THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. HONG DIN CHU, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing
the complaint in Criminal Case No. 81257 allegedly for lack of jurisdiction.

On 22 January 1966,
Hong Din Chu was charged with grave oral defamation
before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 81257) in an information reading as follows:

“That on or about the 21st day of November, 1965, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with the malicious purpose of
impeaching the virtue, honor, charac­ter and reputation of one Mercedes Japco Ong, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, felon­iously and publicly proffer in the presence of
many people against Mercades Japco
Ong the following abusive and slanderous remarks and
expressions, to writ: ‘Your daughter is a prostitute and she is a prostitute
because you too are a prostitute’, and other words and phrases of similar
import which insinuations and imputations, as the said accused well know, were
entirely false and untrue and without foundation in fact whatsoever, highly
offensive and derogatory to her good name, character and virtue, thereby
imputing to the said Mercedes Japco Ong, a married woman of chaste virtues, good moral
character and of high, social standing, unchaste acts, loose virtues, tending
to bring said Mercedes Japco Ong
into public discredit, disrepute, contempt and ridicule, as she was in
fact-brought into public discredit, disrepute, contempt, and ridicule.

“Contrary to law.”

Arraigned on 28
December 1966 the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.  The hearing of the case was postponed several
times, upon representation of counsel for the accused that serious efforts were
being exerted by friends of both parties to effect an amicable settlement of
their difference.  On 14 April 1967, the accused moved for
the dismissal or quashal of the information on the
ground that, as it charges defamation consisting of the alleged commission by
the complainant of an offense (adultery) that cannot be prosecuted de oficio the case should have been initiated at the
instance of the latter.  The records show
that the information in the case was file by on assistant city fiscal of Manila
without the signature of the supposed complainant or offended party.

On 8 May 1967 and over the objection of the prosecution, the
trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, as prayed or by the accused
reasoning that under Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court a case
for defamation On involving an offense that cannot be prosecute of de oficio has to be made out upon the complaint of the
offended party.  Since the accused was
alleged to have imputed to the complainant, a married, woman, the commission of
acts of prostitution, the former, in effect, charged the latter with adultery,
and the information, therefore, cannot be filed by the fiscal without the
signature of the supposed offended party.

From this order of dismissal, the prosecution interposed the
present appeal, claiming that the allegations of the complaint charged the
accused of having specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission
of the crime of prostitution, which is a public crime.  Conse­quently, according to herein appellant,
the information, signed and filed by the Assistant City Fiscal even without the
signature of the said offended party, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the trial court.

We incline to agree with this contention of the State.

Under the pertinent legal provisions on the matter (Section 4,
Rule 110, revised Rules of Court, last paragraph; Article 360, Revised Penal
ode, last paragraph),^[1]
no criminal action for de­famation or slander
consisting in the imputation of an offense that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, such as adultery, concubinage,
se­duction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall be filed except
upon the complaint of the offended party in the slander case.  The issue in this proceeding, therefore,
hinges on the nature of the act or activity that was imputed by the accused
upon the offended party.  Did the alleged
defamatory remark imputed on the offended party the commission of a public
crime or of a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de oficio?

It must be remembered in this connection that what determines the
offense of which the accused stands charged are the allegations in the
information,^[2]
the actual recital of facts made therein.^[3]  The information in this case averred that the
accused, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the virtue, honor, character
and reputation of Mercedes Japco Ong,
a married woman, uttered against the latter, publicly and in the presence of
many people, the remarks – “Your daughter^[4]
is a prostitute and she is a prostitute because you too are a
prostitute”.  As thus alleged, it is
clear that, while the utterance in effect also imputed on her the commission of
adultery, the offended party being a married woman, the disreputable conduct
she was particularly charged with was the crime of prostitution, not
adultery.  And it may be pointed out that
prostitution and adultery are not one and the same thing; the first is a crime
against public morals, committed by a woman, whether married or not, who, for
money or profit, habitually indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct,^[5]
whereas adultery is in the nature of a private offense committed by a married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.^[6]  In short, the essential element in
prostitution is not simply a woman’s entering into marital relations with a man
other than her husband, if she happens to be married, but the existence of
pecuniary or financial gain as inducement to, or consideration for, that
woman’s engaging in sexual activities. 
Thus, to call a married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her
an adulteress, a violator of her marital vows; it is to charge her of having
committed an offense against public morals, of moral de­generacy far exceeding
that involved in the maintenance of adulterous relations.

It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged
defamatory remark by the accused specifically imputed upon the of­fended party
the commission of prostitution, which is a public crime that can be prosecuted de
oficio, the information filed under the sig­nature
of the Assistant City Fiscal duly conferred jurisdiction upon the lower court
to try the case.^[7]

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside,
and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1] “SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal action.
— All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by in­formation shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

xxxxxxxxxx       xxxxxxxxxx       xxxxxxxxxx

“No criminal action for
defamation which consists in the imputation of an offense mentioned above, shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint filed by the offended party.” 
(Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court)

“ART. 360.  Persons responsible. – xxxxxxxxxxx .

“No criminal action for
defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except
at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended
party.” (Revised Penal Code).

^[2] People vs. Agito, G.R. No. L-12120, 28. April 1958, 103 Phil. 526; Que Po Lay vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-11019, 28 Nov. 1958, 104 Phil, 853;
People vs. Abesamis, 93 Phil. 712; also People
vs. Rodis, G.R. No. L-11670, 30 April 1959; People vs. Defensor, 86 Phil. 591.

^[3] People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 656.

^[4]
The daughter of the offended party referred to is the daughter-in-law of the
accused.

^[5] Article 202, Revised Penal Code.

^[6]
Article 333, id

^[7] People vs. Santos, et al., 98 Phil. III.