QUIRICO CONCEPCION, PETITIONER, VS. PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH V, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, E. GERMAR CRUZ, JR., DEPUTY PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, APOLO…

The instant special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition assails the Order of respondent judge issued in Civil Case No,
SM-243 entitled “Apolonio Ramos, Paulina Ramos, Felipe Hilario, Macario Ramos, Teodoro Ramos,
Albino Ramos and Hermogenes Hilario,
plaintiffs, versus Quirico Concepcion,
defendant,” for ejectment and damages, dated
July 3, 1972 denying petitioner’s Petition for Relief from Judgment for having
been filed out of time and the Order dated July 5, 1972 directing the issuance
of a writ of demolition of that portion of petitioner’s house standing on pri­vate
respondents’ property.  In the Resolution
of this Court adopted September 4, 1972, a temporary
restraining order was issued.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In January, 1969, a complaint for ejectment
and damages docketed as Civil Case No. SM-243 was filed by herein private
respondents against herein petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, at Sta. Maria, Bulacan.  In said
complaint, private respondents claimed ownership in fee simple of a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 2604-B covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-86595, located at Sitio Masuso,
Barrio Bunsuran, Municipality of Pandi,
Bulacan with an area of about 13,519 square meters,
more or less; that sometime in October, 1958, petitioner Quirico
Concepcion, in connivance with the spouses Irene
Ramos and Aurelio Agustin, forcibly took possession of said land claiming
ownership in themselves, thereby compelling private respondents to institute
Civil Case No. 1820 for the recovery of said land and during the pendency of said Civil Case No. 1820, Quirico
Concepcion was able to build a house of strong
materials within the disputed land, occupying an area of about 300 square
meters, more or less; that Civil Case No. 1820 was finally decided by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 27842-4 in favor of private respondents who thereupon
demanded that petitioner turn over possession of the property to them.  Petitioner, however, filed suit against
private respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relation (Fifth Regional District)
docketed as CAR Case No. 2032 claiming that he is an agricultural lessee of
private respondents, which was however later dismissed upon a finding that
there was no merit to petitioner’s claim.

By virtue of a writ of possession issued in Civil Case No. 1820,
private respondents were finally placed in possession of their land on January
29, 1969 but petitioner refused to give up possession
thereof nor to account for the palay harvested and
appropriated by him.  Private respondents,
therefore, prayed for the immediate demolition of petitioner’s house erected on
the land and for the latter and all persons claiming under him to vacate the
premises, among other reliefs.

Petitioner filed his Answer to the above complaint alleging that
he had been a tenant and agricultural lessee of the landholding since October,
1958 and that his house was erected prior to 1958 in the homelot
designated by the former legal possessors/landholders of the property and that
the Court (CFI) has no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of
the case which should be filed, settled and resolved in the Court of Agrarian
Relations.

Thereafter, the parties assisted by their respective counsel,
submitted the following Compromise Agreement dated December 18, 1969, to wit:

“COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT

I.     That the parties agree that the plaintiffs
(private respondents) are the owners of that parcel of land with an area of
about 13,519 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-86595;

II.    That the defendant (petitioner) will
continue to work on the land until December
31, 1971, not as a tenant, with the following conditions:

1.   That from the produce for the year 1969,
fifteen cavans shall be delivered to the plaintiffs
(private respondents) not later than January 1970;

2.   That from the produce for the year 1970,
fifteen cavans shall be delivered to the plaintiffs
(private respondents) not later than January 1971; and

3.   That from the produce for the year 1971,
fifteen cavans shall be delivered to the plaintiffs
(private respondents) not later than January 1972,

III.    That the defendant (petitioner) shall not
molest or in any way interfere with the plaintiffs (private respondents) in
their house built on the property in question, and the plaintiffs (private
respondents) shall be free to introduce improvements on portions of the land
not being tilled by the defendant (petitioner);

IV.   That the defendant (petitioner) shall deliver
possession of the property in question unto the plaintiffs (private
respondents) and vacate the premises not later than December 31, 1971; and

V.    That the parties waive their respective
claims without pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs.

Failure of the parties to comply with any of the terms and
conditions above set forth a shall entitle the
aggrieved party to an imme­diate execution.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered by
this Honorable Court based on and pursuant to the foregoing agreement.

