HIPOLITO MEDEL, REPRESENTED BY GALO MEDEL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DIONISIO BARROGA AND HEDELYSSA BARROGA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Through his complaint filed on May 17, 1994, the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendants the possession of the following described motor vehicles:
- Kia Ceres, Model 1991, Engine No. S2-330346 Frame No. KNCSB1114KSO47018 valued at P180,000.00;
- Nissan Double Cab, pick-Up, Motor No. SD23-26675, Serial No. UA720-E82315, License Plate No. PMX-109 valued at P120,000.00; and
- Nissan Patrol Type SD-23-068094, Plate No. ACS 489, Chassis No. WRJ160-B36286 valued at P400,000.00.
claiming to have bought the vehicles from the defendants who did not deliver the vehicles to him despite repeated demands. He attached xerox copies of the alleged corresponding deeds of absolute sale as annexes A, B and C of the complaint.[1]
Upon the plaintiff’s application, the RTC issued a writ of replevin for the seizure and delivery of the motor vehicles on May 31, 1994.[2] The writ was partially enforced on June 1, 1994 with the seizure of the Nissan Patrol.[3] The defendants objected to the enforcement of the writ by citing a substantial discrepancy between the engine and chassis numbers of the vehicle described in the writ and those of the unit actually seized by the sheriff.[4]
In the meanwhile, on June 8, 1994, the defendants filed their answer, averring that:
- During the period covering March, 1992 to February, 1994, plaintiff and defendants had several business transactions and dealings wherein the latter would borrow sums of money from the former;
- To secure the loans mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, defendants executed blank and undated motor vehicle deeds of sale subject to the following condition: that the blank deeds of sale will be duly accomplished with the mutual knowledge of the parties involved, and shall become effective only if defendants shall fail to pay the loans secured by them from plaintiff and, also, only up to the extent of the unpaid balance of defendants’ obligation.
- Defendants have been able to pay in full the various loans secured by them from plaintiff but in all good faith, trustingly allowed the blank motor vehicle deeds of sale to remain in the possession of plaintiff to serve as security for any and future loans they may secure from plaintiff;
- Despite full payment and satisfaction of defendants’ obligations to plaintiff, the latter, without the knowledge and consent of the former, malevolently and in gross bad faith, accomplished the signed, but otherwise blank motor vehicle deeds of sale and, without any valid justification is now claiming to be owner of the motor vehicles subject of the spurious deeds of sale;
- Annex “C” of the Complaint, is a spurious Deed of Sale over a Nissan Patrol Type SL-23-068094 T, Chassis No. WRJ 160-B36286, Plate No. ACS 489 with no File and Registration Certificate Numbers since the one owned by the defendants is a motor vehicle with the following description:
Nissan Patrol Station Wagon, Model 1992, with Motor No. SD-33-068122T and with Serial Chassis No. WRG160-B36281.
Moreover, the consideration of P400,000.00 for the make and model of subject motor vehicle is grossly inadequate. Also, while a notarial page can contain only five (5) documents, Annex “C” is designated as Doc. No. 403, page 43, Book No. XX, Series of 1994 of Notary Public G.P. Zulueta, yet on the same date, May 13, 1994, the same notary public allegedly notarized Annexes “A” and “B” and designated the same as Doc. No. 205, page 43, Book No. XX, Series of 1994 and Doc. No. 203, page 43, Book No. XX, Series of 1994, respectively. Finally, defendant Dionicio S. Barroga, the registered owner of said motor vehicle, is not the one who signed as Vendor to Annex “C”.
- That because of the filing by plaintiff of this malicious and clearly unjustified suit, defendants have suffered serious anxiety, wounded feelings, mental anguish, besmirched reputation and similar injuries which, although incapable of pecuniary estimation, may be approximated at P150,000.00.
