RUBEN VALERO AND ESTRELLA A. DE VALERO, PETITIONERS, VS. ISABEL FOLLANTE, RESPONDENT.

On July 25, 1951, Isabel Follante filed with the Public Service
Commission a petition to operate an ice plant in the municipality of
Candon, Province of Ilocos Sur and its environments. Ruben Valero and
Estrella A. de Valero filed an opposition alleging, among other things,
that the Public Service Commission has already granted the oppositors
authority to operate an ice plant with 5-ton daily capacity in the
municipality of San Fernando, La Union, with right to sell ice in the
municipalities of San Juan, San Gabriel, Bacnotan, Balaoan, Luna,
Bangar and Sudipen, all in the Province of La Union, and in the
municipalities of Tagudin, Sevilla, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Lucia, Candon,
Santiago, San Esteban, Sta. Maria and Narvacan, all in the Province of
Ilocos Sur. They also alleged that the service they were rendering in
the territory covered by their authority was adequate and satisfactory
and that public convenience and necessity did not require the operation
of another ice plant in the municipality of Candon and its environs.
They finally alleged that to grant the petition would only promote
unfair and ruinous competition and that petitioner was not financially
capable of maintaining an adequate and sufficient operation of a new
ice plant as set forth in her petition.

The petition was heard in due time and a decision was rendered on
December 27, 1951 granting to petitioner the authority applied for.
Both on motion for reconsideration, and after a rehearing was held, the
Public Service Commission set aside its former decision and revoked the
authority granted to petitioner in an order issued on June 3, 1952. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and without any further
hearing, another order was issued as follows: Commissioner Paredes
voted to deny the motion and to reaffirm the order issued on June 3,
1952. But Commissioners Ocampo and Prieto voted to grant the motion and
to reaffirm the original decision rendered on December 27, 1951. The
oppositors moved to have this order reconsidered, but their motion was
denied. Hence, this petition for review.

It should be recalled that the petition for authority to operate an
ice plant in the municipality of Candon, Province of Ilocos Sur, and
its environs, was originally granted in a decision rendered on December
27, 1951, but on motion for reconsideration, said decision was set
aside in an order issued on June 3, 1952. It should be noted that, in
connection with said motion for reconsideration, the Commission granted
the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence to
substantiate the new facts alleged in the motion for reconsideration.
And in connection with the new evidence presented, the Commission made
the following findings of fact:

“The Commission has carefully gone over the
additional evidence presented as well as the evidence adduced during
the original hearing, and finds that the fact has been established that
the applicant is not financially capable of operating the ice plant
applied for, and that she is but a mere dummy of a Chinaman by the name
of Tan Tai alias Noo Wah, the owner of a restaurant in Candon, Ilocos
Sur, and husband of Cresencia Follante, a very close relative of the
applicant. The Commission also finds that, with respect to her
financial capacity, applicant misrepresented the facts to this
Commission as evidenced by her statement to the effect, calculated, no
doubt, to impress the Commission regarding for solvency, that she had
deposited P35,000 in the Philippine National Bank branch in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, prior to the date of the original hearing, when the truth
is, as admitted by her during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration, that no such amount was ever deposited. The Commission
is not disposed to believe the statements made by this applicant during
the rehearing, that she pledged and mortgaged personal and real
property in order to raise funds for the operation of the ice plant
applied for, as this is in direct conflict with her previous testimony
to the effect that she had already in her possession P35,000 ready for
the use and for the purchase of the necessary equipment to install and
operate the ice plant in question. The financial ability of an
applicant to operate a public utility is one of the most important
considerations that should be taken into account in the approval or
denial of an application to engage in such operation.

“In
view of the above, particularly of the fact that applicant is a mere
dummy of an alien who has tried to circumvent the provisions of the
Public Service Act as well as of the Constitution of the Philippines,
the Commission finds it its duty to revoke the decision sought to be
reconsidered and to set the same aside.”