Sta. Maria, Bulacan, December 18, 1969,

APOLONIO
RAMOS, ET AL, represented by APOLONIO RAMOS, Plaintiffs.

Assisted by:  Atty.
Esteban Manuel

 (Counsel for the Plaintiffs)

 7-A P. Pelaez St., Proj. 4,

 Quezon City

QUIRICO CONCEPCION, Defendant.

Assisted by:  Atty, Romerico Flores

 (Counsel for the Defendant)

 2nd Flr., Hernando Bldg,

 Malolos, Bulacan“

The lower court rendered its decision on the same date, December 18, 1969, quoting and
approving the fore­going agreement and ordering the parties to strictly comply
with its terms and conditions.

It further appears that the parties submitted a Supplementary
Agreement dated March 12, 1970 to the effect that the fifteen (15) cavans of palay for private
respondents shall be delivered “at the site of the landholding and each cavan to weigh forty-five (45) kilos.”

On April 15, 1972,
a writ of execution was issued commanding the Deputy Sheriff to cause
petitioner to vacate the premises covered by TCT No. T-86595
and to deliver possession thereof to private respondents.  On April 25, 1972, respondent Deputy Sheriff
E, Germar Cruz, Jr. wrote herein petitioner a letter
giving him ten (10) days from receipt thereof to remove all his personal
properties found within the said landholding and informing him that on May 8,
1972, private respondent Apolonio Ramos or his
representative would be placed in possession of the property.

On May 16, 1972,
petitioner filed with the same court and in the same case, through a new
counsel, a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Urgent Motion to Recall and/or To Quash Writ of Execution
and To Set Aside Judgment Approving the Compromise Agreement With
Substitution of Counsel.  In this
petition, petitioner contended, among others, that the decision of the lower
court dated December 18, 1969 was void ab initio as the same was based on a compromise
agreement which was contrary to law, public morals and public policy; that the
writ issued to execute said decision was vague, indefinite and not specific;
and that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the nature
and/or subject matter of the
action.  Private respondents filed an
Opposition arguing that the judgment of the court below sought to be vacated
had already been entered on December 18, 1969, hence had long become final and executory.

In an Order dated July 3,
1972, the lower court denied petitioner’s above-mentioned Petition
for Relief from Judgment for having been filed out of time.  Subsequently, another Order dated July 5, 1972 was issued by the court
below directing the issuance of a writ of demolition of that portion of
petitioner’s house standing on private respondents’ property.

Attributing grave abuse of discretion to the lower court in
issuing the aforesaid Orders, petitioner now come to Us
to set aside the same through the instant special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction.  By
Resolution dated September 4, 1972,
this Court authorized petitioner to litigate as a pauper and as indicated
earlier, directed the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

As required by Us, private respondents herein filed their Answer
to the petition and contended that the Compromise Agreement and Supplemental
Agreement were entered into after hearing on the merits following a pre-trial
order issued by the lower court containing admissions of facts by the parties
and admissions on the authenticity of the documents presented, and after the
presiding Judge and petitioner’s counsel in the court below had found that
there was no truth to petitioner’s claim of tenancy; that petitioner’s Petition
for Relief from Judgment was filed in the lower court out of time; that said
Petition was filed in bad faith for during the deliberations on the Compromise
Agreement in open court, private respondents were persuaded to waive their
claim over the produce of the land covering a 9-year period upon petitioner’s
undertaking to vacate the premises not later than December 31, 1971.

