SPOUSES CESAR AND TERESITA PANTALEON, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. LORENZO MONTEVERDE, HON. JUAN BERMEJO JR. PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, AND SHERIFF LARRY…
BALTAZAR-PADILLA, J.:
As gathered from the records, the factual antecedents are as follows:
Cesar and Teresita Pantaleon (appellants-spouses for brevity) are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at 1230 Mindoro Street, Paco, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234192. In January, 2000, appellants-spouses Pantaleon obtained a loan from herein appellee Lorenzo Monteverde (appellee for brevity) in the amount of P480,000.00 payable on or before December 31, 2000. As a security for the said loan, appellants-spouses allegedly executed a blank Deed of Absolute Sale[3] over the disputed property in favor of appellee.
On July 5, 2001, appellee filed a complaint[4] for collection of sum of money against appellants-spouses for the latter’s failure to pay their obligation. However, the said complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the required prior barangay conciliation proceeding. Thereafter, the questioned property was transferred to and registered in the name of appellee under TCT No. 256177[5]. Consequently, on October 21, 2002, appellee through his counsel, made a demand letter[6] to appellants-spouses requesting them to vacate the subject property until July 30, 2002 and that should they fail to vacate the said lot on the aforesaid date, they have to pay a reasonable amount of P5,000.00 a month starting August 1, 2002. Nonetheless, appellants-spouses did not vacate the property in question despite the demand.
On March 31, 2003, appellee instituted an ejectment case against appellants-spouses docketed as Civil Case No. 174961. It was raffled off to Branch 3, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. On June 28, 2004, the said court ruled in favor of appellee. It ordered appellants-spouses to vacate the disputed lot and to surrender the possession thereof to appellee. Likewise, appellants-spouses were ordered to pay appellee the monthly sum of P5,000.00 from the time of the filing of the complaint until they vacate the subject lot, and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.[7]
Thereafter, a complaint for falsification of public document was lodged by appellants-spouses against appellee before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The complaint avers that appellee supposedly forged spouses-appellants’ signatures in the Certification[8] dated May 27, 1999 which declared that appellants-spouses signed in favor of appellee a deed of absolute sale. A Resolution[9] dated February 16, 2005 was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila holding that no probable cause was found to warrant the indictment of appellee for the offense charged.
Subsequently, the instant case was lodged by appellants-spouses against appellee before the Regional Trial Court of Manila and was later on assigned to Branch 14. In the meanwhile, a writ of execution[10] and notice to pay and vacate[11] were issued against appellants-spouses on April 29, 2005 and May 27, 2005, respectively, by Branch 3, MeTC, Manila involving the ejectment case between the parties. Consequently, appellants-spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion to issue temporary restraining order before the court a quo to maintain the status quo and to restrain the implementation of the aforesaid writ of execution. In an Order dated June 1, 2005, the RTC granted the motion and accordingly directed appellee, the Presiding Judge of Branch 3, MeTC, Manila and the latter court’s sheriff, Larry Salumbides to cease and desist from enforcing the writ of execution and the notice to pay and to vacate for a period of 20 days. A writ of preliminary injunction was later granted in an Order dated June 23, 2005.
Barely two months after the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to settle this case.[12] However, the trial court in an Order[13] dated November 29, 2011 dismissed the extant complaint without prejudice for the failure of the parties to submit a compromise agreement. A motion for reconsideration[14] of the above-mentioned Order was then filed by appellants-spouses. Accordingly, the trial court set aside its November 29, 2011 Order and directed the presentation of appellants-spouses’ evidence on April 17, 2012.[15] At the said scheduled hearing, appellants-spouses’ counsel requested to reset the trial to June 7, 2012. On the latter date, appellants-spouses again failed to present their evidence. Thus, the RTC issued an Order on even date dismissing this case due to the repeated failure of appellants-spouses to adduce their evidence. The relevant portions of the aforementioned June 7, 2012 Order states, viz:
“x x x x
Counsel for defendants moved that the case be dismissed due to the repeated failure of plaintiff[s] to adduce their evidence.
Taking into consideration the oral arguments of said counsel for the defendants, the comment of the counsel for the plaintiff[s], and the explanation given by co-plaintiff herself Teresita Pantaloon (sic), it is the view of the Court that the said motion is impressed with merit.