- That likewise because of the filing of this malevolent suit, defendants were forced to hire the services of counsel for which they contracted to pay P20,000.00.[5]
On June 28, 1994, the RTC ruled on the defendants’ objection against the writ, pertinently stating:
Apparently, the motor/engine and chassis numbers of the vehicle taken into custody are different from the motor/engine and chassis numbers appearing on the plaintiff’s application for Replevin, although the plate number is the same.
However, this Court observes that at the time of sale, defendant Dionisio Barroga failed to disclose to the plaintiff that he made corrections on the description of the vehicle as above-stated, so that, when the plaintiff purchased the vehicle for the sum of P400,000.00, he honestly, and in good faith, believed that he was buying the vehicle as described in the deed of sale (Annex “C”). On the other hand, defendant Dionisio Barroga acted in bad by hiding from the plaintiff the corrections he made. Consequently, he cannot now claim the return of the vehicle in question without causing damage and prejudice to the defendant, a buyer in good faith and for value.
As regards the replevin bond, it is felt that the bond of P1,400,000.00 posted by the plaintiff is sufficient to cover the three(3) vehicles subject of the Writ of Replevin issued by this Court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, defendants’ Formal Objection is hereby DENIED/OVERRULED and the defendants are ordered to produce the other two (2) vehicles, the KIA CERES and NISSAN DOUBLE CAB PICK-UP, also subject of the Writ of Replevin.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On September 26, 1994, the sheriff again served the writ and seized the Nissan Double Cab. At that occasion, defendant Dionisio Barroga related to the sheriff that the Kia Ceres was in Iloilo City but registered in the name of Power Electrical Co., Inc. (PELCO).[7]
After declaring the defendants as in default due to their failure to appear at pre-trial on November 10, 1994 and to file their brief,[8] the RTC reconsidered upon the defendants’ motion for reconsideration and then set the pre-trial.[9] The pre-trial was terminated on December 15, 1995, after which trial ensued.[10]
The evidence adduced during trial is summarized in the RTC decision, as follows:
Plaintiff’s evidence consists of the testimony of Galo Medel, brother and attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Hipolito Medel (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-2 – Special Power of Attorney) who testified that defendant Dionisio Barroga obtained a loan from the plaintiff and Galo Medel in the total amount of P1.2 million. To secure payment of this loan, Dionisio Barroga and Hedelissa Barroga executed three (3) Deeds of Sale in favor of the plaintiff Hipolito Medel involving certain vehicles namely, Kia Ceres Model 1991, Engine No. 52-330346, Frame No. KNCSB1114KS047018 for a consideration of One Hundred Eighty Thousand (P180,000.00) [Exhibits B, B-1 to B-3 – Deed of Absolute Sale]; Nissan Double Cab, Pick-Up, Motor No. SD23-266675, Serial No. UA720-E82315, License Plate No. PMX 109 valued at One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P120,000.00) [Exh. G]; and Nissan Patrol, Type SD-23-068094T, Plate No. ACS 489, Chassis No. WRJI60-B36286 valued at Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) [Exh. H] [Pls. see TSN, pp. 13-17, 02/29/96]. The Official Receipt and the Certificate of Registration for the Kia Ceres were likewise surrendered by the defendants to the plaintiff. When the defendants failed to deliver the aforesaid vehicles to the plaintiff, the latter sent a demand letter dated April 7, 1994 (Exhibits E & E-1).
The loan of P1.2 million was later paid by the defendants (Exhs 1 & 1-A) (TSN, p. 16, supra).
Plaintiff admits having executed and signed Memorandum Agreement dated February 23, 1995 (Exhs. 2 & 2-A; tsn, pp. 22, 02/29/96.)
Plaintiff likewise instituted a complaint for violation of BP 22 before Metropolitan Trial Court of this City where the plaintiff through his atty.-in-fact and the defendant-husband agreed that the former would turn over the possession of the Nissan Patrol provided the defendant pays the interest based on the bank rate and that the rental rate for the use of the car be deducted from the interest (Exhs. 5 & 5-A; Tsn, p. 8, 05/31/96)
The Nissan Patrol car had already been sold by the plaintiff sometime in 1995 for P50,000.00 (TSN, pp. 5-6, 05/31/96).
