THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ISABELO MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. CARLOS CARAMONTE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

There is an attempt here by the State to appeal from a judgment
of acquittal, the prosecuting fiscal evidently nurturing the deeply rooted
belief that the decision sought to be reviewed constituted a flagrant act of
maladministration of justice.  That may
well be so; such instances, though rare, have been known to happen before and
may occur again.  After all the
fallibility of human judgment is one of the facts of life.  As so aptly noted, there is no guarantee of
justice in the long run except the personality of the judge.^[1]

Nonetheless, this appeal by the State is doomed to fail.  It cannot be given due course.  That is the teaching of our decisions,
impressive both as to number and as to certitude, on that particular point.

This appeal started with a communication of September 30, 1968
from the Deputy Clerk of Court of the 12th Judicial District forwarding to us
the record of People v. Caramonte,^[2]
including the minutes of the proceeding and the lists of exhibits presented
during the trial, an appeal having been interposed by the Acting City Fiscal of
Cadiz City against the decision of September 7, 1968, rendered by the Presiding
Judge, acquitting the accused, Carlos Caramonte.  Then came on October 7, 1968, an urgent
motion ex parte for leave to file a
memorandum in support of appeal by the Acting City Fiscal Zulueta
of Cadiz, Negros Occi­dental, wherein it was alleged
that there was a decision of acquittal, that the original records had already
been forwarded to us and that since the appeal was unusual “and in view of
the enormity of the injustice” allegedly perpetrated by the trial Judge,
he would plead for the opportunity to file a memorandum to support the step
taken by him of appealing from such judgment of acquittal.

We then issued a resolution under date of October 16, 1968, requiring the Solicitor
General to comment within ten days from notice on such urgent motion of Acting
City Fiscal Zulueta. 
On November 29, 1968, after three extensions were granted, the then
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of
this Court, filed his comment expressing the view that “the appeal invoked
by the Acting City Fiscal from said judgment will constitute double jeopardy
which should not be allowed.”

The comment thus
submitted by the then Solicitor General is fully supported by the applicable
decisions.  The appeal, to repeat, should
be dismissed.

In the first case decided by us after the Constitution took
effect, People v. Bringas,^[3]
we rejected the contention of the then Solicitor General that the doctrine in Kepner v. United States^[4]
be overruled.  In that case, it was held
by the United States Supreme Court that under the first organic act, the
Philippine Bill of 1902, applicable to the Philippines
during the period of American adminis­tration, an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal by the State would be obnoxious to the principle of double
jeopardy.  We made clear in the Bringas decision that none of the reasons adduced in
support of a plea for the adoption of a new doctrine was of sufficient weight
to induce a modification of the prevailing rule, adhered to for many years, one
which is moreover in consonance with the governing constitutional provision.

In our first decision after liberation, People v. Hernandez,^[5]
such a doctrine was once again adhered to, it being stressed by us that an
appeal after a judgment of dismissal places the accused in a second
jeopardy.  Subsequently, a lower court
decision, that aroused public interest in view of the notorious acts of the
accused therein and the penalty being considered rather light, the accused having killed the pilot and
the purser of a plane, was appealed to us. 
Not­withstanding the force of the argument advanced by the then
Solicitor General, we had to dismiss such appeal in view of the aforesaid Kepner ruling.  We
likewise had occasion to stress: “‘No error, however, flagrant, committed
by the court against the state, can be reserved by it for decision by the
supreme court when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and
discharged, even though the discharge was the result of the error committed’.”^[6]

Then shortly after, in 1955,
came People v. Pomeroy.^[7]
One of the several accused pleaded guilty as a result of which the penalty of
twelve years prision correccional
was imposed by the lower court for the crime of rebellion charged in the
information.  Again, the prosecution
under the belief that a more severe penalty should have been meted out elevated
the matter to us.  The first question,
according to the opinion of the present Chief Justice, was whether such an
appeal could prosper? Relying on People v. Ang Cho Kio, he answered the question
in the negative.

The opinion of the present Chief Justice likewise contained the
following: “The prosecution in the case at bar urges a re­examination of
the question decided in the Ang Cho
Kio and a reconsideration of the view therein
expressed by this Court.  To our mind,
however, the reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in support of his pretense
are not sufficiently weighty to warrant a reversal of said view which is a mere
corollary of the practice established in the Philippines and in the United
States, for so long a time as to form part and parcel, not merely of the
settled juris­prudence, but, also, of the constitutional law, in both
jurisdictions.”^[8]

It is thus crystal
clear that the appeal in the present case does not lie.  The accepted doctrine on double jeopardy,
compelling us to respect a judgment of acquittal by virtue of
such a guarantee, constitutes an insurmountable barrier.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed, without pronounce­ment
as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Cardozo quoting Ehrlich, The Nature of Judicial
Process, pp. 16-17 (1921).

^[2]
L-29599.

^[3]
70 Phil. 528 (1940).

^[4]
195 US 100
(1904); 11 Phil. 669.

^[5]  94 Phil. 49 (1953).

^[6]
State v. Rook, 49 L.R.A. 186, 61
Kan. 382, 59 Pac. 653, as quoted in People v. Ang Cho Kio,
95 Phil. 475, 480. 

^[7]
97 Phil. 927.

^[8]
Ibid, p. 940. See also
People v. Paet, 100
Phil. 357 (1956); People v. Sanchez, 101 Phil. 745 (1957) and People v.
Cabarles, 102 Phil.
926 (1958).