It is the sense of the Court that the plaintiffs have been given sufficient opportunity to present their evidence and/or to offer a reasonable compromise. It is likewise the sense of the Court that the suggested compromise involving an alleged sale of land in Bulacan has very little prospect of coming to fruition. Even before the first dismissal of this case in November 2011, there was already ample opportunity given to the plaintiffs to settle the case or to adduce their evidence.
In the interest of justice and in the exercise of sound discretion, and for the reasons stated therein, the above-captioned case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.”
A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted Order was filed by appellants-spouses. An opposition thereof was thereafter filed by appellee. The lower court issued an Order[16] dated August 2, 2012 denying the motion for reconsideration and ruled that the failure of appellants-spouses to adduce evidence leads to the conclusion that they either purposely delay the resolution of this case or they have no substantial evidence to prove their cause of action.
Hence, appellants-spouses Pantaleon elevated this case before US via the extant appeal wherein they raise this lone issue:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF DEED OF SALE AND TCT NO. 256177 FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE IN VIEW OF THEIR ALLEGED NON-PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE.
Appellants-spouses aver that there is no truth to appellee’s claim that they did not actively participate in the trial of the instant case. They prosecuted their action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch since the filing of the complaint. They did not manifest any pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the present case. Neither did they wantonly fail to observe the mandatory requirements of the rules. They have the sincere desire to settle this case amicably as demonstrated by their efforts to raise money in buying back the subject lot when they obtained a loan from PAG-IBIG. Thus, the trial court manifestly erred when it dismissed this case on the ground of their failure to comply with its orders to present their evidence.[17]
Appellants-spouses further maintain that the pre-trial of this case had already been conducted wherein the parties marked their respective exhibits. Therefore, the extreme sanction of dismissal is not warranted as no substantial prejudice is caused to appellee. The ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved in the instant case are threshed out in a full-blown trial.[18]
Appellants-spouses likewise avow that they obtained the loan from appellee in January, 2000. Initially, the same was secured by a deed of sale involving the disputed property with only the signatures of appellants-spouses appearing therein. They also had an agreement that should appellants-spouses fail to pay their obligation on or before December 31, 2000, appellee is free to register the aforesaid deed. Later on, however, another deed of absolute sale dated July 19, 2002 was executed by appellee which has the same contents as the first one. This clearly means that when the latter deed was made and notarized, the signatures of appellants-spouses were forged making it a spurious document. Consequently, TCT No. 256177 which was issued under appellee’s name by virtue of the second deed of absolute sale is necessarily fraudulent as well.[19]
The certification which they supposedly signed as an acknowledgment of the purported sale of the contested lot to appellee was made on May 27, 1999 but the deed of absolute sale involving the same subject property was executed only on July 19, 2002. The interval of time upon which these two documents were executed warrants a suspicion as to their authenticity. What they really executed is merely a real estate mortgage. In fact, in the June 23, 2005 Order of the trial court which granted appellants-spouses’ application for writ of preliminary injunction, the RTC considered the pertinent deed as an equitable mortgage since appellants-spouses remain in possession of the disputed lot and they still pay its real property tax. Inasmuch as the parties truly intended the same to be just a mortgage, appellee’s automatic registration of the said deed upon failure of appellants-spouses to pay their loan obligation is tantamount to pactum commissorium which is prohibited under the Civil Code. Therefore, TCT No. 256177 which sprung from a void deed of sale is likewise a nullity.[20]
Appellee, on the other hand, asseverates that since the Court of Appeals is not a trier of facts, it cannot determine whether appellants-spouses can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set forth in Rule 3, Section 21 of the Rules of Court. Records disclose that when appellants-spouses appealed the extant case before this Court, they were represented by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) Special and Appealed Cases Service. Later, the appellate court granted the PAO’s manifestation/motion for withdrawal of appearance as counsel for appellants-spouses since the latter opted to just represent themselves. However, it turned out that appellants-spouses who filed their Brief with motion to litigate as pauper litigants were actually represented by a private counsel but did not disclose the counsel’s identity and merely made themselves the signatories of their Brief. Appellants-spouses’ claim that they are pauper litigants, and therefore should be exempted to pay the docket and other legal fees relative to the filing of pleadings with this Court, is highly questionable.[21]
Appellee also argues that the dismissal of the extant case for appellants-spouses’ failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time is proper. Appellants-spouses had been given numerous chances by the court a quo to present their evidence-in-chief but they failed to do so. It is a settled rule that the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in the complaint. Hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendant. Likewise, the burden to show that there are compelling reasons that would make the dismissal of the case unjustified is on the plaintiff. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply with the rules. Appellants-spouses failed to show that there are persuasive reasons for the procedural rules to be relaxed in their favor.[22]
The appeal lacks merit.
