SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS,

Lawas versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Socorro Sepulveda Lawas against the Court of Appeals and Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul the proceedings conducted by the trial court after the death of her father, Pedro Sepulveda, who was the defendant in a complaint for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. The case matters because it fixes the consequences of a party's death on the authority of his counsel and on the jurisdiction of the court over his heirs. It teaches that a judgment rendered against a dead man's heirs without a valid substitution is void.

Procedural History

Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land against Pedro Sepulveda before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Pedro Sepulveda answered, raising laches, prescription, and failure to ventilate the matter in a previous special proceeding. He died during the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence. The trial judge later substituted the fourteen heirs, allowed the plaintiff to present evidence in the absence of the deceased's former counsel, and treated the case as submitted for decision. Judgment was rendered against the heirs. The petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings in the trial court, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the present appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Facts

On December 6, 1972, Pacifico Pelaez sued Pedro Sepulveda for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. Pedro answered on December 31, 1972, resisting the claim on the grounds of laches, prescription, and failure to ventilate the matter in a previous special proceeding. While the plaintiff was presenting his evidence, Pedro died on March 25, 1975. On May 21, 1975, his former counsel filed a notice of death naming his thirteen children and surviving spouse. On May 5, 1975, the petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration, and in July 1976 she was appointed judicial administratrix of her father's estate.

At the hearing on November 27, 1975, Attorneys Domingo Antigua and Serafin Branzuela manifested in open court that their contract with their client ended upon his death, that none of the heirs had renewed it, and that the heirs had engaged other lawyers in the intestate proceedings. Despite this, the trial judge set the case for hearing on January 13, 1976 and sent notice to those same lawyers. On that date he issued three orders: substituting the fourteen heirs as defendants, authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to present evidence in the absence of the former counsel, and treating the case as submitted for decision. On January 28, 1976, he rendered judgment against the heirs.

On February 19, 1976, ten of the children, apparently unaware of the decision, filed an answer through Attorney Jesus Yray, which the judge refused to admit as moot. On March 9, 1976, the widow and two children moved for substitution and reconsideration. The judge set aside his decision on April 7, 1976, but limited the relief to those three heirs, and on July 14, 1976 he lifted that order. On July 9, 1976, the petitioner, already one of the heirs who had answered and later the administratrix, moved to intervene and substitute the deceased. On August 25, 1976, the judge denied the motion because the decision had become final.

Issues

• Whether or not the former counsel of the deceased defendant continued to represent the heirs after their client's death, so that notice to them bound the heirs.
• Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in proceeding with the trial and rendering judgment without awaiting the appointment of the legal representative and without valid substitution of the deceased.
• Whether or not the proceedings conducted after the death of Pedro Sepulveda, including the decision of January 28, 1976, are null and void.

Applicable Provisions

Section 16 of Rule 3 provides:

Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. - Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.

The former counsel complied with this duty by filing the notice of death, and that compliance ended their authority to act further for the heirs.

Section 17 of Rule 3 provides:

Death of party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

This provision gives priority to the legal representative and made it error for the trial judge to substitute the heirs while the intestate proceeding was pending.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in treating the former counsel as counsel for the heirs. The relationship of attorney and client is terminated by the death of the client. As the Court put it in Vda. de Haberer versus Court of Appeals, in the absence of a retainer from the heirs, the attorney has no further power to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and to take the necessary steps to safeguard the decedent's rights. The presumption of authority invoked by the Court of Appeals was unwarranted because the lawyers had expressly disclaimed representation of the heirs in open court.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when he set the continuation of the trial with notice to the deceased's former counsel. Under Section 17 of Rule 3, priority is given to the legal representative, that is, the executor or administrator of the estate. Only in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement, may the court allow the heirs to be substituted. Here, the intestate proceeding was pending and the petitioner's application to be appointed judicial administratrix was awaiting action, so the judge should have awaited her appointment and granted her motion to substitute.

On the third issue, the Court held that when a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued for the appearance of the legal representative or heirs, and no substitution is in fact effected, the trial held without them and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void, because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. The Court added that while the death did not obliterate the verified answer already filed, the heirs or the administratrix could, with leave of court, file an amended answer.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the death of a client terminates the attorney-client relationship, and the attorney's only remaining duty under Section 16 of Rule 3 is to inform the court of the death and to safeguard the decedent's rights. Second, under Section 17 of Rule 3, the court must order the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted within thirty days or such time as it may grant, and priority is given to the executor or administrator. Third, substitution of the heirs is only an alternative, allowed where there is unreasonable delay in appointing an executor or administrator or where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement. Fourth, where no valid substitution is made, the trial and the judgment are null and void for want of jurisdiction over the persons bound.

Disposition

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, granted the petition for certiorari, ordered the petitioner substituted for the deceased defendant Pedro Sepulveda, and set aside the proceedings conducted after his death, including the decision of January 28, 1976, with costs against the private respondent.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the death of a party ends his lawyer's authority and requires substitution of his legal representative, failing which the judgment is void. Examiners use this case on the death of a party under Rule 3, on the termination of the attorney-client relationship by death, and on the nullity of judgments rendered without valid substitution.