MIGUEL CAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, AND DR. GREGORIO VENTURANZA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, for the review and nullification of the
Order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-6042 dated
November 12, 1962; for
the per­manent non-enforcement of the said order; and, for the issuance of an
order directing the herein respondent judge to issue a writ of execution in the above-numbered civil case.

On October 4, 1961,
Miguel Ocampo, the herein peti­tioner, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City a complaint for damages against the
herein respond­ent, Dr. Gregorio Venturanza.  The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-6042 of the said court. 
To this complaint, respondent Venturanza, as
defendant, filed a seasonable answer with
counterclaim.  A timely answer to
this counterclaim was likewise filed by petitioner Ocampo.

In due time, the trial court scheduled Civil Case No. Q-6042 for
hearing on the merits on February 19,
1962 and furnished the parties thereto with the corresponding
notices of the same.  The counsel for
respondent Venturanza, Atty. Cornelio S. Ruperto, received a copy of the said notice on December 9, 1961.

When the case was called for trial on February 19, 1962, however, neither respondent Venturanza nor his counsel, Atty. Cornelio S. Ruperto, appeared. 
Conse­quently, the trial court, on motion of the herein petitioner,
allowed the latter, as the party plaintiff,
to present his evidence ex parte before the Clerk of Court who was then
designated as commissioner.

On March 19, 1962, the trial court, herein respond­ent judge
presiding, rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against respondent Venturanza, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum
of P9,200.00 as “re­imbursement and damages,” P1,000.00 for
attorney’s fees, plus costs.  A copy of
this decision was received by
res­pondent Venturanza’s counsel on March 27, 1962.

On April 30, 1962, or four days after the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration against the above de­cision of March 19, 1962 had
expired, the counsel for res­pondent Venturanza filed
a motion for reconsideration of
the same and for relief from the said judgment on the ground of excusable
negligence.  As the ground invoked was
specified by the said counsel, the notice of hearing was received by his filing
clerk who, however, was taken ill unexpectedly and, consequently, forgot all
about the said notice.  Herein petitioner
opposed the said motion.

On June 5, 1962,
the petitioner filed with the trial court
a motion for the execution of its decision of March 19, 1962 on the ground that the same had since
become final and executory.  On July
10, 1962, the said court issued an order (1) denying for lack of
merit respondent Venturanza’s motion for reconsideration and relief from judgment, and
(2) granting the petitioner’s motion for execution.

On July 30, 1962,
respondent Venturanza filed with the lower court the
following pleadings:  (a) notice of
withdrawal of Atty. Cornelio S. Ruperto as counsel
for respondent; (b) an urgent motion to dissolve and set aside the order of July 10, 1962 insofar as it granted
the petitioner’s motion for execution; and (c) a notice of appeal.

On August 1, 1962, the date set for the hearing of respondent Venturanza’s motion to dissolve and set aside the order of
July 10, 1962, and of the opposition thereto interposed by the herein
petitioner, the respondent judge, motu propio, ordered orally in open session the setting
aside of, not his order of execution of July
10, 1962, but of the decision of March 19, 1962 and, in the premises,
reset the hearing on the merits of Civil Case No. Q-6042 for September 25, 1962.  This order was subsequently handed down in
writing under the order of November
12, 1962 subject of the present petition.

On April 22, 1963,
this Court issued a writ of pre­liminary injunction enjoining the respondent
judge herein from further proceeding with Civil Case No. Q-6042
until further orders.

The sole issue appreciable from the petition on hand relates to
the power or jurisdiction of the herein respond­ent judge to set aside his
decision of March 19, 1962
in Civil Case No. Q-6042 and having the said case reopened for another trial on
the merits.  More specifically, is his
order of November 12, 1962
to the above effect sus­tainable in law and jurisprudence?

The issue should be resolved in the negative.  We find
for the petitioner.

It should be recalled that a copy of the decision of March 19, 1962 was received by Atty.
Cornelio S. Ruperto, respondent Venturanza’s
counsel of record, on March 27, 1962.  The latter, therefore, had only up to April 26, 1962 to move for its
reconsideration or to perfect an appeal from the said decision (Section 3, Rule
41, Rules of Court). 
When, beyond this date, no motion for reconsideration was filed nor any appeal therefrom perfected, the finality of the said decision set
in as a matter of course.  Having thus become final, it was removed from
the power or juris­diction of the said court
to further alter or amend, much less revoke.  (Arnedo v. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil.
257; Viquiera v. Baraña, 78
Phil. 486) The only power retained by the trial court, after a judgment has become final and executory, is to order its execution.  (Bili
v. Chunaco, G. R. No. L-6630,
February 29, 1956)

It is true, of course, that the lower court is conferred the
power to extend reliefs from judgment under Section 2
of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.  But as
the said rule itself recites, and as this Court has repeatedly held,
such reliefs should be awarded only “when a judg­ment
or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, through fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.” Neither the records of this case nor the
respondents’ ar­guments, however, establish the incident under consider­ation
to be within the rule.  On the contrary,
no evidence of inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent Venturanza’s counsel is more forceful and convincing than
the ground invoked by the latter for setting aside the decision of March
19, 1962.  The explanation
that the said counsel failed to appear at the scheduled trial because the
receiving clerk who received the notice for the same was taken ill unexpectedly
and thus forgot all about it has
already been assessed by this
Court in the case of Philippine
Air Lines v. Hon. Francisco Arca, et al., G. R. No. L-22729, February 9, 1967 ?

“x x x the most
hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court.  The uncritical
accept­ance of this kind of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court’s repeated rul­ings that they are neither credible nor con­stitutive
of excusable negligence (Gaerlan v. Bernal, L-4039, January 29, 1952; Mercado v.
Judge Domingo, L-19457, December 17, 1966) is certainly whimsical exercise of judgment as to be a grave
abuse of discretion.”

To the respondent Judge’s view that an innocent party ought not be made to suffer from the mistake of his attor­ney,
suffice it to say that the rule is settled that clients are bound to and by
such errors and negligence.  (Montes v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
48 Phil. 640; Isaac v. Mendoza, G. R. No. L-2820, June 21, 1951; Vivero v. Santos, G. R. No.
L-8105, February 28, 1956; 52 O. G. p.
1424; Flores v. The Philippine Alien Property Ad­ministrator, G. R. No.
L-21741, April 28, 1960).

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is granted.  The order of the respondent Judge dated November 12, 1962, in Civil Case No.
Q-6042, is hereby revoked and set aside and the said
respondent Judge is hereby ordered to desist and refrain permanently from
reopening or otherwise proceeding with the said civil case other than to issue
the writ of execution accordingly with the decision in the said case dated March 19, 1962.  Costs against respondent Venturanza.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ.,
concur.