WE find that the dismissal of the extant case by the lower court is warranted under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court. The said provision reads:
“SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.”
As can be gleaned from the records and the pronouncements of the court a quo in its August 2, 2012 Order, the following were the events that took place in their chronological order prior to the dismissal of this case, to wit: 1) The complaint was filed as early as June 15, 2005 and until the dismissal of this case, appellants-spouses have yet to present their evidence-in-chief; 2) The extant case was re-raffled to Branch 49, RTC, Manila under Judge Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara since Judge Cesar Solis of Branch 14, RTC, Manila, who originally tried this case, had inhibited as per the motion for inhibition filed by appellants-spouses[23]; 3) Pending the trial of this case, appellants-spouses instituted an administrative case for gross misconduct before the Office of the Bar Confidant against Atty. Oliver C. Ong, appellee’s counsel[24]; 4) Appellants-spouses’ counsel, Atty. Ramon Contawi, failed to appear four (4) times sans any explanation for his absence at the scheduled hearings for pre-trial set on December 9, 2009[25], January 27, 2010[26], February 23, 2010[27] and March 3, 2010[28]; 5) On June 15, 2011, appellants-spouses filed a motion to reset and/or additional period of time to submit compromise agreement for the reason that they have not yet produced the amount needed to settle this case and that their son Michael had already applied for a loan with PAG-IBIG the proceeds of which would also be utilized to settle this case[29]; 6) At the next scheduled hearing on September 7, 2011, appellants-spouses once again were given more time to raise the money required to settle the extant case and to submit a compromise agreement on November 29, 2011, with a warning that should they fail to present evidence on the said date, the court a quo would dismiss this case for failure to prosecute[30]; 7) On November 29, 2011, the parties still failed to come up with a compromise agreement, thus, an Order dismissing the present case without prejudice was made by the trial court[31]; 8) Upon appellants-spouses’ Motion, the RTC in an Order dated February 21, 2012 set aside the aforesaid Order and fixed the hearing for presentation of appellants-spouses’ evidence on April 17, 2012[32]; 9) On the latter date, appellants-spouses still were not able to present their evidence and prayed for the re-setting to June 7, 2012 over the objection of appellee’s counsel[33]; 10) Consequently, the instant case was dismissed on June 7, 2012 due to the repeated failure of appellants-spouses to adduce their evidence despite of the ample opportunity accorded to them by the court a quo[34].
All of these developments point to appellants-spouses’ failure to submit to the trial court a concrete compromise of the case with appellee or adduce evidence on the main case within a reasonable period of time. To the mind of the Court, there was lack luster effort on the part of appellants-spouses to really come-up with a just and fair compromise of the case considering the pendency of the case since June 15, 2005 and the warning given by the trial court that if the parties would fail to submit a compromise agreement on November 29, 2011, the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Obviously, appellants-spouses took the court’s warning lightly. Thus, on November 29, 2011, still no compromise agreement was filed with the said court. True to its warning, the lower court dismissed the case on the said date. Even then, it later set aside its order of dismissal upon appellants-spouses’ plea to give them the chance to present evidence on their complaint. The case was again set on April 17, 2012. The chance given was not taken seriously by appellants-spouses as they were not able to present any evidence on the said date. The trial court gave them another opportunity resetting the trial to June 7, 2012. The said chance was once again blown away by appellants-spouses. Notably, no valid and justifiable reason was given by appellants-spouses for their repeated and continued failure to submit evidence in their favor.
