ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO BANZON AND ROSA BALMACEDA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS.

Associated Insurance and Surety versus Banzon

The Case

This is an appeal by Antonio Banzon and Rosa Balmaceda from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting a petition filed by Associated Insurance and Surety Company, Incorporated. The petition asked the court to order Banzon to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Rizal his owner's duplicates of two transfer certificates of title, so that they could be cancelled and new titles issued in the name of the insurance company, which had bought the covered lots at an execution sale. The case matters because it gathers in one decision three rules every reviewee must carry: the presumption of regularity of official proceedings, including the service of summons; the burden of proof that falls on the party who attacks a final judgment for want of jurisdiction over his person; and the rule that registered title in the name of one spouse defeats a bare claim that the land is conjugal.

Procedural History

The story begins in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch Four, in a civil case for a sum of money brought by the insurance company against Maximo Santa Maria and Antonio Banzon. Judgment was rendered against the defendants, solidarily liable, for several amounts with interest, attorney's fees, and costs. That judgment became final and executory. A writ of execution issued, the properties of Banzon covered by two transfer certificates of title were levied upon, and after the proceedings required by law the properties were sold at public auction to the insurance company as the highest bidder. The period of redemption expired without being exercised, and the purchaser obtained the final certificate of sale, duly registered.

When Banzon refused to surrender his owner's duplicates, the insurance company filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, asking that he be ordered to present the duplicates for cancellation and that the Register of Deeds be directed to issue new titles in the petitioner's name. Banzon opposed, claiming that the Manila judgment was void as to him because he had never been summoned, and that the levy and sale were void because the lots were conjugal property of himself and his wife. The Rizal court ruled for the petitioner and ordered the oppositors to surrender the certificates for cancellation. The Banzons appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the same two grounds.

Facts

In the Manila collection case, the insurance company obtained a final judgment against Maximo Santa Maria and Antonio Banzon. Execution followed. The sheriff levied on two parcels of land, each containing 650 square meters, situated in Barrio Calaanan, Caloocan, Rizal, and covered by transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Antonio Banzon. The properties were sold at public auction for a total of 41,000 pesos, the insurance company being the highest bidder. The certificate of sale was issued in June 1957 and registered in June 1959. The redemption period expired in June 1960 without anyone exercising the right of redemption, so the final certificate of sale was issued and registered.

The insurance company then demanded that Banzon deliver his owner's duplicates of the two certificates, and he refused. That refusal led to the petition in the Rizal court.

In his opposition, Banzon insisted that he had never been served with summons in the Manila case, and that the lots were conjugal property of himself and his wife, Rosa Balmaceda. The records of the Manila case, however, showed that the proceedings there had been conducted by counsel for all the defendants, including Banzon. Banzon had also received the notice of execution and levy and the notice of sale at public auction, yet he filed no third party claim and sought no injunction, and he allowed the sale to be consummated and the redemption period to lapse. The certificates of title stood in his name alone, and there was no sufficient evidence that the lots were acquired during the marriage.

Issues

• Whether or not the Manila judgment was void as to Antonio Banzon for want of service of summons upon him.
• Whether or not the levy and execution sale of the two parcels were void because the parcels were conjugal property of the spouses Banzon and Balmaceda.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific article or section of a statute. It rests on the fundamental rule of evidence on the presumption of regularity of official actions, which the trial court stated and the Supreme Court adopted, and on the constitutional guarantee against deprivation of property without due process of law, which the trial court invoked in these words:

If the contention of the oppositor were true, that is, no summons was ever served upon him and that he was completely unaware of the proceedings in the civil case aforementioned, the properties in question could not be levied upon for that would amount to a deprivation of oppositor's property without due process of law.

That guarantee fixes the stakes: a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the person cannot support a levy, which is why the Court examines who bore the burden of proving the want of summons.

The presumption itself was stated by the trial court in the passage the Supreme Court quoted with approval:

It is a fundamental rule that the regularity of all official actions and proceedings will be presumed until the contrary is proved.

This presumption supplies the rule of proof that decides the first issue.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal was without merit. The trial court's reasoning, quoted at length and adopted, is this: the objection that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not waived where no summons was served at all, because waiver applies only where summons was served although defectively. But the burden rests on the oppositor to prove that there was in fact no service, and Banzon failed to substantiate this with sufficient evidence. The regularity of official actions and proceedings is presumed until the contrary is proved. The records of the Manila case, particularly the answer and the motion to dismiss, showed that counsel acted for all the defendants, including Banzon, so the presumption stands that either summons was duly served or that Banzon voluntarily appeared without it. To rebut that presumption, the oppositors needed competent evidence such as the sheriff's return, and they offered none.

The Court added that the circumstances strengthened the presumption. Banzon received the notice of execution and levy and the notice of sale at public auction. Had he truly been deprived of due process, he should have filed a third party claim on the levied property or sought an injunction to stop the sale, and he should not have allowed the sale to be consummated and the one year redemption period to lapse. These facts told against the opposition and suggested that the properties were not conjugal, or that if they were, the debt redounded to the benefit of the family, for which the conjugal partnership may be held liable.

On the second issue, the Court held that the claim of conjugal ownership was belied by the record, which showed that the two transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of Antonio Banzon alone. There was, moreover, no sufficient evidence that the properties were acquired during the marriage. The claim therefore failed.

Doctrine

First, the regularity of official actions and proceedings is presumed until the contrary is proved. A party who asserts that he was never served with summons bears the burden of rebutting that presumption with competent evidence, such as the sheriff's return, and a bare assertion will not do.

Second, the objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is deemed waived only where summons was served although defectively; it is not waived where no summons was served at all. But the party raising it must first prove the want of service.

Third, a judgment that has become final and executory, followed by a levy, a public sale, the lapse of the redemption period, and the issuance of the final certificate of sale, will not be disturbed at the instance of a debtor who received the notices of execution, levy, and sale, yet filed no third party claim and sought no injunction.

Fourth, a claim that levied land is conjugal property is defeated by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of one spouse alone, coupled with the absence of sufficient evidence that the land was acquired during the marriage.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, with costs, so the insurance company prevailed and the Banzons were ordered to surrender the certificates of title for cancellation and the issuance of new ones in the company's name.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the regularity of official proceedings is presumed until the contrary is proved, and the burden of proving that no summons was ever served lies on the party who attacks the judgment. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between no service of summons and defective service, and to test who bears the burden of proof when a final judgment and an execution sale are collaterally attacked.