G.R. No. L-30526. November 29, 1971
BATAMA FARMERS’ COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. AND IGNACIO VICENTE, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE INOCENCIO ROSAL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE …
MAKASIAR, J.:
On December 11, 1968, respondent Antonio Villegas filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental in Civil Case No. 4784, for injunction and damages with prayer for a restraining order against the
petitioners, claiming that since he already resigned as a member of petitioner
BATAMA Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. as of July 10, 1968,
and revoked, effective August 30, 1968, the “Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney” which he executed in favor of said BATAMA Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., said
association and its agents should be enjoined from continuing or trying to
continue, with the authority of the 1967-1968 “Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney,” in the management, production, milling, and
marketing of his sugar cane and sugar cane products for the crop year
1968-1969 and succeeding crop years, or from doing or performing any act or
acts thereunder (pp. 1-2, Petition; Appendix
“A”, pp. 18-22, rec.).
On December 18, 1968,
the petitioners filed their Answer denying the material averments of the
complaint and asserting affirmative defenses and counterclaims (p. 3, Petition;
Appendix “G”, pp. 24-27, rec.).
On January 6, 1969, respondent Juan Teves,
claiming to have a legal interest in the subject matter of respondent Antonio
Villegas’ complaint or in the success of the latter, because “he has a
common cause of action with the plaintiff, i.e., the lack of authority of defendant
association to act on the strength of the already-expired ‘Marketing Agreement
and Power of Attorney’s”, filed, thru the same counsel of respondent Antonio
Vilegas, an urgent motion for intervention. Attached, to said motion was his proposed complaint-in-intervention,
in which
he averred, among others, that as a sugar cane planter, he joined defendant
association as a member and in 1967, signed with the association a
“Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney” similar in substance as
to terms and conditions to the “Marketing Agreement and Power of
Attorney” of plaintiff Antonio Villegas with said association (pp. 3-4,
Petition; Appendices “D” and “D-1”, pp. 29-35, rec.).
On January 21, 1969, petitioners filed their opposition to
urgent motion for intervention, alleging that Juan Teves‘ “Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney” with defendant BATAMA Farmers’
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., is entirely distinct and separate from
the “Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney” of plaintiff Antonio
Villegas; that accordingly, a breach or grievance arising out of one agreement,
no matter how similar it may be to a breach or grievance arising out of another
or separate agreement with another person, both in the manner of the infliction
and in the remedy for the redress thereof, does not and cannot give rise to a
so-called “common cause of action” that will justify intervention, or
stated differently, that the rights of movant Juan Teves under his “Marketing Agreement and Power of
Attorney” with defendant association are so entirely distinct and separate
from the rights of plaintiff Antonio Villegas under the latter’s separate
“Marketing Agreement and Power of
Attorney” with same defendant association, that their enforcement cannot
be joined in one action or complaint; and that the proposed intervenor’s
rights are not of such nature that they may not be fully protected in a
separate proceeding (Appendix “H”, pp. 40-42, rec.).
Private respondents filed their rejoinder to the opposition to
the urgent motion for intervention dated February 5, 1969, asserting, among
others, that as “plaintiff-in-intervention has certainly an interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of the plaintiff, since he has a
common cause of action with the plaintiff,”
the intervention is in order (Appendix “J”, pp. 45-46, rec.)
On March 15, 1969, respondent judge issued an order
(Appendix “K”, p. 47, rec.)
admitting respondent Juan Teves‘
complaint-in-intervention, on the ground that it “is in due form and
substance and that it has been shown that he has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of the plaintiff.”
On March 27, 1969,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the last-mentioned order on
the ground that said order is contrary to the facts and the law of the case
(Appendix “L”, pp. 48-50, rec.).
This motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent judge “for
lack of sufficient merits” in an order dated May 7, 1969 (Appendix “M”, p. 51, rec.).
On May 12, 1969,
petitioners filed an ex parte
motion for extension of time to plead to respondent Juan Teves‘
complaint-in-intervention (Appendix “N”, p. 52, rec.).
