REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY FRAN­CISCO F. SAGUIGUIT, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMIS­SIONER OF THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, PETITIONER VS. HON. ALEJANDRO …

Republic versus Tagum Municipal Council

The Case

This is Republic of the Philippines versus the Mayor and Municipal Council of Tagum, Davao del Norte, decided by the Supreme Court in July 1976. The Republic, represented by the Commissioner of the Agricultural Productivity Commission, sued the municipal officials to nullify a municipal resolution that partitioned and allocated a government agricultural nursery to other offices, and to restrain the municipality from bulldozing the site. The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was really an action for forcible entry, outside his court's jurisdiction. The case matters because it teaches how a court fixes the subject matter of an action: not by the label a party chooses, and not by the relief the facts might support, but by the nature and character of the pleadings and the issues the parties actually submit for trial and judgment.

Procedural History

The Republic filed a complaint for injunction, both preliminary and permanent, in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, against the Mayor and the Municipal Council of Tagum. The respondents moved to dismiss, and later filed an amended answer raising special defenses: that there was a presumed grant of the land in favor of the municipality, and that the action was one of forcible entry beyond the court's jurisdiction. The trial judge issued an order dismissing the complaint, ruling that it was actually an action for forcible entry with preliminary injunction and that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Republic brought the matter to the Supreme Court by appeal by certiorari, assigning a single error: that the lower court erred in treating the action as one of forcible entry.

Facts

The national government owns two parcels of public land in Magugpo, Tagum, Davao del Norte, with a total area of about seventy four thousand five hundred twenty seven square meters. Since 1938 these parcels had been used continuously, openly, publicly, peacefully, and adversely as a demonstration station or nursery, first by the Bureau of Plant Industry, later by the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, and then by the Agricultural Productivity Commission, serving as a demonstration center for the farm population of the province.

On March 2, 1972, the Municipal Council of Tagum passed Resolution Number 78, approving the partition and segregation of the property to different government offices for various purposes. The Republic alleged that the resolution was enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction and was therefore a patent nullity. The Commissioner of the Agricultural Productivity Commission sent a telegram to the Provincial Agriculturist advising that the Commission retain the property as its rightful occupant.

Despite that objection, the respondent Mayor ordered the bulldozing of the site and allied activities toward developing the area for the purposes stated in the resolution, and men under his command began bulldozing the area. The Republic pleaded that this would destroy the nursery layout, waste government funds, and frustrate a continuing public need for the nursery. It prayed that the resolution be declared void, that the respondents be enjoined, and that the injunction be made permanent.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the Republic's action was one of forcible entry and therefore beyond its jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the question of possession of the land can be decided without first settling the question of ownership, that is, whether the land belongs to the Municipality of Tagum or is public land under the exclusive control and authority of the national government.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which defines the summary action for forcible entry, provides:

Section 1. Who may bring action. The person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, shall present his complaint to the proper Court of First Instance or justice of the peace court of the municipality or municipal district in which the property is situated, against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving possession of the same, or any person or persons claiming under them, at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

This is the provision the trial court invoked, and the Court measured the complaint against its elements: prior possession lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred. The settled rule is that the subject matter of a given case is determined, not by the nature of the action that a party is entitled under the facts and the laws to bring, but by the nature and character of the pleadings and issues submitted by the parties to the court for trial and judgment. To ascertain jurisdiction, the Court relied on the allegations of the complaint, the truth of which is theoretically admitted in considering a motion to dismiss. Those allegations showed an ordinary action to nullify Resolution Number 78 as enacted in excess of authority, to restrain the municipality from interfering with the use of government owned property as an agricultural nursery, and to make the injunction permanent. The Court explained what must be proven in forcible entry:

The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that the same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.

The prayer for restoration of possession, the Court said, was merely incidental to the principal purpose of nullifying the resolution and preventing interference in the administration or use of the property.

On the second issue, the Court held that possession could not be decided without first settling ownership. The municipality's power to administer or dispose of the property by allocating portions to the District Land Office and the Provincial Engineer logically depended on whether there was a presumed grant of the lot in favor of the municipality by the State, since it was not denied that the parcel is public land. Two requisites are necessary before a grant of land to a municipal corporation by the State may be presumed: that the land is one which the municipality itself can exclusively own, and that the land is used to meet a public necessity. Because the question of possession was inextricably linked with the question of ownership, the action could not be the summary action for forcible entry under the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court.

Doctrine

First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the nature and character of the pleadings and issues submitted, not by the name or form of the action a party might have brought. Second, in forcible entry under Section 1 of Rule 70, the main thing to be proven is prior possession lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and the court restores possession regardless of title or ownership. Third, where the determination of possession is inextricably linked with the resolution of ownership, the action is not a summary action for forcible entry but an ordinary action within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Fourth, a presumed grant of land from the State in favor of a municipality requires that the land be one the municipality can exclusively own and that it be used to meet a public necessity; agricultural or commercial lands do not qualify.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the trial court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for trial on the merits, with no special pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line that jurisdiction is fixed by the nature and character of the pleadings and issues, not by the label of the action. Examiners use this case to test whether a complaint that prays for restoration of possession is truly forcible entry, or an ordinary action for nullity and injunction where ownership must first be settled.