SPS. SOFRONIO GARMAY AND AMELIA GARMAY AND CELITA GERANDOY, PETITIONERS- APPELLANTS, VS. ANGELITA GONZAGA, SHERIFF ARNIEL APOSTOL AND JUDGE ELEANOR C. KWONG, PRESIDING JUDGE, MT…

The respondent Angelita Gonzaga _{(or hereafter Gonzaga)} sued the petitioners spouses Sofronio and Amelia Garmay _{(or the Garmays)} and Celita Gerandoy _{(or Gerandoy)} separately for Ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City _{(or MeTC)}. The cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21812 and 21813.

A Joint Decision favorable to Gonzaga was rendered in these cases, decreeing that:

which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court _{(or RTC)} of the same place and by this Court in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43787. The Decision attained finality on April 17, 2000.

Gonzaga moved for the execution of the judgment and this was granted by the MeTC. The Garmays and Gerandoy however sought to quash the writ of execution on the ground that there has been a change in the circumstances which makes the execution inequitable. They averred that in 1997 while the case was on trial, the real owner of the subject property through the agency of Lagman Realty offered it for sale on installment. They accepted the offer and started to pay the agreed monthly installments. A Contract To Sell was executed by Lagman Realty in their favor after they have paid a considerable amount. Clearly, Gonzaga has lost any right to ask for their eviction.

Gonzaga disputed this arguing that the Decision had already attained finality and the issuance of a writ of execution had become ministerial on the part of the trial court. Also, she moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition.

On July 26, 2001, Hon. Judge Eleanor Kwong issued an Order resolving that:

The Garmays sought relief with the RTC of the same place by petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case C-684.

On September 2, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision on this decreeing that:

Hence this appeal with the Garmays and Gerandoy positing this issue for Our resolution:

Generally, the execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. The ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court is to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final and executory. It may happen, however, that new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after judgment had been rendered and circumstances may develop or occur after judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed judgment become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that time. In the first situation, any attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an executory decision must fail. Once the judgment has become final and executory, the only remedy left for material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There is no other mode of thwarting the execution of judgment on equitable grounds predicated on facts occurring before the finality of judgment. In the second situation, the execution may be stayed, notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court. It is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein which would render the execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice. The interested party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and further supervening facts _{(Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 133883, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 415)}.

Asseverating that they already acquired the property subject of the ejectment suit and there was a change in the situation of the parties, the Garmays and Gerandoy moved to quash the writ of execution. However, the new facts or circumstances that would justify a modification or non-enforcement of a final and executory judgment, as said, refer to those matters which developed after the judgment acquired finality and which were not in existence prior to or during the trial and while an appeal therefrom is pending.

Here, the alleged offer to sell in favor of the Garmays and Gerandoy was made in 1997 and since then they were allegedly paying the installments for the property. The circumstance therefore that allegedly changed the status of the parties took place in 1997. But mark that the Decision of this Court attained finality only on April 17, 2000. Therefore, the alleged offer to sell and sale in their favor is not a supervening event that would warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court. Clearly, the present case does not fall under the exception relied upon by the Garmays.

Indeed there are in fact cases which hold that while parties are given a remedy from a denial of a motion to quash or recall writ of execution, it is equally settled that a writ will not be recalled by reason of any defense which could have been made at the time of the trial of the case. Rules of fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties cannot for the first time on appeal from the denial of a Motion to Quash a Writ of Execution raise issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even on appeal from the decision of the trial court _{(Reburiano vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 102965, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 342)}. The MeTC therefore correctly denied the Garmays’ Motion to Quash.

As the assailed MeTC Order was not issued with grave abuse of discretion, there was therefore no cause and basis for the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for by the Garmays. The RTC thus acted correctly in denying due course to the Garmays petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Guariña, III and Romilla-Lontok, JJ., concur.