On May 14, 1969,
petitioners filed an urgent motion for suspension of proceedings on the
complaint-in-intervention of respondent Juan Teves
(Appendix “P”, pp. 54-56, rec.).
Acting on said motion, respondent judge, on May 15, 1969, issued an
order, as prayed for, suspending the proceedings insofar as the
complaint-in-intervention of Juan Teves is concerned,
in order to afford the petitioners an opportunity to test before the appellate
courts the validity of its order dated March 15, 1969, allowing the
intervention of respondent Juan Teves, giving the
petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days for said purpose (Appendix “Q”,
p. 57, rec.).
On May 27, 1969, the present petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction was filed with this Court,
petitioners praying among others for the annulment of the order of respondent
Judge dated March 15, 1969 allowing
respondent Juan Teves‘ complaint-in-intervention, as
well as his order dated May 7, 1969 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the aforestated order dated March
15, 1969, and to disallow, as a consequence, respondent Juan Teves‘ complaint- in-intervention (p. 16, Petition).
On June 28, 1969, this Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, ordering respondent Judge to refrain from taking any action on respondent Juan Teves‘
complaint-in-intervention until
further orders from this Court (pp. 64-65, rec.).
As clearly stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court,
to be permitted to intervene in a pending action, the party must have a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both,
or he must be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof.
The legal interest must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant. If the party who has no true interest in the
subject matter of the action would be allowed to intervene, the proceedings
will become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable, which contravenes
the policies of the law.[1]
Herein private respondent Juan Teves
signed a separate independent contract with herein petitioner Association. Nobody else, much less herein private
respondent Villegas, signed the said contract with him. Herein private respondent Villegas has
likewise a separate independent contract with herein petitioner Association,
which he alone signed, without any intervention on the part of herein private
respondent Teves.
Consequently, private respondent Teves has no
legal interest in the subject matter of the contract signed by herein private
respondent Villegas with petitioner Association. The fact that their respective separate,
distinct and independent contracts with herein petitioner Association contain
the same identical terms and conditions with respect to the management,
production, milling and marketing of their sugar cane, milled sugar and the
by-products thereof, does not create in favor of private respondent Teves a legal interest in the contract of private
respondent Villegas or vice versa.
Whatever may happen to the sugar cane, milled sugar, and its by-products
belonging to private respondent Villegas which are the subject matter of the
contract between him and herein petitioner Association, or any breach of the
terms of said agreement, is no concern of herein private respondent Juan Teves. Consequently,
any decision that may be rendered in the case filed by herein private
respondent Villegas against herein petitioner Association on the basis of
Villegas’ contract with petitioner Association, will not affect one way or the
other the interest of herein private respondent Juan Teves
under his own contract with herein petitioner Association. Respondent Teves is
a total stranger to, and therefore has no legal interest in, the contract of
respondent Villegas with petitioner Association.[2]
A mere collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation cannot
justify intervention.[3]
The interest of herein
private respondent Juan Teves in the contract between
herein private respondent Villegas and herein petitioner Association, cannot be
likened to the interest of:
(1) an unpaid vendor who claims right of preference over the proceeds of
the sale of the properties he sold to a partnership under dissolution, by
reason of which such unpaid vendor may validly intervene in the dissolution and distribution of the proceeds of the
property of the partnership;[4]
(2) a third party who claims preference over the mortgaged property sought
to be foreclosed, which
interest justifies intervention,[5]
unless said third party is
merely a general unsecured creditor;[6]
(3) the heirs in the hereditary estate of a decedent, who believe that the
acts of a judicial administrator are prejudicial to their interests;[7]
(4) the Republic of the Philippines, which can properly intervene in an action instituted by a
Filipino citizen against the Philippine Alien Property Administration of the
United States for the return of a parcel of land of which said entity divested an enemy corporation of all title and
rights and transferred the same to the United States government, because under
the Property Act of 1946, such properties will have to be transferred to the
