VALERIO TACAS, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE FLORENTINO C. CARIASO, PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI-ILOCOS SUR, BRANCH V, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED IN THIS INSTANCE BY HONORAB…

Tacas versus Cariaso

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Valerio Tacas against Judge Florentino C. Cariaso, the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Branch Five, and the People of the Philippines. Tacas asks the Supreme Court to stop the trial court from proceeding with a second criminal case against him for assault upon a person in authority, after he had already been convicted and had fully served his sentence for less serious physical injuries arising from the very same act. The case matters because it is a classic illustration of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, and of how that guarantee bars a second prosecution when the second charge is necessarily included in the first, or when both charges flow from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent.

Procedural History

Two criminal complaints were filed against Tacas by the same Chief of Police of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, one Felipe Agdeppa. The first, dated January 2, 1973, charged less serious physical injuries. Tacas pleaded guilty on the same day and was immediately sentenced to thirty days of arresto menor, which he fully served. The second complaint, dated April 17, 1973, charged assault upon a person in authority for the same act. Tacas objected on jeopardy grounds, but the respondent judge denied his objection. Tacas then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, and the Court granted the writs prayed for.

Facts

On December 15, 1972, at about 4:30 in the afternoon, in Barrio Zapat, Sinait, Ilocos Sur, Valerio Tacas assaulted and attacked Emiterio Ibaan with a bolo, inflicting multiple hacking and stab wounds on different parts of his body. The injuries were alleged to incapacitate Ibaan from the performance of his customary labors for at least thirty days and to require medical attendance for the same period.

On January 2, 1973, the Chief of Police filed a criminal complaint for less serious physical injuries against Tacas. On the very same day, Tacas pleaded guilty and was immediately sentenced to a prison term of thirty days of arresto menor, with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty in his favor. He fully served that sentence and was released.

Then, on April 17, 1973, after his release, the same Chief of Police filed a second criminal complaint against Tacas, this time for assault upon a person in authority, alleging that Tacas stabbed Emiterio Ibaan, a duly elected and incumbent barrio captain of Barrio Zapat, three times with a jungle bolo. Tacas objected on the ground of double jeopardy, but the respondent judge denied the objection. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the constitutional provision on double jeopardy bars a prosecution for assault upon a person in authority when the accused had previously been charged and convicted of less serious physical injuries for the same act, and had fully served his sentence.
• Whether or not the offense charged in the second complaint necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first complaint.

Applicable Provisions

Article Four, Section Twenty-Two of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This is the constitutional guarantee that Tacas invokes, and it is the provision the Court applies to nullify the second prosecution.

Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

This is the procedural rule that implements the constitutional guarantee, and the Court relies on it to hold that the second charge is barred because it necessarily includes the first.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that certiorari lies and that double jeopardy bars the second prosecution. The Court reasoned that from the commission of the act complained of, resulting in the prosecution for less serious physical injuries, there was no intervening event or circumstance that could affect or change the nature of the act originally committed. This is a case of a single act resulting in a complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority. The indictment, however, was solely for less serious physical injuries. It is therefore now too late to hold Tacas liable as well for the offense of assault against a person in authority.

On the second issue, the Court held that the offense charged in the second complaint necessarily includes the offense charged in the first. The Court relied on the well-settled interpretation embodied in the Rules of Court that the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the subsequent indictment is for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The Court cited People versus Bonotan, where the charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries necessarily includes the offense of less serious physical injuries, especially because in both the information and the complaint the physical injuries inflicted were alleged to have required medical assistance and incapacitated the offended party from labor for the same period. As proof that the offense charged in the information includes the offense charged in the complaint, conviction of the defendants of the latter offense may, without question, be had under the information if the other ingredients of the crime charged in the information are not proved. Hence, the defense of double jeopardy was well taken.

The Court also cited United States versus Gustilo, where Justice Moreland made clear that while the protection afforded by the jeopardy clause requires that it may be invoked when it is the same offense, it can extend as well to a felony traceable to the same criminal intent. The Court quoted:

We are confident that the portion of the Philippine Bill embodying the principle that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense should, in accordance with its letter and spirit, be made to cover as nearly as possible every result which flows from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent. The fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the public which a criminal action seeks to redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to individuals. In so far as a single criminal act, impelled by a single criminal intent, in other words, one volition, is divided into separate crimes and punished accordingly, just so far are the spirit of the Philippine Bill and the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code violated.

The Court further cited People versus Elkanish, which reaffirmed the Gustilo ruling, and People versus Tumlos, where Justice Villa-Real held that when the theft of thirteen cows took place at the same time and in the same place, the defendant performed but one act, and the fact that eight cows pertained to one owner and five to another did not make him criminally liable for two distinct offenses, because neither the intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of division.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as implemented by Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, bars a second prosecution not only for the same offense but also for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Second, when a single criminal act is impelled by a single criminal intent, the act cannot be divided into separate crimes and punished accordingly; the accused cannot be prosecuted twice for the same act. Third, the designation of the offense in the complaint or information is not conclusive; what controls are the allegations in the body thereof. Fourth, the rationale of the rule on double jeopardy is non bis in idem, meaning not twice for the same, or nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa, meaning no one ought to be twice tried for the same cause.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the writs prayed for, nullified and set aside the orders of the respondent judge dated July 5, 1973 and July 31, 1973 as contrary to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy, and ordered the respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the criminal case for assault upon a person in authority, except for the purpose of dismissing the same.

Remember This

A single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent cannot be split into separate crimes to justify a second prosecution; the first conviction, even for a lesser offense, bars the second charge that necessarily includes it. Examiners like to use this case to test the scope of double jeopardy under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, particularly the rule that the second offense need not be identical to the first but may be one that necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the former charge.