On the other hand, defendants evidence discloses that defendant-husband is a businessman for eighteen (18) years engaged in general construction under the firm name Power Electrical Company. Defendant-husband came to know the plaintiff through his brother and attorney-in-fact, Galo Medel whom he knows since 1985. The latter is also his neighbor. Defendant-husband does not remember to have entered into any transaction with the plaintiff. However, sometime in 1990, 1991 & 1992, defendant-husband obtained a loan from Galo Medel in the total sum of P1.2 million. To secure payment of the loan, he issued three (3) post-dated checks in the total amount P1.2 million, and blank deeds of sale, the number of copies of which he does not remember anymore as everytime he borrowed money he was always asked to sign five copies of deed of sale. The execution and signing of the deed of sale was for purposes of securing payment of the loan, i.e., in case he fails to pay his obligation, Galo Medel was authorized to fill up the blank deed of sale (TSN, pp. 9-12, 10/30/96). Due to the filing of this case, defendant-husband almost paid his obligation. He just left an outstanding balance of P25,000.00. Despite payment, Galo Medel refused to give back the signed deed of sale because the latter was demanding payment of interest in an exhorbitant amount of P2million. When he refused to pay the amount demanded, he deposited the post-dated checks which the defendant-husband earlier issued. As expected, considering that the same were already staled, the checks bounced and they filed a criminal case against him. Meanwhile, the blank spaces in the deeds of sale were filled up without his authority. The same were notarized in his absence and the residence certificate number appearing therein was not his residence certificate number. As may be noted, the deeds of sale bear the same residence certificate number as that of the plaintiff’s residence certificate stated in his Complaint. At any rate, in settlement of the civil aspect of the case, he paid Galo Medel the amount of P1.2 million (Exhibit 1), a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by him and his wife, and Galo Medel (Exhs 2 & 2-A). However, despite payment, Galo Medel refused to return the unit to him.
Defendant-husband denies having sold the subject vehicles to the plaintiff, much less did he sign any deed of sale conveying his Nissan Patrol car. However, he admits that his wife signed as a vendor in the deed (Tsn, p. 27, 10/30/96). He insists that he owns the Nissan Patrol as evidence by the Certificate of Registration issued in his favor by Land Transportation Office (Exh. 7) and the Commercial Vehicle Policy issued by the Utility Assurance Corporation (Exh. 6). Defendant likewise denies the signature appearing on the Deed of Sale involving a Nissan Double Cab (Exh. G) and the Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle involving a Nissan Patrol (Exh. H) found above the typewritten word “vendee”. Moreover, defendant-husband did not surrender the certificate of registration of the Nissan Patrol because at that time the same was still the financing institution, but he gave Galo Medel a copy of promissory note for the financing company.
On the other hand, the Kia Ceres is owned by Power Electrical Company as evidenced by the Certificate of Registration issued in its favor by the Land Registration Authority (Exhibit 8). Nonetheless, considering that the Kia Ceres was part of the collateral, he surrendered to the plaintiff the Certificate of Registration thereof. This holds true with that of the Nissan double cab, but it was his wife who surrendered the Certificate of Registration to Galo Medel because anyway it was registered in her name.
Prior to the filing of this case, defendants never received any demand letter from the plaintiff. In any case, as a result of this unwarranted filing of this case against him, the aforesaid defendant suffered sleepless nights and embarrassment which if quantified would amount to about a million, as well as legal fees amounting to P150,000.00 to P200,000.00, more or less.
