J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO ARANETA INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE RAFOR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal interposed by defendant Jose Rafor from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (in Civil Case
No. Q-3624) ordering him and all persons claiming under him to vacate
the lot in question owned by plaintiff J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., to
remove his 2 houses and other constructions thereon, to restore
possession thereof to plaintiff, to pay the latter the sum of P50.00 a
month from 1950, until plaintiff is restored to its possession, and to
pay the costs of the suit.

In the complaint originally filed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, it is alleged, among others, that plaintiff Tuason &
Co. is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as the Santa Mesa
Heights Subdivision, situated at Quezon City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1267 (37686-Rizal) of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, issued in its name; that as such registered owner,
plaintiff had been in peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof, when
sometime in 1950, defendant, without and against plaintiff’s consent,
through force, strategy, and stealth, unlawfully entered into the
possession of a portion of 400 square meters, more or less, within said
parcel of land of plaintiff, situated at Barrio North Tatalon, Quezon
City, and constructed his 2 houses thereon; and that as a result of the
acts of usurpation committed by defendant, plaintiff has suffered and
will continue to suffer damages at the rate of P120.00 monthly,
representing the fair rental value of its premises. Plaintiff prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering defendant and all persons claiming
under him to vacate the premises in question, remove his 2 houses and
other constructions thereon, and restore possession thereof to
plaintiff, and pay the latter the sum of P120.00 a month from the date
of usurpation, until plaintiff is restored to its possession, and to
pay the costs of the suit.

To this complaint, defendant filed his answer, alleging as special
defenses, that even before 1873 up to his death, one Telesforo Deudotf
was the sole owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in
Matalahib, Tatalon, and Masambong, Quezon City, with an area of 50
quinones, described in an abstract of the certificate of ownership
recorded in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds and Property
during the Spanish regime, issued in favor of Telesforo Deudor; that
said deceased Telesforo Deudor was in continuous, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said property as absolute owner thereof until his death
when he was succeeded in all his rights and interests therein by his
son Tomas Deudor, exclusively enjoying the crops produced thereon,
until a portion thereof was sold, transferred, and conveyed to Agustin
Torres, who succeeded him in all his rights of ownership and
possession, which portion contained an area and is described in Tax
Declaration No. 8524 of the assessment rolls of San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City; that as successor in interest of Tomas Deudor, and
while in continuous, peaceful, and adverse possession of the portion of
land conveyed to him by Tomas Deudor, Agustin Torres, on February 15,
1949, by way of absolute sale, conveyed and transferred to defendant a
portion thereof of approximately 250 square meters in area, as
evidenced by a public instrument executed and acknowledged before a
notary public; that immediately after said sale, defendant took
possession of said property, and since then up to the present, has been
in continuous, peaceful, and adverse possession thereof and has
introduced considerable improvements thereon; that the land sold by
Agustin Torres to defendant is part of the 400 square meter lot
described in the present complaint; that plaintiff or its
predecessor-in-interest has never been in possession of the property in
question at any time, while defendant’s predecessor-in-interest has
always been in continuous, peaceful, and adverse possession thereof for
more than 80 years as absolute owner; that sometime in 1950, Agustin
Torres, predecessor-in-interest of defendant, died and his legal wife
Rufina Guerrero succeeded to all his rights and interests over the
land; that prior to his death, cases regarding the land were filed and
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. Q-135, Q-169, Q-174, and Q-177 in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, which cases were terminated by
a Compromise Agreement dated March 16, 1953, wherein said Ruflna
Guerrero and other successors-in-interest of Telesforo Deudor
renounced, ceded, and waived all their rights, title, and interests in
the property, including the land already sold to herein defendant, in
favor of plaintiff herein, in consideration of the sum of
P1,201,063.00, which” were done without the knowledge and consent of
defendant; that judgment was rendered in said cases based on said
Compromise Agreement; that OCT No. 735 from which TCT 1267
(37868-Rizal) of plaintiff was derived, is null and void ab initio
and, therefore, the present action has already prescribed; that
plaintiff is not an innocent purchaser for value and said Compromise
Agreement having been made in consideration of P1,201,063.00, is not
legally a compromise agreement, but a contract of sale or cession and,
therefore, plaintiff is now estopped and is deemed to have waived its
right to invoke the indefeasibility of OCT No. 735 and all TCT’s
derived therefrom; and that said Compromise Agreement is a “negocio
juridico con caracter translativo de derecho” and, as such, has all the
effects of an absolute sale, and plaintiff became a second vendee in
bad faith as it acquired said property knowing it had already been
transferred to third persons and is aware that it was then in
continuous, peaceful, and adverse possession of defendant. Defendant
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. As counterclaim, he prayed
that OCT No. 735 and TCT No. 1267 (37686-Rizal) of plaintiff be
declared null and void ab initio; that if defendant is
declared not entitled to the land, that plaintiff be ordered to pay to
him Pl,200.00 as value of his improvements and to pay defendant
P5,000.00 as damages and P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees. This
counterclaim was answered by plaintiff on February 26, 1959.

Issues having been joined, the case was set for hearing for March 17, 1959.