Jurisprudence is rich on the pronouncement that the speedy disposition of cases will spare litigants and their witnesses the anxieties, tribulations and expenses of a protracted or prolonged litigation. The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain, from the court, the relief prayed for in his complaint; hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendants. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure.[35]
Appellants-spouses attempt to attribute part of the blame to the unavailability of their counsel on the scheduled hearing on June 7, 2012. In their motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, they argued that their counsel was purportedly attending to an equally important case on the same date. WE find this explanation self-serving, if not flimsy, which will not justify the setting aside of the aforesaid order of dismissal. Incidentally, a lawyer should arrange his court appearances and adopt a system that takes into account the pleadings to be filed within the period therefor. His failure to do so constitutes negligence. It is elementary that a client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel.[36] Furthermore, almost seven (7) years have lapsed from the filing of the complaint in June 2005 while the order of dismissal was rendered only on June 7, 2012. Appellants-spouses’ failure to present their evidence-in-chief for an unreasonable length of time leads to no other conclusion than that they no longer have any interest in seeing this case terminated at the earliest possible time or that their allegations were not really meritorious or unsupported by concrete evidence. The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and where, as here, appellants-spouses are guilty with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude in the prosecution of the instant case, and absent grave abuse on the part of the court a quo, the dismissal must perforce be upheld.[37]
Even assuming argumentatis that WE delve into the merits of this case, the extant appeal just the same must fail.
Appellants-spouses exhort US to nullify the supposed fraudulent deed of absolute sale involving the questioned property since what they executed was a real estate mortgage which served as a security for the loan that they obtained from appellee.
WE do not agree.
WE emphasize that this Court will not resolve the factual issues raised by appellants-spouses. WE have no means to ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts.[38] As WE have expostulated earlier, appellants-spouses’ failure to present their evidence-in-chief makes their claims patently baseless. They are merely self-serving statements which are bereft of any evidentiary value. Basic is the rule that the one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[39] WE now remind appellants-spouses that here, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. Therefore, appellants-spouses as plaintiffs below are not automatically entitled to the reliefs prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.[40]
Having thus concluded, there is no need for US to discuss the other issues raised by appellants-spouses.
All told, this Court finds and so holds that the RTC committed no reversible error in rendering the challenged twin Orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The impugned June 7, 2012 Order and the August 2, 2012 Order are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Tijam, N. G., Chairperson and Sorongon, E.D., JJ., concur.
[*] Judge Juan Bermejo, Jr. of Branch 3, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and Sheriff Larry Salumbides are not parties in the extant case. Their names were inadvertently included in the Appellants’ Brief.
[**] Vice J. Agnes Reyes Carpio, per Office Order No. 200-14-ABR, dated May 9, 2014.
[1] Records at 384.
[2] Records at 407-410.
[3] Records at 42-43.
[4] Records at 44-46.
[5] Records at 210.
[6] Records at 52.
[7] Records at 48-51.
[8] Records at 200.
[9] Records at 227-228.
[10] Records at 65-66.
[11] Records at 225.
[12] Records at 345. Order dated October 6, 2010.
[13] Records at 362-363.
[14] Records at 365-366.
[15] Records at 379-380.
[16] Records at 407-410.
[17] Rollo at 45-46. Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
[18] Rollo at 45-47. Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
[19] Rollo at 48-49. Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
[20] Rollo at49-50. Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
[21] Rollo at 94-95. Brief for Defendant-Appellee.
[22] Rollo at 96-101. Brief for Defendant-Appellee.
[23] Records at 169-170. Order dated October 3, 2005.
[24] Records at 396-404.
[25] Records at 303. Order dated December 9, 2009.
[26] Records at 305. Order dated January 27, 2010.
[27] Records at 307. Order dated February 23, 2010.
[28] Records at 309. Order dated March 3, 2010.
[29] Records at 355-356.
[30] Records at 360. Order dated September 7, 2011.
[31] Records at 362. Order dated November 29, 2011.
[32] Records at 379-380. Order dated February 21, 2012.
[33] Records at 382. Order dated April 17, 2012.
[34] Records at 384. Order dated June 7, 2012.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Baylon vs. Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau Represented by Director Agapito Rosales and the Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 150870, December 11, 2002.
[37] See 3A Apparel Corporation et al. vs. Metrobank et al., G.R. No. 186175, August 25, 2010.
[38] See People et al. vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, October 7, 2003.
[39] Felicitas Amor-Catalan vs. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007.
[40] See Atienza vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006.