Defendant-wife, on the other hand, is the treasurer of Power Electrical Company. She does not know the plaintiff herein, but she knew the latter’s attorney-in-fact, Galo Medel, since 1985 the latter being their neighbor. Defendant-wife corroborated her husband’s testimony, but further testified that the blank deed of sale given to them for signing was a sort of pro-forma, i.e., without any specifications. As per their agreement, in case they fail to pay their obligation, they would give Galo Medel the authority to fill up the blank Deed of Sale which the latter himself prepared. However, whatever amount that would be placed in the blank deed of sale would be shown to them. According to her, they have already paid the loan which they obtained from Galo Medel. But despite payment, the latter failed to return to them the deed of sale which they signed because they (plaintiff) wanted them to pay the alleged interest on the loan in the amount of P2million, more or less. Nonetheless, they were forced to pay the same when the plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for Violation of BP 22 as the post-dated checks which they earlier issued bounced (Exh. 1). The witness likewise testified that when the Deed of Sale (Exhibits H & 9) was signed by her, it did not contain any description of the motor vehicle. In fact, he signed the same in blank. Moreover, she never appeared before any notary public, neither did he give her residence certificate to the plaintiff herein. In sum, she never sold her husband’s Nissan Patrol to the plaintiff.[11]
On April 30, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants finding the former to have right of possession over the subject vehicles. It appearing that the delivery of Kia Ceres 1991 model with Engine No. S2-330346 Frame No. KNCSB11147018 cannot be made as the same is reportedly in Iloilo, the defendants are hereby ordered to pay the value thereof in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Pesos (P180,000.00), Phil. Currency.
Likewise, the defendants are ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00, and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this appeal.
The defendants assign the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ITS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE BY THIS APPEAL WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE HAS THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT VEHICLES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED – AND ITS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE ON APPEAL – WHEN IT RULED THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE THREE (3) DEEDS OF SALE AS WELL AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE POSTDATED CHECKS REFER TO TWO DIFFERENT AND SEPARATE TRANSACTIONS DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVE ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE HAS PROVEN ITS CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WITH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF HIPOLITO MEDEL HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF SUIT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND IN DISMISSING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ COUNTERCLAIM.
The decisive issues are: 1) whether the parties entered into 2 distinct transactions – one of sale of the motor vehicles and the other of loan wherein the motor vehicles were security; 2) whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the motor vehicles from the defendants; and 3) in case of reversal, how much might be recovered by the defendants by virtue of the implementation of the writ of replevin as to the Nissan Double Cab and Nissan Patrol.
The appeal is meritorious.
Relevant to the first issue, the RTC concluded as follows:
Undisputably, the defendant signed the questioned deeds of sale. Likewise, the defendants issued in favor of the plaintiff postdated checks in the total amount of PHP 1.2 million. The defendants claim that the loan has already been paid. The defendants further allege that payment was made when the latter issued postdated checks in favor of the plaintiff in settlement of the civil aspect of the criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 filed by the plaintiff against him (Exh. 1 & 1-A). However, this Court believes the execution of the three (3) deeds of sale as well as the issuance of the postdated checks were two different and separate transactions between the parties herein. The defendants themselves admitted in their answer that they allowed the blank motor vehicle deeds of sale to remain in the possession of the plaintiff to serve as security for any and future loans they may secure from plaintiff (Answer, par. 4). Moreover, this Court could not believe that a borrower like the defendants in this case would pay more than what is required of him to pay. It is likewise unbelievable that the plaintiff herein would cede the subject vehicles only in payment of the alleged interest for the loan obtained. Obviously therefore the defendants herein issued postdated checks in the total amount of PHP 1.2 million loan (Exhs. 2 & 2-A) to cover payments of the loan which the defendants earlier obtained from the plaintiff which loan is actually distinct and separate transaction from that of the three (3) deeds of sale executed by the defendants which involved the three (3) vehicles herein. Be it as it may, it is undisputed that the defendants herein executed and signed the subject deeds of sale.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court believes that the plaintiff herein has proven his case against the defendant herein with preponderance of evidence.
We cannot uphold the RTC.