Republic of the Philippines;[8]
(5) the possessor of parcels of land, which are the subject matter of an
action filed by a judicial administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband against another party seeking the annulment of a
deed of sale over said parcels of land, some of which parcels were the
exclusive property of her deceased husband and the others were conjugal
property;[9]
(6) the unpaid supplier of construction materials, who by reason thereof
can intervene in an action by the plaintiff for damages against the defendant contractor who abandoned
the unfinished construction of a hospital;[10]
(7) the alleged purchaser of the estate of the deceased who was allowed to
intervene in the probate of the will and testament of the said deceased;[11]
(8)
the transferee or assignee of the
insured’s interest in his insurance policy, who was allowed to intervene in an
action filed by the insured against the insurance company to recover on his
policy under an agreement to pay certain fees to the attorney employed in the
litigation, because the transferee or assignee would in the end have to pay for
such attorney’s fees;[12]
(9) an alleged natural daughter of the decedent to intervene in the probate
of his will, upon the production of a prima facie evidence
of her civil status,[13]
although only such heirs whose rights have been prejudiced can intervene in the
case of this character;[14]
(10)
an heir who can intervene in order
to protect the interest of the deceased, when the judicial administrator fails
to interpose the necessary and effective legal defenses in an action for the
recovery of a claim rejected by the committee on claims and appraisal;[15]
(11)
a testamentary heir who may
properly intervene in a civil action filed against the administratrix
of the estate of the deceased
to recover the unpaid balance on a promissory note signed by the deceased and
his wife, where the wife alleges that the said promissory note is fictitious,
without consideration and was obtained through fraud;[16]
(12)
an heir to intervene in the
probate of a will and distribution of the testatrix’s estate at any time after
the court acquired jurisdiction over the estate and establishes his right to
participate in the final distribution or disposition thereof;[17]
(13)
an alleged partner of the deceased
to intervene in the approval of the accounts of the said deceased on the
allegations that he and the deceased during his lifetime had formed a
partnership which was dissolved upon the death of one of the partners;[18]
or
(14)
the intervenor
seeking possession of the vessel solely from the plaintiff who tried to remove
from the defendant the possession of said vessel.[19]
The interest of the herein private respondent Teves
does not even approximate the interest of a party whose intervention was
disallowed in the following cases:
(1) one who claims that the goods sold by the plaintiff to the defendant
were acquired from him, cannot intervene in the case, where it was found that the sale by the intervenor to the plaintiff and the sale by plaintiff
to the defendant were two separate and distinct sales which had been
consummated (similar to the case at bar) and such intervention would only
result in delay in the adjudication of the right of parties and the claim of
the intervenor could be better threshed out in a
separate proceeding;[20]
(2)
in an action filed against the
defendant for the recovery of
the value of a certain promissory note, the heirs of the deceased
husband of the defendant, who on the date of the execution of the note was
already married to another, cannot intervene as they have no sufficient legal
interest as their interest in the property of the deceased is, if not conjectural,
contingent and expectant;[21]
(3) in an action for partition of property of a deceased person where an
amicable settlement was reached whereby one of the defendants ceded his interest and title in a parcel of
land to the plaintiff, a third party who claims that the said land ceded in the
amicable settlement had already been adjudicated to them by the cadastral
court, cannot properly intervene as the proceeding is in personam, not in rem, and therefore he is not bound by the amicable settlement;[22]
(4) in an action for the
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, the collector of
internal revenue cannot properly intervene on the ground that the two
defendants in said cases were indebted to the government for a deficiency in a
specific tax;[23]
(5) the owner of merchandise
lost by reason of a collision between two vessels, may not be allowed to
intervene in an action
between the owners of the two steamships for damages;[24]
(6)
neither a mere creditor can
intervene in a foreclosure suit since he has no right to the property
litigated;[25]
when the rights of the intervenor may be fully
protected in the separate proceedings, the intervention should be disallowed.[26]
A fortiori the intervention of herein private respondent Teves should have been disallowed by the trial court, which erred in so permitting
his intervention in the case filed by
private respondent. Villegas
against herein petitioner Association.
