REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GABRIEL V. VALERO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, AND ANTONIO TAN, RESPONDENTS.

Republic versus Valero

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Judge Gabriel Valero, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, and against the private respondent Antonio Tan. The Republic asks the Supreme Court to annul the entire naturalization proceedings that culminated in the grant of Filipino citizenship to Tan, to cancel the certificate of naturalization issued to him, and to compel the respondent judge to approve the Government's record on appeal. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest statement that there is no such thing as citizenship by estoppel, and that a naturalization granted in proceedings where the Government was denied its day in court is void from the start and may be cancelled at any time.

Procedural History

Antonio Tan filed his petition for naturalization before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, where it was docketed as a naturalization case. On the scheduled initial hearing, the trial court refused to allow the Assistant Provincial Fiscal to appear for lack of written authority from the Solicitor General, proceeded to receive Tan's evidence ex parte, and on the same day rendered judgment granting the petition. The Government, through the Acting City Attorney of Lucena City acting on instructions of the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal, but the trial court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Solicitor General had no personality to appeal, not having filed any opposition, and that the appeal was filed out of time. Tan later moved to be allowed to take his oath, and over the Government's opposition the respondent judge issued an order allowing the oath taking and directing the issuance of the certificate. Tan took his oath on the very day the Solicitor General received his copy of that order, before the order became final. The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied, and its subsequent notice of appeal was likewise dismissed as late. Hence this petition, in which the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction without bond restraining Tan from representing himself as a Filipino citizen.

Facts

In July 1946, Antonio Tan filed a verified petition for naturalization, alleging among others that he was born in Manila in May 1933, that he had been employed since 1947 with an average annual income of at least six thousand pesos, and that he was married to Asuncion Lo without any child as yet. Attached to the petition were a joint affidavit of two character witnesses, a declaration of intention, and a native-born certificate of residence issued by the Acting Commissioner of Immigration.

On February 15, 1962, the case was called for its initial hearing. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal manifested in open court that his office had not yet received any written authority from the Solicitor General to appear, but before he could even move for a continuance, the trial court ruled that he had no personality to appear. The court then proceeded with the hearing ex parte, received the applicant's evidence, gave the Government's representative no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, and rendered judgment granting the petition on that same day.

After the trial court dismissed the Government's appeal, Tan moved in 1964 to calendar his oath taking. Over the opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal and the special counsel for Lucena City, the respondent judge allowed Tan to take his oath and directed the issuance of the certificate of naturalization. Tan took his oath before the respondent judge on the very day the Solicitor General received his copy of the order, before that order had become final. The Government's motion for reconsideration and its later notice of appeal were both denied or dismissed, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the naturalization proceedings were void for having been conducted ex parte, without giving the Government its day in court.
• Whether or not the failure to serve notice of the motion for oath taking upon the Solicitor General invalidated the oath taking and the certificate of naturalization.
• Whether or not Tan's having already taken his oath of allegiance cured the defects in the proceedings.
• Whether or not the Government's appeal was filed on time, considering that notice of the judgment must be served on the Solicitor General and not on the fiscal.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory text; it rests on settled jurisprudence and on the rules governing naturalization proceedings, which require that the Government be given notice and an opportunity to oppose. The controlling principle is that the Solicitor General is the counsel of record for the Republic in naturalization cases, so that all processes and notices must be served upon him. This principle bears on the case because the trial court disregarded it at every stage, from the initial hearing to the oath taking.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Government was indubitably denied its day in court. The trial court erred in disqualifying the fiscal and in ruling that no appearance was possible absent a formal written opposition. To sustain that ruling, the Court said, would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel. The Court declared that the grant of naturalization under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at any time, and that neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar to nullify the certificate so issued.

On the second issue, the Court held that the hearing prior to the oath taking was conducted without the required notice to the Solicitor General. The authority given to the fiscal to represent the Government at the hearing of the application did not extend to the hearing preparatory to the oath taking. Tan was therefore under legal obligation to serve his motion for oath taking upon the Solicitor General, and his failure to do so was not mere inadvertence but intentional, to prevent the State from opposing. The Court stressed that even if a fiscal appears authorized to represent the Solicitor General, the counsel of record for the Republic remains the Solicitor General, and all processes and notices should be served upon him.

On the third issue, the Court held that Tan's having already taken his oath did not legalize the proceedings, which were pregnant with legal infirmities. Compounding these irregularities was the fact that he was allowed to take his oath before the expiration of the thirty-day period within which an appeal may be made, making the oath not only highly improper but also illegal.

On the fourth issue, the Court found no necessity to dwell at length on the timeliness of the appeal, since the entire proceedings were void. But it expressly rejected the trial court's view that the Government's period of appeal had expired, holding that the period commences to run only from the time notice of the judgment or order is served upon the Solicitor General's Office and not upon the fiscal.

Doctrine

There is no such thing as citizenship by estoppel. A grant of naturalization obtained in proceedings where the Government was denied its day in court is illegal, and cancellation thereof may be had at any time; neither estoppel nor res judicata may bar the necessary proceedings to nullify the certificate. The Solicitor General is the counsel of record for the Republic in naturalization cases, and all processes and notices, including the motion for oath taking, must be served upon him; service upon the fiscal does not suffice. The period of appeal for the Government runs only from notice to the Solicitor General's Office, not to the fiscal. An oath of allegiance taken before the order allowing it becomes final, and before the expiration of the thirty-day appeal period, is illegal and does not cure the defects in the proceedings.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, declared the entire proceedings that led to the grant of citizenship to Antonio Tan null and void, and cancelled and declared null and void the certificate of naturalization issued to him together with the oath of allegiance he had taken.

Remember This

Memorize the line that there is no such thing as citizenship by estoppel, and that a naturalization granted without giving the Government its day in court is void and may be cancelled at any time. Examiners like to use this case on the consequences of an ex parte naturalization hearing, on the Solicitor General as counsel of record for the Republic, and on when the Government's period to appeal begins to run.