THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SAGLALA MACATANDA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Macatanda

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Saglala Macatanda, a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction for cattle rustling. The accused pleaded guilty in the trial court and was sentenced under Presidential Decree Number 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. He appealed directly to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law, asking that two circumstances be credited in his favor, lack of instruction and membership in a cultural minority, and disputing the trial court's computation of the penalty. The case matters because it settles two things a reviewee must carry into the examination room: that lack of instruction must be proved, not presumed from a guilty plea, and that the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law is not an entirely separate special law but is to be read with the Revised Penal Code, so that Article 64 on mitigating circumstances applies.

Procedural History

Saglala Macatanda was charged with cattle rustling in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch Four, sitting in Iligan City. He entered a plea of guilty, and the trial court convicted him, crediting in his favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, with no aggravating circumstance attendant, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The trial court imposed an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, credited his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, ordered the payment of 150 pesos to his counsel de oficio, and placed the costs against him. From that judgment the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising purely legal questions, so the appeal went up without any intermediate appellate court.

Facts

In the evening of December 25, 1976, the complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. The following morning he noticed that they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, the team leader of the constabulary home defense unit, and joined a posse composed of members of that unit and the barangay captain to search for the animals.

When the posse reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and the appellant in possession of the two carabaos. Surprised at being discovered, the four engaged the posse in a gun battle, and the appellant was wounded. His companions fled, leaving him and the carabaos behind.

The appellant was taken into custody and charged with cattle rustling. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. Because of that plea, no evidence was presented on his behalf, and the record contained nothing to show his degree of instruction or the circumstances of his life as a member of a cultural minority.

Issues

• Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction may be appreciated in favor of the appellant, who pleaded guilty and offered no evidence of his lack of instruction.
• Whether or not membership in a cultural minority, being a Moslem, is a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, or may be joined with lack of instruction to constitute the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction.
• Whether or not the trial court computed the proper penalty, that is, whether Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the penalty prescribed by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.

Applicable Provisions

Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court cites in holding that mere membership in a cultural minority is not among the mitigating circumstances, provides:

Mitigating circumstances are those which, if present in the commission of the deed, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty.

The Court uses this enumeration to show that membership in a cultural minority is not listed, and that it does not fall under the catch-all clause of paragraph 10 of Article 13, which speaks of any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.

Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, on theft of large cattle, is the offense the Court treats the decree as amending, and Article 104 of the same Code on the civil liability of the offender is the provision the Court says could not have been intended to be discarded by the decree. Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, on the rules for applying penalties when mitigating circumstances are present, is the provision the Court holds applicable, and it is the pivot of the ruling on the penalty.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended by Act Number 4225, is quoted by the Court through the Solicitor General, and it provides:

If the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

This fixes the floor and the ceiling of the indeterminate sentence once the penalty under the decree is determined.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court refused to appreciate lack of instruction. The case of United States versus Maqui could not be invoked as a precedent, because in that case the record showed that the offender was an uncivilized Igorot, while here, owing to the plea of guilty, the record disclosed no evidence to prove lack of instruction. The Court laid down the governing rule: all circumstances modifying criminal liability must be proved directly and positively. There being no evidence, there was no basis on which to judge the degree of the appellant's instruction.

On the second issue, the Court held that membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply an uncivilized or semi-civilized state of the offender, which was the circumstance that moved the Court in Maqui. Mere membership in a cultural minority is not expressly mentioned by the Revised Penal Code among the mitigating circumstances, nor does it come under the catch-all clause of Article 13. The Court also observed that the Maqui case was decided in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots had not advanced as it has in recent years, and that it can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in the country that he is uncivilized or semi-civilized. The stricter treatment provided by the decree for the crime charged, with a more severe penalty imposed, hardly justifies applying that law with leniency.

On the third issue, the Court disagreed with the Solicitor General that the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law is a special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed, which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, and not the penalties ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent is clear that the decree shall be deemed an amendment of the Revised Penal Code with respect to theft of large cattle, or otherwise subject to its applicable provisions, such as Article 104 on civil liability. Article 64 should likewise be applicable. Under that article, the presence of two mitigating circumstances, plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, entitles the appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which under the decree is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. For the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be one degree lower still, or arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, that is, from four months and one day of arresto mayor to four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum, and not less than four years, two months and one day of prision correccional nor more than ten years of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty imposed by the trial court was within the range as to its maximum, but beyond the range as to its minimum, which should be not more than four years and two months of prision correccional.

Doctrine

First, mitigating circumstances must be proved directly and positively; a plea of guilty leaves the record empty, and the court cannot appreciate lack of instruction on the strength of the plea alone. Second, mere membership in a cultural minority is not a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, and it does not fall under the catch-all clause of Article 13, because it does not per se imply an uncivilized or semi-civilized state. Third, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law is not an entirely separate special law; it is deemed an amendment of the Revised Penal Code on theft of large cattle, so Article 64 on mitigating circumstances and Article 104 on civil liability apply. Fourth, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same, with the minimum taken one degree lower where the rules on mitigating circumstances so require.

Disposition

The judgment appealed from was modified by reducing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to four years of prision correccional, maintaining the maximum at eight years of prision mayor as imposed by the lower court, and affirmed in all other respects.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that mitigating circumstances must be proved directly and positively, and that the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law is read together with the Revised Penal Code, so Article 64 applies. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of lack of instruction, the treatment of cultural minority membership, and the correct computation of the indeterminate sentence under a decree that borrows the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.