While it is true that the
motion for intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
(Section 2[b], Rule 12, Rules of
Court), such discretion however
is not without limitations.[27]
Intervention should be denied when it
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the right of the parties;[28] or when the claim of the intervenor
can be properly decided in a separate proceeding[29] like the claim of respondent Teves.
To sustain the position of private respondent Juan Teves would be to permit persons similarly situated as he is, to save
on filing fees and other expenses of litigation by just intervening in cases
analogous to the case filed by private respondent Villegas against herein
petitioner Association.
There are numerous borrowers from financing institutions and
purchasers on credit from industrial concerns from Batanes
in the North down to Sulu in the South executing identical contracts with the same terms and
conditions. Following the logic of
herein private respondent Juan Teves, the moment one
borrower or purchaser on credit files a suit on the basis of his contract with the creditor firm, all other
customers of such firm with similar contracts can intervene in such suit. Such absurdity can never be envisioned as permissible under
the rules on intervention.
The respondent Judge therefore committed a grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the intervention of private respondent Juan Teves
in Civil Case No. 4784.
As a consequence, private respondent Juan Teves
should file against herein petitioner Association a separate action, which may
be heard jointly with Civil Case No. 4784, should the court and the parties
find it feasible and convenient.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted; the orders of
respondent Judge dated March 15, 1969 and May 7, 1969 are hereby set aside as
null and void; and the motion for
intervention and the complaint filed by private respondent Juan Teves are hereby denied and disallowed, with costs against
private respondents Antonio Villegas and Juan Teves.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Garcia, etc. vs. David, et.
al., 67 Phil. 279; Hacienda Sapang Palay Tenants League vs. Yatco, L-14651, Sept. 29, 1960.
[2]
Garcia vs. David, supra.
[3]
The Lottawanna
(William vs. Ball), 20 Wall. (U.S.) 201, 22 L. ed. 259.
[4]
Torres vs. Genato,
7 Phil. 204.
[5]
International Banking Corporation vs.
Corrales, 10 Phil. 435.
[6]
International Banking Corporation vs.
Corrales, 14 Phil. 360.
[7]
Dais vs. CFI of Capiz, 51 Phil. 396.
[8]
Rep. of the Phil. vs. Ysip, L-3928, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 535, 540.
[9]
Sta. Romana,
et. al.
vs. Barrios, 63 Phil. 456, 458-60.
[10]
Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Stamatelaky, et. al., 65 Phil. 206.
[11]
Mirasol vs. Magsusi,
et. al., L-12166, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 1284.
[12]
Gmur, Inc. vs. Revilla,
55 Phil. 604.
[13]
Asinas vs. Court, 51 Phil. 665.
[14]
Gutierrez del Campo vs. Varela,
59 Phil. 631.
[15]
Adriano vs. Obleada,
et. al., 58 Phil. 302.
[16]
Adriano vs. Obleeda, supra.
[17]
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855.
[18]
Villanueva vs. de Leon, 47 Phil. 780.
[19]
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Company,
L-6060, Sept. 30, 1954,
95 Phil. 905.
[20]
Evans vs. Soriano,
et. al., L-9033, April 30, 1956, 98 Phil. 1008.
[21]
Garcia, et. al. vs. David, 67
Phil. 279.
[22]
Bool vs. Mendoza, L-5539, April 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 892, 894.
[23]
Rizal Surety vs. Tan, 83 Phil. 732.
[24]
Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco
River Plantation Co., 26 Phil. 632.
[25]
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Aldecoa & Do., etc., 30 Phil. 255
[26]
Pfleider vs. de Britanico,
L-19077, Oct. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 222.
[27]
Jerez, et. al. vs. Nietes,
et. al., L-26876, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 904, 911.
[28]
Balane, et. al. vs. de Guzman, L-21281, May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 177-79; Evans vs.
Soriano, et. al.,
supra; Rizal Surety vs. Tan, 83 Phil.
732.
[29]
Bool vs. Mendoza,
supra; Pfleider vs. Britanico,
L-19077, Oct. 30, 1964, 12
SCRA 222.