After the case had been considered submitted for decision,
petitioner filed a Motion dated March 17, 1973 to cite private respondents and
their counsel in contempt of court allegedly for having filed in the lower
court a motion seeking to implement and carry out the Compromise Agreement
subject of the instant certiorari proceedings, in defiance of the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court.  Ordered to comment on the foregoing Motion,
private respondents contended that the above restraining order merely enjoins
the implementation and enforcement of the (a) writ of execution which commanded
petitioner to vacate the premises in question, and the (b) order of demolition,
but does not prohibit private respondents from receiving palay
harvested from their own property; that it was petitioner himself who prompted
private respondents to take delivery of fifteen (15) cavans
of said palay from the 1972 harvests, but refused
delivery unless private respondents would sign a receipt that the palay was in payment of yearly rentals under a contract of
tenancy; and that private respondents’ right to receive a certain amount of palay harvested from their own land is not lost even if
petitioner were to succeed in obtaining a permanent restraining order from this
Tribunal.

The Court deferred action on petitioner’s above Motion for
contempt until the case is decided on the merits.

The principal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without
jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s Petition for Relief from Judgment for
having been filed out of time and in ordering the issuance of a writ of
demolition.

The pertinent provisions of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court
on “Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other
Proceedings” state as follows:

“Sec. 2.  Petition to Court of First
Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof.  – When a judgment or order is entered, or any
other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.

“Sec. 3. Time for filing petition;
contents and verification.  – A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order
or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense,
as the case may be.”

In the case of Quijano vs. Tameta, L-16473, April 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 997, We
said that:

“x x x The
remedy allowed by said rule to a party adversely affected by the decision is
merely an act of grace or benevolence intended to afford the litigant a
penultimate opportunity to protect his interest.  Considering the nature of such relief and the
purpose behind it, the period fixed by said rule is non-extendible and is never
interrupted; nor can it be subject to any condition or contingency because it
is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency.”

In the more recent case of Turqueza
vs. Hernando, L-51626, April 30,
1980, 97 SCRA 483, the Supreme Court also held that:

“There is no justification in law and in fact for respondent
judge’s void act of ordering the reopening of the case which has long become
final and which has in fact been executed. 
It is settled that once a decision becomes final and executory,
it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to
further alter or amend, much less revoke it. 
As the Court stated in the case
of Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, ‘Reasons of public
policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of
litigants as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability
be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of
competent jurisdiction.’

x x x

“The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of
finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of
courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law.  The law gives an exception or ‘last chance’
of a timely petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary
period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment)
under Rule 38, supra, but such grace period must be taken as ‘absolutely fixed,
inextendible, never interrupted and cannot be
subjected to any condition or contingency. 
Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or
contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable
remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party
another and last chance’ and failure to avail of such last chance within the
grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal.”

The rule, therefore, is
that in order for a petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be entertained
by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully
and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38.  Consequently, in assailing the lower court’s
dismissal of his petition for relief for having been filed out of time, it is
incumbent upon herein petitioner to show that the said petition was filed
within the reglementary period specified in Section
3, Rule 38.  He has failed to do so,
instead he argues on the merits of his petition for relief, without first
showing that the same was filed on time in the court below.  On this ground alone, the instant case should
be dismissed.

Moreover, We agree with respondent trial court that the petition for
relief was filed late.  We note that the
decision sought to be set aside was rendered on December 18, 1969, on the day itself that the parties submitted
their compromise agreement.  On the other
hand, petitioner filed his petition for relief on May 16, 1972.  This Court has held that a judgment approving a compromise agreement which
contains nothing that would require subsequent court approval “right then
and there writes finis to a controversy”, and the period to file the
petition for relief from said judgment commences to run from the date
the decision was rendered.  (Dirige vs. Biranya,
L-22033, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 840, 850; Bodiongan vs, Hon, Ceniza, etc., et al.,
102 Phil. 750, 755-756).  Clearly,
the petition for relief in the case at bar was filed more than two (2) years
after the decision sought to be set aside, therefore, beyond the period allowed
by Section 3, Rule 38.  As in previous cases,
this Court holds and so rules that the instant petition filed after the lapse
of the reglementary period cannot be
entertained.  (See Villeza
vs. Almedo, 1 SCRA 761, 762; Quijano
vs. Tameta, 1 SCRA 997, 998; Prospero vs, Robles, et al., 8 SCRA 189, 192; J.M, Tuason & Co., Inc. Aguila, 9
SCRA 537, 539; Dirige vs, Biranya, supra, p. 851; Daran
vs. Angco, 20 SCRA 1127, 1129; Radiowealth
Trading Corporation vs. Abastillas, 33 SCRA 93, 98; Turqueza vs. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, 489).

