LOURDES ARCUINO, ELEUTERIA LAUDE, FLORENCIA PATOMBON AND ANGELITA PATOMBON, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

On May 26, 1964,
Lourdes Arcuino, Eleuteria
Laude, Florencia Patombon,
and Angelita Patombon –
hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs – commenced the present action in said
court, for the “recovery of possession, damages and legal
redemption.” In their complaint, filed by Attorneys Bruno A. Villamor and Vicente Rodriguez, plaintiffs alleged that
they are co-owners pro indiviso of
shares aggregating about 13/24^[1]
of a residential land of about 332 square meters, known as Lot No. 355 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ormoc City, which lot is covered
by original Certificate of Title No. 13672 of the Province of Leyte; that in 1946, defendant spouses, Casiano
Puray and Rufina Aparis – hereinafter referred to as the Purays
– took possession of said lot, “thereby unlawfully and illegally excluding
the plaintiffs from their lawful possession of their respective shires,”
which the Purays refused to return to the plaintiffs,
despite repeated demands by them made “for several years;” that on
April 29, 1964, plaintiffs learned that some of the co-owners had sold their
respective shares in said lot to the Purays, in view
of which they (plaintiffs) offered, shortly thereafter, to redeem said shares,
but the Purays rejected the offer; and that,
consequently, plain­tiffs suffered damages. 
Plaintiffs prayed, therefore, that judgment be rendered ordering the Purays to deliver to them (plaintiffs) their respective
shares and sentencing the Purays to permit them
(plaintiffs) to redeem the shares sold to them (Purays),
as well as to pay damages, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs.

In their answer to the complaint, the Purays
denied the alleged share of the plaintiffs in said Lot No. 355, and averred
that the same belongs to them (the Purays), having
acquired it in good faith, for value, in 1946, from Marciano
Melgar and Pilar Melgar, his (Marciano’s) daughter
by his deceased wife, Pilar Laude, pursuant to a deed
of conveyance, copy of which is appended to said answer, as Annex 1 thereof;
that Marciano Melgar and Pilar Laude had, in turn, purchased it on May 16, 1938,
from the registered owners of said lot, as attested to by a deed of absolute
sale attached to the answer, as Annex 2 thereof, executed by Gaudioso Arcuino and Teresa and Diosdado Pa­tombon; that
plaintiffs’ right of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitation;
and that plaintiffs are guilty of laches.  The Purays,
likewise, set up a counterclaim for damages.

Upon the filing of plaintiffs’ answer to the counterclaim, the
lower court ordered the case set for pre-trial on June 17, 1964; but neither the plaintiffs nor their
counsel appeared on that date. 
Thereupon, on motion of Purays‘ counsel, said
court issued an order dismissing the case.

It would seem that, immediately thereafter, Atty. Villamor informed the Court that Atty. Rodriguez, who, he (Villamor) intimated, was handling the case for the
plaintiffs, could not be present because he was then in Mindanao.  Moreover, Atty. Villamor
asked that the pre-trial be postponed, but the Court did not grant such
request.  Hence, Atty. Villa­mor filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that, while he was in the courthouse, in Ormoc City,
on June 10, 1964, as counsel for one of the parties in Civil Case No. 633-0 of
said court, notice of the pre-trial in the case at bar was served upon him;
that he placed said notice inside his en­velope of the aforementioned Case No.
633-0; that, after the hearing thereof, he went to his office, and, after
placing the aforementioned envelope inside a drawer, he returned home; that, it
being late in the afternoon, he forgot to advise Atty. Rodriguez of said
pre-trial; that Atty. Rodriguez left Ormoc City the
next day and proceeded to Iligan City via Cebu City, leaving on his office calendar a note to the
effect that the pre-trial in the present case would be held on June 19, 1964;
that Atty. Rodriguez was evidently under the honest belief that the date set
for the pre-trial was June 19, not June 17, 1964; that when Atty. Villamor heard, on June 17, 1964, that the pre-trial would
then be held, he remem­bered that notice thereof had been served upon him while
he was attending the hearing of said case No. 633-0; that, there­upon, he
examined his envelope of that case and found there­in said notice; and that the
failure of Atty. Rodriguez to ap­pear at the pre-trial was due, therefore, to
excusable mistake.