On March 16, 1959, however, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that “there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause”, in that on February 27,1959, Rufina
Guerrero as successor-in-interest of Agustin Torres,
predecessor-in-interest of defendant Rafor, filed a complaint (Civil
Case No. Q-4057) in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City against
herein plaintiff, asking for reconveyance to her of a lot of 4
quifiones in area which covers and includes the lot involved in the
present action; that although said Rufina Guerrero is not a party to
the present action she and defendant represent the same interest, the
latter being her successor-in-interest; that the relief is founded on
the same facts, and the title or essential basis of the relief in the
present case and in that other case (Case No. Q-4057) are the same, and
any judgment rendered in Case No. Q-4057 on the merits would be
conclusive between the parties and could be pleaded in bar in the
present case.

When the present case was called for hearing on March 17, 1959,
defendant’s counsel verbally moved for postponement of the hearing, on
the ground that he has filed said motion to dismiss of March 16, 1959,
but the court denied said motion to postpone “considering that there
has already been an answer filed by the defendant in this case and that
such motion to dismiss is only for purposes of delay”. Hence, the case
was heard and the parties presented their respective evidence.

On March 23, 1959, the court rendered a decision which reads:

“Plaintiff adduced evidence tending to establish the
fact that it is a domestic corporation, duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines; that it is the registered owner of a
parcel of land known as the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision and located
at Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267 (Exh.
A) of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon “City; that
sometime in 1950, the herein defendant without and against the
plaintiff’s consent, through force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully
entered into the possession of a portion of 400 square meters, more or
less, of the aforesaid parcel of land of plaintiff situated at Barrio
North Tatalon, Quezon City, and constructed his house thereon, as shown
in the plan (Exh. B) and indicated therein as Exhibit B-1.

“Defendant,
on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that he acquired
the premises of a deed of sale (Exh. 2) executed in his favor on
February 15, 1949, and has been in possession of the same since then up
to the present time; that as wife and successor in interest of the late
Agustin de Torres, Rufina Guerrero was a party to the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties in certain civil cases filed in
court (Civil Cases Nos. Q-135, 139, 174, and 177 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City) which were terminated by virtue of decision
baaed on the compromise agreement.

“It appears, however, that
the herein defendant Jose Rafor, is not a party to the aforesaid
compromise agreement, nor is he a party to one of the above-mentioned
civil cases. While it is true that there is a deed of sale executed by
Agustin de Torres in, favor of the defendant herein, the same, however,
is not a proper deed of sale for all purposes, because the subject
matter thereof is a property which already titled to another party, not
the vendor therein. As a matter of fact, the title of the property in
question which is a portion of the lot of plaintiff has been issued to
plaintiff since May 29, 1939, whereas the herein deed of sale exhibited
by defendant covering a portion of 400 square meters within the said
title of plaintiff has been executed only last February 15, 1949. There
is no question, therefore, that the herein plaintiff is entitled to the
possession of the property in question and recover the same from the
defendant, and that the evidence of (record militates in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant in this case.

“Wherefore,
judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff, and against the defendant
Jose Rafor, by ordering the defendant Jose Rafor and all persons
claiming under him to vacate the premises in question, to remove his
two houses and other construction therefrom, and restore possession
thereof to plaintiff; by ordering the same defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of P50.00 per month from the date of usurpation of
the same in 1950 until plaintiff is restored to the possession thereof;
and by ordering the same defendant to pay the costs. “So ordered.”

Dissatisfied, the defendant gave notice that “he appeals to the
Supreme Court on questions of law from the decision rendered by the
Court”.

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

“1. The trial court erred in denying the motion for postponement of trial and/or summarily denying the motion to dismiss.

“2.
The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint, or if not, the
trial thereof suspended until Civil Case No. Q-4057 is finally
determined.

“3. That trial court erred in ordering the
defendant to vacate the premises in question and to remove his two
houses and other construction from the date of usurpation until
plaintiff is restored to the possession thereof.”

Considered together, we find no merit in the first two assignments
of error. Under Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a motion to
dismiss for any of the grounds therein enumerated—pendency of another
action is one of them— must be filed ‘Within the time for pleading”,
that is, within the time to answer (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court [1952 Ed.] 190). Appellant, in the instant case, filed his motion
to dismiss on March 16, 1959, or 25 days after he filed his answer to
plaintiff’s complaint on February 19, 1959, and on the very eve of the
hearing of the case on the merits set for March 17, 1959. On the other
hand, even granting that (a) the parties in the two cases represent the same interest, (b) assert the same rights or pray for the same relief and, (c)
the relief is founded on the same facts—three of the requisites of lis
pendens—still, the fourth requisites, that the judgment to be rendered
in the first case, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res juticata against the second action,^[1]
is not present here. For, if Tuason & Co. wins in the first case,
the present action should still proceed to judgment to determine the
liability of defendant Refor for his unlawful detention of the
property. In the circumstances, the trial court was not in error in
denying the motion to dismiss and the petition for postponement
predicated on said motion.

Appellant predicates his last assigned error on his allegedly being
a builder in good faith. This raises a question of fact which we are
not authorized to review. Since appellant has specifically appealed
from the decision, of the court a quo questions of law, we
are bound by the factual findings therein. Needless to say, there is
nothing in said decision to show that appellant is, indeed, a builder
in good faith as he claims. Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all respects, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs. Aldecoa & Co., 30 Phil. 265, 274-5; Olayvar vs. Olayvar, G.R. No. L-8088, Nov. 29, 1955.