Nor did petitioner comply with the requirement of Rule 38 to
support his petition for relief with an affidavit of merit showing the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
his good and meritorious defense.  Such
noncompliance has been declared by this Court as a ground for denial of a
petition for relief.  (Quijano vs. Tameta, supra;
J.M. Tuason & Co., etc. vs. Baloy,
8 SCRA 72, 73; Prospero vs. Robles, et al., supra; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De la Rosa, 18 SCRA 591,
594-595).

Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief, petitioner’s
main contention is that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of Civil Case No. SM-243 and
therefore, its decision dated December
18, 1969, as well as the writ of execution dated April 15, 1972 and the order of
demolition dated July 5, 1972
issued to implement said decision, were all null and void.  According to petitioner, the case involves an
agrarian dispute and an established tenancy relationship between the parties, hence, it should fall squarely within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR).

The contention is without merit. 
It cannot be controverted that the allegations
of the Complaint filed by herein private respondents in the court below (Civil
Case No. SM-243) constitute a cause of action for ejectment
and damages against petitioner.  Private
respondents, as complainants therein, claimed ownership over the parcel of land
in question identified as Lot No. 2604-B but which was allegedly in the
possession of petitioner who had been unlawfully depriving them of their right
to possess the property for several years. 
In other words, they filed an accion publiciana, a plenary action for the recovery of
possession of real property, properly cognizable by the court of first
instance.  See Firmeza
vs. David, 92 Phil. 733, 735; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil, 643, 648; Cunanan vs. CA and Basaran, 25
SCRA 263, 268).  The Court does not lose
nor is it deprived of its jurisdiction by a de­fense of tenancy but has the
authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it
has jurisdiction (Evangelista vs. CAR Iloilo, et al., 109 Phil. 957).

Thus, in the case at bar, petitioner’s defense of tenancy in his
Answer to private respondents’ complaint did not automatically divest the lower
court, a court of first instance, of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. SM-243.  It merely gave the court authority to receive
evidence to determine the tenability of the claim of tenancy.  A hearing on the issue of tenancy, however,
became unnecessary in view of their Compromise Agreement dated December 18, 1969, up to which time
the lower court still had jurisdiction over the case.  And finding nothing contrary to law, public
morals or public policy in said agreement, the court correctly approved the
same and rendered judgment on the basis thereof.  A judgment rendered upon a compromise
“is in the nature of a contract and is in effect an admission by the
parties that the judgment is a just determination of their rights on the facts
of the case, had they been proved,” and it has upon the parties “the
effect and authority of res judicata.” (Serrano vs. Miave,
et al., L-14678, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 461,
466.  See also Araneta
vs. Perez, 7 SCRA 923, 924; Ramos vs. Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc. and Ferrer, 79 SCRA 170,
174- 175).

For the reasons stated above, the Order of the lower court dated July 3, 1972 denying herein
petitioner’s Petition for Relief as well as the Order dated July 5, 1972 directing the issuance of
a writ of demolition, should be, as they are, hereby affirmed.  In view hereof, petitioner’s Motion dated March 17, 1973 to declare private
respondents and their counsel in contempt of court need not be passed upon.

WHEREFORE, the instant special civil action is hereby
DISMISSED.  Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar,
(Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.