The records do not support the aforecited conclusion that the sale transactions were separate and distinct from the loan transactions but, on the contrary, establish that the parties had only 1 transaction, the loan. Galo Medel himself, the plaintiff’s attorney-in-fact and witness, testified so:
xxx
COURT – What is the basis for your complaint?A – His 1.2 million debt, sir.
COURT – What was the result?
A – He has a P1.2 million debt or “utang”, sir
COURT – Whose “utang”?
A – Mr. Barroga, Your Honor.[13]
xxx
It is unquestionable, therefore, that the plaintiff brought this action for possession as his mode of recovering the defendants’ unpaid indebtedness of P1,200,000.00, directly debunking the conclusion about the loan and the sale being separate and distinct.
At the same time, it is evident that the parties resorted to the drawing of the deeds of absolute sale to conveniently embody their collateral agreement to have the vehicles be the security for the repayment of the loans. Again, Galo Medel confirmed so, testifying on cross-examination as follows:
xxx
Q (Atty. Palamos)
– And the Deed of Sale was executed to secure a loan, right?A – Yes, sir.[14]
xxx
The defendants averred in their unverified answer, supra, that the deeds were spurious and otherwise did not express the true intention of the parties; and also denied taking part in the execution of the deeds except to sign them in blank. Did not the defendants thereby impliedly admit the genuineness and due execution of the deeds of absolute sale attached to the complaint as Annexes A, B and C?
They did not, despite their answer being unverified. Sec. 7, Rule 8, Revised Rules of Court (1964), the rule then applicable, stated:
Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
The plaintiff’s attaching of the copies of the deeds of absolute sale as annexes of the complaint was not sufficient, for the substance of the deeds as actionable documents must also be set forth therein. Only thereby could the defendants have been required to make their specific denial of the genuineness and due execution of the deeds under oath, considering that Sec. 8, Rule 8, Revised Rules of Court (1964), clearly provided:
Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. – When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
At any rate, the deeds were not to be accepted as instruments of sale from the mere fact that they were notarized. Ordinarily, a document notarially acknowledged bears the imprint that it is duly executed and is genuine. Yet, such rule does not apply to the deeds herein considering that the defendants, as the parties sought to be principally bound thereby, placed their genuineness and due execution in issue.
The reliability of the deeds as instruments of sale is also under serious question. The records contain sufficient indicia of irregularity and falsification attendant to such deeds. For one, the deeds were not acknowledged by the defendants before the notary public, for, contrary to the notarial protocol, Medel alone had caused the notarization of the deeds. Consequently, the deeds could only be treated as private documents,[15] thus necessitating further proof of their due execution and authenticity as a condition to their admission as evidence.[16] Another irregularity was that the residence certificate attributed to defendant Dionisio Barroga was the same residence certificate used by the plaintiff in his verification of the complaint.[17] Then there was the earlier-cited discrepancy between the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Patrol on the corresponding deed of absolute sale and its description in the corresponding certificate of registration, a discrepancy that should not be taken lightly. Yet another was that the deed of absolute sale vis-a-vis the Nissan Patrol had only the signature of defendant Hedelissa Barroga, but its registered owner was Dionisio Barroga. And, finally, the deed involving the Kia Ceres contained the signature of Dionisio Barroga although the vehicle was registered under the name of Power Electric Company without any explanation in the deed why said defendant had signed as vendor. All such circumstances are badges of suspicion and doubt.
As the second issue, the RTC grossly erred in favoring the plaintiff on the question of possession. Firstly, our finding that the execution of the deeds of absolute sale was only for convenience leads to the only acceptable conclusion, which is that the defendants, not the plaintiff, were entitled to the exclusive possession. And, secondly, the plaintiff’s demand for the delivery of the vehicles was completely unfounded and unjust because he had no more right to demand payment in view of the payment of the indebtedness by the defendants. Such full payment was admitted by him, through his brother and witness/attorney-in-fact Galo Medel who, when examined, declare that the defendants had already paid their indebtedness of P1,200,000.00.[18]
To clarify, a writ of replevin is available to recover possession of a personal property capable of delivery.[19] When the plaintiff filed this action and applied for the writ of replevin, he thereby assured that he had the better right to possess the vehicles. By the delivery to him of 2 of the vehicles in litis, however, he did not become entitled to the possession in a permanent way, for such delivery to him was only provisional and temporary, subject to the final determination after trial on the merits. Otherwise stated, the plaintiff’s obtaining possession of the personal property by a writ of replevin did vest him with absolute title thereto, anymore than a defendant who would file a redelivery bond for its return. Either would only hold the property subject to the final judgment in the action.[20] Indeed, Sec. 9, Rule 60, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, makes that clear enough, as follows:
Sec. 9. Judgment. – After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.