Upon denial of this motion for reconsideration, plain­tiffs
interposed the present appeal, directly to the Supreme Court.

It is not disputed that, owing to the failure of plaintiffs and
their counsel to appear at the pre-trial of this case, notice of which had been
duly served upon the parties, the lower court had the authority to dismiss the
case.^[2]
It is, likewise, settled that the determination of whether or not an order of
dismissal issued under such conditions should be maintained or reconsidered,
rests upon the sound discretion of His Honor, the Trial Judge.^[3]
The issue, in this appeal, hinges on whether or not such discretion has been so
abused as to warrant a reversal of said order.

Upon a review of the records, we are fully satisfied that the
answer must be in the negative, for:

1)   The explanation given in plaintiffs’ motion
for reconsideration is far from satisfactory. 
Atty. Villamor would have us believe that he had
been unable to transmit to Atty. Rodriguez the notice of pre-trial served upon
the former.  Yet there was, on the office
calendar of Atty. Rodriguez, a note – seemingly written by him – to the effect
that said pre-trial would take place on June
19, 1964.  Atty. Rodriguez
knew, therefore, that there would be such pre-trial.  In other words, the notice thereof must have
reached him, although his associate, Atty. Villamor,
believes that he (Rodriguez) must have committed an honest mistake regarding
the date of the pre-trial.

2)   Both lawyers were counsel for plaintiffs
herein.  In the absence of his associate,
Atty. Villamor could have and should have appeared,
therefore, on behalf of the plaintiffs, at the pre-trial.

3)   The very complaint of plaintiffs herein shows
that the Purays had been in adverse possession of Lot
No. 355 continuously since 1946, and that plaintiffs were aware of such
fact.  When the present action was filed
on May 26, 1964, plaintiffs
had been, therefore, in such possession, adversely for about eighteen (18)
years.  Moreover, the Purays
had acquired the land from Marciano Melgar and his daughter Pilar Melgar, as heir to the interest therein of her deceased
mother, Pilar Laude, who, together with Mariano Melgar, had bought it, on May 16, 1938, from Gaudioso Arcuino and Teresa and Diosdado Patombon.  Hence,
together with the possession of their predecessors in interest, the Purays had altogether 26 years of adverse possession in
their favor.  It is true that lands
registered under the Torrens system may not be acquired
by prescription; but, plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners.  They merely claim to have re­quired, by
succession, their alleged title or interest in Lot No. 355.  At any rate, plaintiffs herein are guilty oflaches.^[4]

In fact, the order complained of, denying the motion for
reconsideration above referred to, was predicated, mainly, upon the futility of
reinstating the case owing to the insurmountable
obstacles facing plaintiffs herein.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
It is alleged that Lourdes Arcuino has 3/12 or 6/24; Eleuteria Laude 1/8 or 3/24; Florencia
Patombon 1/12 or 2/24; and Angelita
Patombon 1/12 or 2/24.

^[2] Peralta
Vda. de Caina
v. Reyes, L-15792, May 30, 1960.

^[3] Smith BeIl & Co., et al. vs. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 94
Phil., 879; Matias vs. Teodoro, 54 Off. Gaz., 619; Benares Montelibano vs. Benares, 54 Off. Gaz., 3787; Adorable vs. Bonifacio,
L-10698, April 22, 1959; Flores
vs. Phil. Alien Property Administrator,
L-12741, April 28, 1960; Vernus-Sanciangco vs.
Sanciangco, L-16219, April 28, 1962; People vs. Cloribel,
et al., L-20314, August 31, 1964; and Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. vs. De la Cerna,
L-17631, October 19, 1966.

^[4] Mejia
de Lucas vs. Gamponia,
53 O.G. 677, 679.