LEONARDO AVILA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.

Avila versus Auditor General

The Case

This is the case of Avila versus the Auditor General, decided by the Supreme Court in July 1974. Leonardo Avila, a provincial treasurer, sought back salaries for the period he had been preventively suspended from office. His suspension arose from a criminal charge of malversation of public funds, and it was accompanied by an administrative finding that he was guilty of gross negligence. The case matters for two reasons. First, it settles that a public officer found administratively guilty of gross negligence cannot collect back salaries merely because the criminal case against him was later dismissed. Second, and more importantly for procedure, it fixes the rule that a public official cannot appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the Auditor General; only a private party or entity may do so, and everyone else must go to the President.

Procedural History

The case began as an appeal by Avila from an adverse decision of the respondent Auditor General. Avila filed his petition before the Supreme Court on October 25, 1973. The Solicitor General was asked to comment, and he did. Avila was then allowed to file a reply, which he submitted in January 1974. In a resolution dated January 28, 1974, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Avila filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Solicitor General again refuted, and the Court denied it for lack of merit. Avila then filed a second and a third motion for reconsideration, raising procedural points. It was this third motion for reconsideration that the Supreme Court resolved in the decision before us, denying it with finality.

Facts

Leonardo Avila was a provincial treasurer. A criminal case for malversation of public funds was filed against him, and as a result he was preventively suspended from office. Separately, in an administrative proceeding, he was found guilty of gross negligence.

The criminal prosecution dragged on for twenty-one years. It eventually ended, not in an acquittal, but in a dismissal. The dismissal was caused primarily by the death, on August 19, 1964, of the principal witness for the prosecution, the Provincial Auditor.

Avila then claimed back salaries covering the entire period of his suspension. The Auditor General ruled against him, and Avila brought the matter to the Supreme Court, insisting that he was entitled to appeal directly to the Court and that the dismissal of the criminal case entitled him to his salaries.

Issues

• Whether or not a provincial officer, here a Provincial Treasurer, who was preventively suspended from office as a result of a criminal case for malversation of public funds, and who was found administratively guilty of gross negligence, is entitled to back salaries covering the period of his suspension when the criminal prosecution was thereafter dismissed after twenty-one years.
• Whether or not a public official may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the Auditor General.
• Whether or not a petition may be dismissed by a mere minute resolution of the Supreme Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Article Eleven of the 1935 Constitution, as implemented by Commonwealth Act Number 327, governs appeals from the rulings of the Auditor General. The Court, through Justice Teehankee in the earlier Buendia case, described it thus:

Petitioners' appeals at bar from the adverse ruling of the Auditor General, having been filed on March 1, 1971 and September 7, 1971, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the 1935 Constitution (section 3, Article XI) and by the implementing Act, Commonwealth Act No. 327, whereunder only a 'private party or entity' may appeal from the Auditor-General's decision directly to the Supreme Court; otherwise the appeal should be taken to the President, whose action shall be final.

This provision bears directly on the case because Avila is a public official, not a private party or entity, so his direct appeal to the Supreme Court was improper.

Section 9 of Article Ten of the Constitution recognizes the practice of deciding petitions by minute resolution. The Court quoted its last sentence:

The Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of minute resolutions.

This provision bears on Avila's claim that his petition could not be dismissed by a mere resolution, showing that the Constitution itself allows the practice.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Avila was not entitled to back salaries. There was no acquittal; there was a dismissal caused primarily by the death of the principal witness for the prosecution, the Provincial Auditor. Avila himself admitted that there was a previous administrative decision finding him guilty of gross negligence. On these facts, his claim for back salaries covering the period of suspension could not prosper.

On the second issue, the Court held that Avila had no right to appeal directly to the Supreme Court. As far back as June 1973, in Philnabank versus Auditor General, the Court had ruled that only a private party or entity, not a public official, can appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the Auditor General. The Court reiterated the doctrine in Buendia versus City of Baguio, quoting the passage set out above: only a private party or entity may appeal directly to the Supreme Court; otherwise the appeal should be taken to the President, whose action shall be final.

On the third issue, the Court held that a petition may indeed be dismissed by a mere resolution. This is a well-settled principle going back to Soncuya versus National Law Investment Board. What is more, the Constitutional Convention expressly recognized the practice when it incorporated into the Constitution the sentence on minute resolutions quoted above. A minute resolution would thus have sufficed for the denial of the third motion for reconsideration.

Doctrine

Three rules must be retained. First, a public officer who is preventively suspended because of a criminal charge, and who is found administratively guilty of gross negligence, is not entitled to back salaries for the period of suspension merely because the criminal case is later dismissed, especially where the dismissal is not an acquittal but is caused by the death of the principal prosecution witness. Second, only a private party or entity may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the Auditor General; a public official must appeal to the President, whose action is final, as Section 3 of Article Eleven of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act Number 327 provide. Third, the Supreme Court may dispose of petitions by minute resolution, a practice expressly recognized by Section 9 of Article Ten of the Constitution.

Disposition

The third motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, so the Auditor General prevailed and Avila obtained no back salaries.

Remember This

Memorize this line: only a private party or entity may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the Auditor General; a public official must go to the President. Examiners use this case in administrative law and in procedure, to test the rule on appeals from the Auditor General and the validity of minute resolutions.