Due to our reversal of the RTC, we have now to determine the value of the Nissan Double Cab and the Nissan Patrol that were seized and turned over to the plaintiff. Their return to the defendants as owners/lawful possessors is no longer a practical recourse.
Difficulty arises because the defendants adduced no competent evidence on such value. True, they stated in their objection to the implementation of the writ that the Nissan Patrol had a “current minimum book value” of P750,000.00, as contrasted with the P400,000.00 stated by the plaintiff as the value in support of his application for the writ of replevin.[21] But they did not competently substantiate such valuation; hence, such valuation could not be used herein. On the other hand, the plaintiff declared P400,000.00 as value of the Nissan Patrol and P120,000.00 as value of the Nissan Double Cab.[22]
We resolve that the valuations of the plaintiff should be used considering their nature as judicial admissions under Sec. 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court.[23] But we impose interest of 6%/per annum thereon, reckoned for the P400,000.00 from the seizure of the Nissan Patrol on June 1, 1994 and for the P120,000.00 from the seizure of the Nissan Double Cab on September 26, 1994.
We further require the plaintiff to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as nominal damages under Art. 2221, Civil Code,[24] due to fact that the defendants’ right to the unhampered possession of such vehicles having been unwarrantedly violated or invaded by the plaintiff and that such right should be vindicated or recognized.
Lastly, the plaintiff should pay to the defendants attorney’s fees because he compelled them to incur expenses by bringing this clearly unfounded civil action against them. Such liability is based on Art. 2208, (4), Civil Code. For the purpose, we fix the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 30, 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is entered, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit; and ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendants P400,000.00 as value of the Nissan Patrol, plus interest of 6% per annum from June 1, 1994 until fully paid; P120,000.00 as value of the Nissan Double Cab, plus interest of 6% per annum from September 26, 1994 until fully paid; P150,000.00 as nominal damages; and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Costs of suit to be paid by the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., (Chairman) and Librea-Leagogo, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, pp. 1-6.
[2] Records, pp. 43-44.
[3] Records, p. 46, (Sheriff’s Partial Return dated June 7, 1994).
[4] Records, pp. 31-34 (Formal Objection).
[5] Records, pp. 36-38.
[6] Records, p. 65.
[7] Records, p. 110 (Sheriff’s Partial Return dated September 27, 1994).
[8] Records, p. 128 (Order dated November 10, 1994).
[9] Records, p. 245 (Order dated September 27, 1995).
[10] Records, p. 265 (Order dated December 15, 1995).
[11] Records, pp. 366-368.
[12] Records, pp. 368-369.
[13] TSN, January 25, 1996, pp. 7-8.
[14] TSN, February 29, 1996, p. 16.
[15] United States v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 (1908), where the Supreme Court defines a private document to be “every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth.
[16] Bunag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299; Nolan v. Sales, 7 Phil. 1 (1906); United States v. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 (1915); Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).
See also Sec. 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21 a)
[17] Records, pp. 2, 4, and 5.
[18] TSN, February 29, 1996, p. 14; Exhibit 1 (Receipt);
[19] Sec. 1, Rule 60, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[20] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th Revised Edition, p. 675.
[21] Records, p. 33.
[22] Records, pp. 1-2 (Verified Complaint).
[23] Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
[24] Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.