defendants and third-party plaintiffs’ position is anchored on
the proposition that the third-party complaint is “also related to the
claim of the plaintiff because third-party defendants have made the plaintiff
believe and claim that (Lot No. 2 of Psu-117285) is a part of the public domain
resulting from their own acts of illegal appropriation of the Wawang Dapdap River which caused
the latter to bend towards the property of the herein defendants ­third-party
plaintiffs.”

The complaint filed by the plaintiff is for the recovery of a
specific parcel of land, Lot No. 2 of Psu-117285, which is said to form part of
the public domain.  Its claim for damages
is based on certain allegedly illegal acts of defendants, namely, the
excavations they had made in the Wawang Dapdap River and the illegal works constructed by them on
the land covered by their foreshore lease application along the same river.

On the propriety of the third-party complaint the lower court
observed:

“x x x Now the
third-party plaintiffs would like to make this Court be­lieve that because of
the illegal con­structions by the third-party defendants they are facing the risk
for answering the damages to the plaintiff although the ones at fault are
really the third-party defendants.  There
is no showing that if the third-party complaint is permitted and thereby bring
into liti­gation the persons of Felipe Asuncion and Basilia
Gonzales who have no rela­tion or in any way related to the claim of the
plaintiff the third-party plaintiffs would be exempt or absolved from the claim
of the plaintiff.  If the third-party
plaintiffs could be held answerable for damages as per allegation in the
complaint of the plaintiff, it is due to their own acts and not due to the act
of third-party defendants.  The latter
have no interest in Lot No. 2, Psu­-117285. Under the guise of avoiding
multiplicity of suits the third-party plaintiffs would like the third-party
defendants be brought into the litiga­tion in order that the issues which
affect them should be resolved in one style proceeding.” (underlining sup­plied)

 And the lower court
concluded:

“x x x If the
third-party plaintiffs could be held liable for damages it is due to their own
acts where the third-party defendants have no participation either directly or
indirectly.  The third-party plaintiffs
can be held answerable for damages to the plaintiff on the allegations of the
complaint.  The Court will not be
powerless to ad­judge third-party plaintiffs exempt from the liability if they
can prove that the fault does not lie with them but with other persons.”

Rule 6, Sec. 12, allows third-party complaints in order to
minimize the number of lawsuits and avoid the necessity of bringing two or more
actions involving the same subject-matter.  Thus, if it appears probable that a second
action will result if the plaintiff prevails, but that this could be avoided if
the third-party defendant were retained in the case, a motion to dismiss the
third-party complaint should be denied. 
Yet the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of suits should not
operate so as to consolidate in a single proceeding, under the supposed
authority of Rule 6, Sec. 12, matters which are or should be appro­priately
threshed out separately.  A third-party
defendant may not be impleaded if the effect would be
to introduce a new and separate controversy into the action.

In this case, as the lower court said, “if the third-party plaintiffs
could be held answerable for damages as per allegation in the complaint of the
plaintiff, it is due to their own acts and not due to the acts of third-party
defendants.” As far as may be gathered from the pertinent allegations in
the pleadings, plaintiff’s causes of action against defendants are unrelated to
those of the latter against third-party defendants.  A declaration that the land described in the
complaint is part of the public domain and that excavations and constructions
were made by defendants therein would not necessarily make for a cause of
action in their favor and against third-party defendants.  The latter would be liable, if at all, on an
entirely separate ground, namely, that the illegal constructions and
excavations allegedly made by them on a parcel of land which was altogether
different had caused damages to third-party plaintiffs. There is no averment
that the latter’s illegal acts were induced or rendered necessary by the
illegal acts of third-party defendants; or more specifically, that if no
constructions or excavations had been made by third-party defendants, Lot No. 2
Psu-117285, would not be part of the public domain at all.  True, it is alleged in the third-party
complaint that if not for those acts the river “would not have bent toward
third-party plaintiffs’ property and become shallower and narrower.” But
it is not alleged how this circumstance could affect plaintiff’s cause of
action against defendants, or render third-party defendants liable for
“contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief” in respect
of plaintiff’s claim.

The allowance of a third-party complaint is predicated on the
need for expediency and the avoidance of unnecessary lawsuits.  But it should not be considered as an excuse
for indiscriminately filing any claim which a defendant may have against a
third-party defendant, although unrelated to the main action.

Having found that there is no legal basis for the filing of the
third-party complaint against third-party defendants, the determination of the
other grounds invoked by third-party defendants becomes unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court sustaining
third-party defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby affirmed.  Costs against the
appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ.,
concur.