CARLOS B. CREER, COMPLAINANT, VS. CONCORDIO L. FABILLAR, ACTING JUDGE, MCTC OF GIPORLOS-QUINAPUNDAN, PROVINCE OF E. SAMAR, RESPONDENT.

Creer versus Fabillar

The Case

This is an administrative case brought by Carlos Creer against Judge Concordio Fabillar, the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapundan in Eastern Samar. The complainant charges the judge with gross ignorance of the law, dishonesty, and abuse of official position, arising from the judge's handling of a criminal case for grave coercion in which the complainant was the accused. The case matters because it fixes the standard of legal competence demanded of every judge, and because it applies the rule that an application for probation cannot be entertained once the accused has perfected an appeal.

Procedural History

The administrative charge grew out of a criminal case for grave coercion in the municipal circuit trial court presided over by the respondent. The respondent judge convicted the complainant and sentenced him to imprisonment and a fine. The complainant appealed to the Regional Trial Court at Guiuan, Eastern Samar, which affirmed the conviction. The complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration. In a later decision, the Regional Trial Court gave due course to that motion and reversed the judgment of conviction. Meanwhile, the complainant filed this administrative complaint before the Supreme Court. The Court referred the matter to Judge Francisco Mazo of the Regional Trial Court at Guiuan for investigation, report, and recommendation. The investigating judge found the respondent guilty of ignorance of the law, and the Office of the Court Administrator concurred. The case then came before the Supreme Court as an original administrative matter.

Facts

In March 1993, the respondent judge found Carlos Creer guilty of grave coercion and sentenced him to two months and fifteen days of imprisonment plus a fine of 250 pesos. The complainant appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the conviction in February 1998. The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration.

In early March 1998, the respondent issued a subpoena commanding the complainant and his bondsman to appear on 10 March 1998. On that date, two of the three bondsmen appeared and submitted a withdrawal of their bonds. The respondent forthwith ordered the immediate apprehension of the complainant and fixed bail at 10,000 pesos. The complainant was arrested that afternoon and jailed until 13 March 1998. While detained, he was made to sign an application for probation and an application for release on recognizance. The respondent then gave due course to the probation application, placed the complainant under the custody of Antonia Creer on recognizance, and directed a post-sentence investigation.

On 22 May 1998, after receiving the probation officer's recommendation for disapproval, the respondent denied probation and revoked the recognizance. The complainant was arrested and confined a second time, from 22 May 1998 until 8 August 1998, the full term of his sentence. The complainant claimed this second confinement was due to his persistence in pursuing his appeal, of which the respondent was aware. The Regional Trial Court later reversed the conviction. It also appeared that the respondent had previously been held guilty of partiality, gross ignorance of the law, and grave abuse of discretion in an earlier administrative case, for which he was suspended for three months with a warning.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for acting on an application for probation despite the accused having already perfected an appeal.
• Whether or not the respondent judge erred in acting on the bondsmen's withdrawal of bonds instead of referring the matter to the appellate court.
• Whether or not the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator is the proper penalty under the circumstances.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, provides:

Section 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

This provision is decisive because the complainant had already perfected his appeal when he applied for probation, so the respondent had no authority to entertain the application at all.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent was guilty of ignorance of the law. It was undisputed that at the time the complainant applied for probation, an appeal had already been perfected. Although the respondent eventually denied the application, he still acted on it by ordering a post-sentence investigation instead of outrightly denying it as the law explicitly mandates. The Court stressed that observance of the law, which a judge is bound to know and sworn to uphold, is required of every judge, and that when the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the investigating judge that the respondent should not have acted on the plea for withdrawal of the bondsmen but should have referred the matter to the appellate court. Bondsmen should not be relieved of their obligation unless the custody of the accused would have first been relinquished by them to the Court or proper authorities.

On the third issue, the Court found the recommended penalty of dismissal too severe. After due deliberation, it considered a suspension of six months without pay, plus a fine of 20,000 pesos, to be warranted, with a new warning of a most severe penalty for another infraction.

Doctrine

Every judge is bound to know and sworn to uphold the law, and when the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Bondsmen may not be relieved of their obligation unless they have first relinquished custody of the accused to the Court or proper authorities, and a request for withdrawal of bonds should be referred to the appellate court.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and suspended him from the service for six months without pay, ordered him to pay a fine of 20,000 pesos, and warned him of a most severe penalty for any further infraction.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted once the defendant has perfected an appeal. Examiners use this case to test the interplay between appeal and probation, and to illustrate gross ignorance of the law as a ground for administrative liability of judges.