G.R. No. L-22979. June 26, 1967
RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, MANUEL G. …
SANCHEZ, J.:
Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider
the decision herein, filed by counsel for petitioners-
"One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the question as to whether or not a particular subject matter
is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency
of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard
to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court,
not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its
decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of
this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to
and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations. This
manifestation appears in this Honorable Court’s decision in the instant
case. As a result, the errors committed
in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue. x x x.
* * *
It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court
contravened Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules of Court when it applied the
so-called ‘rule against splitting of jurisdiction’ in its Decision in the
present case. As applied by this
Honorable Court, the rule means that when an employee files with the Court of
Industrial Relations numerous claims relative to his employment but only one
[of] which is
cognizable by said court under the law, while the others pertain to
other tribunals, that court has authority to entertain all the claims to avoid
multiplicity of suits. x
x x."
drew from the
Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt
with for contempt of court.
In respondent attorneys’ verified return, they offered
"their most sincere apologies for the language used" and stated that
"[i]t was not and it has never been their
intention to be disrespectful." They manifested that the language
"was the result of overenthusiasm on the part of
Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought best to focus
the attention of this Honorable Court to the issue in the case, and was not in
any way meant to slight or
offend this Honorable Court." They also said that the "unfortunate
Motion for Reconsideration was prepared and filed by Atty. Armonio
who had been personally handling the case since its inception at the Court of
Industrial Relations, and who had, perhaps, become too emotionally involved in
the case."
Respondent members of the law firm, namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna,
Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full responsibility" for what
appears in the motion for reconsideration.
They submitted, not as an excuse, but as a fact, that not one of the
partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said motion, and
that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed
and filed the motion "without clearing it with any of the partners of the
firm." The return winds up with an expression of deep regret about the
incident, coupled with an earnest pledge that it "shall never happen
again."
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in
court. Attys. Ponce Enrile
and Armonio were orally heard.
1. As we look back at the
language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to
rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law
on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making "any reference to and analysis of" the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that
this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court; it has committed error and continuously repeated that error
to the point of perpetuation, It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the
line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of
the members – and some former members -of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm when counsel labelled as "so-called" the
"rule against splitting of jurisdiction”.[1]
By now, a lawyer’s duties to the Court have become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly
be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers."
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The
attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all
good fidelity x x
x to the courts." Worth remembering is
that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he
is bound to uphold."[2]
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others’ lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court’s decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
2. What we have before us
is not without precedent. Time and
again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of
the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory,
of this Court or the lower courts.[3]
Resort by an attorney – in a motion for reconsideration – to words which may
drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified
nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court
in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are
"sufficient", and such words "superfluous."[4] It is in
this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio
"thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the
issue in the case" does not give him unbridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various
methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court’s attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle
does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power
to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief."[5]
Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the
result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat
an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really
bad. In fact, the one or the other is no
less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the
bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our
system of government.[6]
We are not unmindful of counsel’s statement that the language
used "was not in any way meant
to slight or offend" this Court.
Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the
language employed. For, counsel cannot escape
responsibility "by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader
must have understood them as meaning."[7]
At best, it extenuates liability.
3. We now turn to the
partners of the law firm. They explained
that not one of them cleared the motion in which the questionable portion
appears. Their reason is that they were
not in the office at the time said motion was filed – which was the last
day. They added that "
it is the policy of the firm known to all its members and associates
that only the partners can sign court pleadings except in rare cases where, for
want of time or due to unexpected circumstances, an associate has to sign the
same". We understood Atty. Alfonso
Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in his
long years of practice, he knows that it serves no useful purpose to downgrade
the dignity of the Court. We may
overlook the short comings of the members of the law firm; except that, as we
see it, partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court
pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of their
law firm. Seemingly, such control was
absent here.
In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Armonio,
with the warning that repetition of this incident will be dealt with
accordingly. Let a copy of this
resolution be attached to his record.
Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile,
Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequate
supervision and control of the pleadings and other documents submitted by their
law firm to the courts of justice of this country.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ., concur.
[1]
The decision actually employed the words "split jurisdiction".
[2]
Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92.
[3]
Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 223, 226; Salcedo
vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Medina vs,
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151, 157; In re Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 316; People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 579-580, 583; In re
Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 601-602; People vs. Venturanza,
98 Phil. 211, 217; De Joya vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 99 Phil. 907, 915-916; Sison vs. Sandejas,
L-9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas vs. Cruz
(Resolution), L-24438, July 30, 1965.
[4]
Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 727. See
also Paragas vs. Cruz, supra.
[5]
Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 728.
[6]
Id., at p. 729; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85
Phil. 772, 775; Paragas vs. Cruz, supra.
[7]
In re Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 316, cited in Paragas vs. Cruz, supra.