Note also that the above order was written by Commissioner Paredes
and was concurred in by Commissioner Prieto. Commissioner Ocampo was
then on leave. Later, however, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, and on the strength of the same evidence, and without
any further hearing, Commissioner Paredes, who received the additional
evidence, and penned the order, issued an order on August 21, 1952,
reiterating his previous findings and denying the motion; but this time
Commissioner Ocampo dissented, and his dissenting opinion was concurred
in by Commissioner Prieto. Since their dissenting opinions carried two
negative votes, they became the opinion of the majority. This is the
opinion which is now being impugned by the oppositors in the present
petition for review.

The reasons expressed by Commissioner Ocampo in his dissenting opinion are as follows:

“The order revoking the decision which granted to
the applicant a certificate of public convenience is based on the
additional evidence which oppositors produced during the rehearing.
This evidence consists of the testimony of Ruben L. Valero, one of the
oppositors but said evidence does not provide a sufficient basis for
the revocation of the certificate granted to the applicant. This
evidence purports to prove that applicant is a dummy of a Chinese
national and that she is not financially qualified to install and
operate the plant. The testimony of Valero on these points is clearly
hearsay and at times even double hearsay—told to Valero by someone to
whom it was told. There is no reliable direct evidence proving these
allegations of financial incapacity or that applicant is a mere dummy.
On the other hand there is the rebuttal evidence of applicant that she
had accumulated about P20,000 which is the money she used to install
her plant and we do not see that this testimony is in any way
unbelievable.”

As already stated, Commissioner Prieto concurred in the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Ocampo, but apparently his reasons for
dissenting are based on a matter of procedure more than on the reasons
set forth by Commissioner Ocampo in his dissenting opinion.
Commissioner Prieto expressed the opinion that the oppositors should
not have been allowed to present evidence on the lack of financial
capacity of the applicant and on the fact that she was a mere dummy of
a Chinaman who was the real party behind her application for the simple
reason that those are new facts which were not alleged either in the
written opposition, or in the motion for reconsideration filed by
oppositors, and because of this transgression of an important rule of
procedure, he believed that those new facts cannot serve as basis for
setting aside the original decision rendered on December 27, 1951. It
would seem therefore that Commissioner Prieto is of the opinion that
the findings made by Commissioner Paredes in his order of June 3, 1952,
which was concurred in by him, to the effect that petitioner was not
financially capable and was a mere dummy of a Chinaman are correct, but
that the reason for reversing his previous stand is that those facts
cannot be taken into account because they are not among the issues
raised in the pleadings filed by the oppositors. We may therefore say
that, in substance, these findings bear the approval and support of the
vote of two commissioners.

As regards the matter of procedure brought out by Commissioner
Prieto, we may say that, while the stand he has taken is in line with
ordinary rule of procedure, the same need not be strictly adhered to by
the Commission, nor should the latter be strictly bound by it, for the
law creating the Commission has invested it with ample power to conduct
its hearings and investigations without being trammeled by the ordinary
rules of court. Thus, Section 29 of the Public Service Act provides
that “All hearings and investigations before the Commission shall be
governed by the rules adopted by the Commission, and in the conduct
thereof the Commission shall not be bound by the technical rules of
legal evidence.” The only thing required is that the parties be given
proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules (section 16),
except in cases where the Commission can act without previous hearing
(section 17). So that, in our opinion, the Commission cannot be said to
have acted improperly in receiving the additional evidence if in its
opinion such evidence is necessary to enable it to reach an enlightened
decision of the controversy. And having reached this conclusion, we are
of the opinion that the real decision of the Commission on the merits
is that rendered on June 3, 1952 which bears the affirmative vote of
two commissioners.

Wherefore, the dissenting opinions of Commissioners Ocampo and
Prieto dated August 28, 1952 are hereby set aside and the decision of
Commissioners Paredes and Prieto dated June 3, 1952 is hereby
maintained, as reaffirmed in the order of Commissioner Paredes dated
August 21, 1952, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.